Martin v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on July 10, 2014. (rw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
MECHELLE R. MARTIN
vs.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 2:13-cv-02150

CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mechelle R. Martin (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application
for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. The Parties have consented
to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including
conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment
proceedings. ECF No. 7.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion and
orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1.

Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her SSI application on April 26, 2007. (Tr. 15, 226). In her

application, Plaintiff claims to be disabled due to asthma, anxiety disorder, and bipolar disorder. (Tr.
271). At the administrative hearing in this matter on April 16, 2009, Plaintiff also alleged being
disabled due to carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 62). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of January 1, 2005.2

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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ____” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”
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Plaintiff originally alleged an onset date of April 26, 2007 but later amended that onset date to
January 1, 2005. (Tr. 15).

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(Tr. 15). This application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 112-114).
Thereafter, on March 19, 2008, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her application, and
this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 146).
Plaintiff’s original administrative hearing was held on January 23, 2009, and Plaintiff’s
supplemental administrative hearing was held on April 16, 2009. (Tr. 57-111). At this supplemental
hearing, Plaintiff was present and was represented by Keith Blythe. (Tr. 57-86). Plaintiff and
Vocational Expert (“VE”) Sarah Moore testified at this hearing. Id. As of the date of this hearing,
Plaintiff was thirty-nine (39) years old, which is defined as a “younger person” under 20 C.F.R. §
416.963(c). (Tr. 61). Plaintiff also testified at this hearing that she had only completed the seventh
grade in school. (Tr. 63).
On January 19, 2012, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s application
for SSI. (Tr. 12-30). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial
Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since April 26, 2007, her application date. (Tr. 17, Finding 1). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD), facet hypertrophy of the lumbar spine, hypertension, obesity, bipolar disorder, and
dependent personality disorder.

(Tr. 17, Finding 2).

The ALJ also determined Plaintiff’s

impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments
in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 17-21, Finding 3).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her RFC.
(Tr. 21-28, Finding 4). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found her
claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained
the RFC to perform the following:

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After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b)
except the claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, dusts, odors, gases,
and other pulmonary irritants. Further, the claimant can understand, remember, and
carry out simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; can respond to usual work situations
and ordinary work changes; can have incidental contact with supervisors and
coworkers; but can have no contact with the general public.
Id. “Light work” includes the following:
(b) Light work. Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the
weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal
of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some
pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing
a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of
these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also
do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine
dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.
20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) (2010).
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and determined Plaintiff had no
PRW. (Tr. 28, Finding 5). The ALJ then evaluated whether Plaintiff retained the capacity to
perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy considering her age,
education, work experience, and RFC. (Tr. 29-30, Finding 9). The ALJ heard testimony from the
VE on this issue. Id. Based upon that testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity
to perform representative occupations such as an assembler (example: toy assembler and bottle line
attendant) with 10,969 such jobs in Arkansas and 571,519 such jobs in the national economy and
such as inspectors and sorters (example: gasket inspector) with 1,609 such jobs in Arkansas and
127,194 such jobs in the national economy. Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, from her application date of April 26,
2007. (Tr. 29, Finding 10).
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Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 10). On April 3, 2013, the Appeals Council declined to review this unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 1-3). On June 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The Parties
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on June 7, 2013. ECF No. 7. Both Parties have filed
appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 13-14. This case is now ready for decision.
2.

Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines

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a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3.

Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the following: (1) the ALJ did not properly develop the

evidence in the record; (2) the ALJ improperly assessed her severe impairments; (3) the ALJ erred
in his RFC determination; and (4) the ALJ erred in his Step Five determination. ECF No. 13 at 1-21.
Because the Court finds the ALJ erred by providing no basis for his determination that her carpal

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tunnel syndrome was non-severe, the Court will only address Plaintiff’s second argument for
reversal.
A claimant suffers from a severe impairment if that impairment is more than slight and if that
impairment affects the claimant’s ability to do his or her basic work activities. See Householder v.
Bowen, 861 F.2d 191, 192 n.1 (8th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has also held that a claimant does
not suffer from a severe impairment where the claimant only suffers from “slight abnormalities that
do not significantly limit any ‘basic work activity.’” See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 155 (1987)
(O’Connor, S., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Brown v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 311, 311-12 (8th
Cir. 1987) (adopting Justice O’Connor’s language from Bowen v. Yuckert). See also Kirby v. Astrue,
500 F.3d 705, 707-09 (8th Cir. 2007).
Furthermore, the standard for determining whether a claimant suffers from a severe
impairment is a low standard. See Nicola v. Astrue, 480 F.3d 885, 887 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing the
decision of the ALJ and holding that a diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning should have
been considered severe because that diagnosis was supported by sufficient medical evidence). If the
ALJ errs by finding a severe impairment is not severe, the ALJ’s disability determination must be
reversed and remanded. See Nicola, 480 F.3d at 887.
In the present action, the ALJ determined Plaintiff only had the following severe
impairments: asthma, anxiety disorder, and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 271). The ALJ did not find
Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome was severe. Id. This is despite the fact Plaintiff alleged at the
administrative hearing she was disabled due to her carpal tunnel syndrome (Tr. 62) and her medical
records also demonstrate she suffers from the severe impairment of carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr.
535). Notably, On April 3, 2009, Plaintiff was diagnosed at the Good Samaritan Clinic as having
carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. Based upon this diagnosis, her physician at Good Samaritan Clinic
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prescribed her a wrist splint. Id. Plaintiff was even wearing the split at the administrative hearing
on April 16, 2009 and stated it had been prescribed by her physician at the Good Samaritan Clinic.
(Tr. 62-63).
In his opinion, the ALJ recognized Plaintiff’s diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 17,
Finding 2). The ALJ then found Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome was non-severe. Id. The ALJ
did not provide any basis for his finding that this impairment was non-severe. Id. Instead, the ALJ
merely speculated that this impairment was non-severe:
The claimant alleges bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. The claimant’s treatment
records reveal a history of bilateral carpal tunnel release syndrome. However, the
medical evidence of record does not support finding that this condition imposes more
than minimal limitations on the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.
Therefore, this condition is not severe within the meaning of the regulations.
Id (emphasis added).
The ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly develop the record in this matter. See Snead v.
Barnhart, 360 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding “[w]ell-settled precedent confirms that the ALJ
bears a responsibility to develop the record fairly and fully, independent of the claimant’s burden to
press his case”). In this case, based upon Plaintiff’s medical records from the Good Samaritan
Clinic, the ALJ should have included Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome as a severe impairment or,
at the very least, fulfilled his duty to develop the record and further investigate her claim on this
issue. His failure to do so is reversible error. See Nicola, 480 F.3d at 887 (“. . . we reject the
Commissioner’s argument of harmless error”). Accordingly, this case must be reversed and
remanded.
4.

Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits

to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
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judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 10th day of July 2014.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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