Clark v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
ORDER on Attorney Fees in favor of Wesley Clark against Social Security Administration Commissioner in the amount of $3,277.20. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. Further, any EAJA award by this Court should be made payable to plaintiff and not counsel; and granting 17 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Honorable James R. Marschewski on August 7, 2013. (lw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
Civil No. 2:12-cv-02248-JRM
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of
Social Security Administration1
ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Plaintiff, Wesley Clark, appealed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits to this court.
ECF No. 1. On March 4, 2013, judgment was entered remanding Plaintiff’s case to the
Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 16. Plaintiff now
moves for a total of $3,277.20 in attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), requesting compensation for 17.80 attorney hours at an hourly
rate of $174.00 and 3.60 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $50.00. ECF Nos. 17-18. The
Commissioner filed a timely response, stating no objections. ECF No. 19.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney’s fees to a
prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner’s position in denying benefits was
substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for
the government’s denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After
reviewing the case, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under
On February 14, 2013, Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin has been substituted for
Commissioner Michael J. Astrue as the defendant in this suit.
Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentencefour judgment reversing the Commissioner’s denial of benefits and remanding the case for
further proceedings is a prevailing party.
An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion
of the case, Plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)
was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,
535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99
Stat. 186 (1985).
To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary
standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a
claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or
her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.
Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under
both acts facilitates the purpose of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the prevailing
party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action. Id. See
also Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).
The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit “an itemized
statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were
computed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting
statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with “contemporaneous time
records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of
the work.” Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
In determining a reasonable attorney’s fee, the court will in each case consider the
following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required
to handle the problems presented; the attorney’s experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits
resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency
or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,
588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). The district court is “in the best position to evaluate
counsel’s services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe
firsthand counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim.” Hickey v.
Secretary of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359,
361 (8th Cir. 1989)). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request,
even in the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456,
459 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires
an accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.”).
The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,
amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to
$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). Attorney’s fees may not be awarded in
excess of $125.00 per hour, the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A), unless the court
finds that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of
qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase
the hourly rate is not automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v.
Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990),
the court stated that the hourly rate may be increased when there is “uncontested proof of an
increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly attorney’s fees of more than $75.00 an
hour,” such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”).
In this instance, counsel requests attorney’s fees at an hourly rate of $174.00 for work
performed in 2012 and 2013. ECF No. 17, Exs. 1-2. Counsel presented a link to the CPI as
evidence that this rate is a proper reflection of the cost of living. ECF No. 18, at 2-3. Counsel’s
requested rate is consistent with Amended General Order 39, which sets forth the maximum
hourly rate for EAJA fees in the Western District of Arkansas. Accordingly, the undersigned
finds that counsel is entitled to an hourly rate of $174.00 for work performed in 2012 and 2013.
The undersigned next addresses the number of hours Plaintiff’s counsel claims he spent
working on this case. Counsel requests a total of 17.80 attorney hours for work performed in
2012 and 2013. ECF No. 17, Ex. 1. The undersigned finds that counsel’s requested time is
reasonable and will award the full 17.80 hours. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff
is entitled to 17.80 attorney hours at an hourly rate of $174.00.
Counsel also requests compensation for 3.60 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $50.00.
ECF No. 17, Ex. 2. A prevailing party that satisfies EAJA's other requirements may recover
paralegal fees at prevailing market rates. Richlin Sec. Service Co. v. Chertoff, 128 S.Ct. 2007,
2019 (U.S. 2008). Plaintiff’s counsel cited to Stockton v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 49 (8th Cir. 1994),
as evidence that this hourly rate is appropriate for paralegal work. ECF No. 18, at 3. The
undersigned finds $50.00 per hour for paralegal work to be reasonable, and the Commissioner
does not object to this rate. The undersigned also finds the requested time to be reasonable and
will award the full 3.60 paralegal hours. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that counsel is
entitled to 3.60 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $50.00.
Based on the above, the undersigned awards Plaintiff fees under the EAJA for 17.80
attorney hours at an hourly rate of $174.00 and 3.60 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $50.00,
for a total attorney's fee award of $3,277.20. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not
out of, any past due benefits which Plaintiff may be awarded in the future. Further, this award
should be made payable directly to Plaintiff, but may be properly mailed to Plaintiff’s attorney.2
The parties are reminded that the award under the EAJA will be taken into account at such time
as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent double
recovery by counsel for the Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of August 2013.
/s/ J. Marschewski
HONORABLE JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On June 14, 2010, the Supreme Court overturned Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 2008),
and held that an EAJA fee award is payable to the prevailing litigant, not the prevailing litigant’s attorney.
Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521, 2252-2253 (2010). Therefore, any EAJA fee awarded by this court should be
payable directly to Plaintiff, but may be properly mailed to Plaintiff’s attorney.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?