Cooper v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Mark E. Ford on February 23, 2015. (lw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
TINA L. COOPER

PLAINTIFF

v.

Civil No. 14-2010

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Tina Cooper, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §405(g), seeking judicial review
of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying her
claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social
Security Act (hereinafter “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). In this judicial
review, the court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record
to support the Commissioner’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Procedural Background:
Plaintiff filed her application for DIB on July 22, 2011, alleging an onset date of December

30, 2010, due to chronic back pain, plantar fasciitis, insomnia, hypertension, shoulder pain, arm
pain, swelling in the hands, and pain in the feet and toes. Tr. 164, 171-172, 191, 199, 202. The
Commissioner denied her application initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 73-79. At the Plaintiff’s
request, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held an administrative hearing on May 3, 2012.
Tr. 35-70. Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel.
At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 47 years old and possessed an eleventh grade
education. Tr. 40, 165. Although she tried to obtain her GED, she was unable to do so. Tr. 41.
She had past relevant work (“PRW”) experience as a server, cook, and housekeeper. Tr. 42-47,
165, 181-188.

On December 28, 2012, the ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff’s arthralgias/probable
fibromyalgia, edema of the lower extremities, bilateral osteoarthritis of the feet/tarsal tunnel
syndrome/plantar fasciitis, diabetes mellitus, essential hypertension, and history of carpal tunnel
syndrome (“CTS”) were severe, but concluded they did not meet or medically equal one of the
listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. Tr. 12-13. He concluded that the
Plaintiff could perform sedentary work involving only occasional climbing, balancing, stooping,
kneeling, crouching, crawling, and operation of foot controls. Tr. 13. The ALJ also determined
that the Plaintiff could frequently, but not constantly, handle and finger with both hands. Tr. 13.
With the assistance of a vocational expert, the ALJ found the Plaintiff could perform work as a
clerical worker and assembler. Tr. 18.
The Appeals Council denied the Plaintiff’s request for review on November 18, 2013. Tr.
1-3. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. ECF No. 1. This matter is before the undersigned
by consent of the parties. Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for
decision. ECF Nos. 14, 15.
II.

Applicable Law:
This court’s role is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.
2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind
would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must be
affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d
964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the
Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists
in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the court would have

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decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other
words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ
must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one
year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari,
274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A Plaintiff
must show that his or her disability, not simply their impairment, has lasted for at least twelve
consecutive months.
The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial
gainful activity since filing his or her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or
mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal
an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy
given his or her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)- (f)(2003). Only
if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work
experience in light of his or her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d
1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C .F.R. § § 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

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III.

Discussion:
The ALJ’s RFC determination is of great concern to the undersigned. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is
a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Adequate medical evidence
must therefore exist that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. See Lewis
v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). The ALJ is not at liberty to make medical
judgments regarding the ability or disability of a claimant to engage in gainful activity where such
inference is not warranted by clinical findings. McGhee v. Harris, 683 F. 2d 256 (8th Cir. 1982).
The Plaintiff suffers from arthralgias/probable fibromyalgia, edema of the lower
extremities and bilateral osteoarthritis of the feet/tarsal tunnel syndrome/plantar fasciitis. The ALJ
found these impairments to be severe and concluded that the Plaintiff could perform a range of
sedentary work limited only by postural limitations. Although he contends that the assessment of
Dr. David Oberlander, an examining neurologist, supports his RFC determination, the ALJ fails to
account for the sitting limitations imposed by Dr. Oberlander. See Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448,
452 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that Commissioner is encouraged to give more weight to the opinion
of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of speciality than to the opinion of a
source who is not a specialist). This is particularly troubling, given the fact that sitting limitations
were also imposed by examining orthopedist, Dr. Michael Westbrook and the Plaintiff’s treating
physician, Dr. Carolyn Dillard.
In February 2012, Dr. Dillard indicated that the Plaintiff must periodically alternate
between sitting and standing. Tr. 281-282. Later, in August 2012, Dr. Oberlander commented
that the Plaintiff could sit for two hours at a time for a total of four hours per day. Tr. 286-288.

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Similarly, Dr. Westbrook opined in September 2012 that the Plaintiff could sit for 45 minutes at a
time for a total of four hours per day.
By definition, sedentary work requires that the individual be capable of sitting for a total
of six hours during an eight-hour workday. SOCIAL SECURITY REGULATION 96-6P. Given the fact
that the Plaintiff is limited with regard to sitting for extended periods, we believe that remand is
necessary to allow the ALJ to reconsider the Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ is directed to recontact the
aforementioned physicians with any questions he may have concerning the limitations they
imposed. He is also directed to recall the vocational expert to testify concerning the work that
would be available to the Plaintiff, given her sitting limitations.
IV.

Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the ALJ and remand this case to the

Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
DATED this 23rd day of February, 2015.
/s/Mark E. Ford
HONORABLE MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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