Weifenbach v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on January 29, 2014. (lw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
MARTI RENE WEIFENBACH
Civil No. 2:13-cv-02011
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Marti Rene Weifenbach (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his application
for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), and a period of
disability under Titles II and XVI of the Act. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a
magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial,
ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 6.1
Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final
judgment in this matter.
Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI on October 8, 2010. (Tr. 8, 117130). Plaintiff alleged he was disabled due to three back surgeries, chronic pancreatitis, and use of
a feeding tube. (Tr. 176). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of March 9, 2010 which was later amended
to December 16, 2009.
(Tr. 8). These applications were denied initially and again upon
The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ____” The transcript pages for
this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”
reconsideration. (Tr. 58-64, 69-73). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on his
applications and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 74).
Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on December 13, 2011. (Tr. 22-49). Plaintiff was
present and was represented by counsel, Cory Rush, at this hearing. Id. At the time of this hearing,
Plaintiff was forty-seven (47) years old, which is defined as a “younger person” under 20 C.F.R. §
404.1563(c), had graduated high school and attended some college. (Tr. 25, 28). On January 13,
2012, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s application for DIB and SSI. (Tr.
8-16). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act
through December 31, 2013. (Tr. 10, Finding 1). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had not
engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since December 16, 2009. (Tr. 10, Finding 2).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the severe impairments of disorders of the back and
pancreatitis. (Tr. 10, Finding 3). The ALJ then determined Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or
medically equal the requirements of any of the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P
of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 11, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his RFC.
(Tr. 12-14). First, the ALJ indicated he evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found his
claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained
the RFC to lift or carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; sit for 6 hours
during an 8-hour workday; stand or walk for 2 hours during an 8-hour workday; occasionally climb,
balance, crawl, kneel, stoop, and crouch; and must avoid hazards including work at unprotected
heights and around dangerous moving machinery. (Tr. 12, Finding 5). The ALJ also found Plaintiff
was able to understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine, repetitive work; respond
appropriately to usual work situations; and interact appropriately with supervisors, co-workers, and
the general public. Id.
The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 14, Finding 6). The
ALJ found Plaintiff unable to perform his PRW as a deliveryman, route salesman, insurance
salesman, and office manager. Id. The ALJ, however, also determined there was other work existing
in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 15, Finding 10). The
ALJ based his determination upon the testimony of the VE. Id. Specifically, the VE testified that
given all Plaintiff’s vocational factors, a hypothetical individual would be able to perform the
requirements of a representative occupation such as an assembler with approximately 365 such jobs
in the region and 49,700 such jobs in the nation, machine tender with approximately 250 such jobs
in the region and 19,200 such jobs in the nation, and surveillance system monitor with approximately
75 such jobs in the region and 7,800 such jobs in the nation. Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined by the Act since December 16, 2009.
(Tr. 16, Finding 11).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s unfavorable decision.
(Tr. 114). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.968. The Appeals Council declined to review this unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 1-3). On January 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The Parties
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on February 6, 2013. ECF No. 6. Both Parties have filed
appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 13, 15. This case is now ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
In his appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 13, Pg. 6-10. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the ALJ
erred: (1) in the credibility determination of Plaintiff and (2) failure to consider and review new
medical. Id. In response, the Defendant argues the ALJ did not err in any of his findings. ECF No.
15. Because this Court finds the ALJ erred in the credibility determination of Plaintiff, this Court
will only address this issue.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz
v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily
Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two
additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other
symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back,
standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the
Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983
(2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating
factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional
restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not perform a proper Polaski analysis. While the ALJ
indicated the factors from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 had been considered (Tr.
12), a review of the ALJ’s opinion shows that instead of evaluating these factors and noting
inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the evidence in the record, the ALJ
merely reviewed the medical records and recognized the proper legal standard for assessing
credibility.3 In his opinion, the ALJ only made the following perfunctory statement regarding
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints:
After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the claimant’s medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence
and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are
inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.
The ALJ made no specific findings regarding the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s claimed
subjective complaints and the record evidence. The ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulate the reasons for discrediting the Plaintiff’s testimony, and address any
inconsistencies between the testimony and the record. The ALJ failed to perform this analysis. This
lack of analysis is insufficient under Polaski, and this case should be reversed and remanded for
further consideration consistent with Polaski. Upon remand, the ALJ may still find Plaintiff not
disabled, however a proper and complete analysis pursuant to Polaski should be performed.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 29th day of January 2014.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The ALJ also did not even specifically reference the Polaski factors which, although not required, is the
preferred practice. See Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007).
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