Goodwin v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Mark E. Ford on July 28, 2015. (hnc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION

BRANDON CARL GOODWIN

PLAINTIFF

VS.

Civil No. 2:14-cv-02162-MEF

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Brandon Carl Goodwin, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial
review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”)
denying his claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income
(“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “the Act”). In this judicial
review, the court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record
to support the Commissioner’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Procedural Background:

Plaintiff filed his applications for DIB and SSI on June 8, 2012, alleging an onset date of
September 8, 2011, due to spinal osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis, high
blood pressure, and high cholesterol. (T. 125) Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and on
reconsideration. (T. 52-54, 55-58, 63-64, 65-67) Plaintiff then requested an administration hearing,
which was held via teleconference before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Hon. Clifford
Shilling, on April 23, 2013. Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel.
At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 27 years old and had graduated from high school. (T.
38, 196) His past relevant work experience included working as a general laborer in construction

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from July 2006 until September 2007 and August 2010 to August 2011, a security guard in 2007,
a production worker in 2009, and a factory worker in 2010. (T. 127)
On July 26, 2013, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease (status post-surgery),
hypertension, and obesity severe; however, he found Plaintiff’s hyperlipidemia not severe as it
caused no more than minimal vocationally relevant limitations. (T. 11-12) Considering the
Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) based
upon all of his impairments, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled from September 8, 2011
through the date of his Decision issued July 26, 2013. The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the RFC
to perform light work, except he was limited to no more than frequent climbing of ramps and stairs
and occasional use of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Plaintiff was limited to positions that required
no more than occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. (T. 12)
Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council, but his request for review was denied
on June 24, 2014. (T. 1-3) Plaintiff then filed this action on July 29, 2014. (Doc. 1) This case is
before the undersigned pursuant to consent of the parties. (Doc. 8) Both parties have filed briefs,
and the case is ready for decision. (Doc. 10 and 12)
II.

Applicable Law:

This court’s role is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
findings. Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the
Commissioner’s decision. Teague v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2011). The Court must
affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Blackburn v.
Colvin, 761 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record
that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reverse it simply because substantial

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evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the court
would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015). In
other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the Court must affirm the
ALJ’s decision. Id.
A claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his disability by
establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and that prevents him
from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217
(8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical
or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D). A plaintiff must show
that his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.
The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process
to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful
activity since filing his or her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental
impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an
impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy
given his or her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
Only if he reaches the final stage does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and
work experience in light of his or her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683
F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).

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III.

Discussion:

The Court must determine whether substantial evidence, taking the record as a whole, supports
the Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff had not been disabled from the alleged date of onset on
September 8, 2011 through the date of the ALJ’s Decision issued July 26, 2013. Plaintiff raises
two issues on appeal, which can be summarized as: (A) the ALJ erred in his RFC determination;
and, (B) the ALJ erred in his step four analysis finding Plaintiff could perform his past relevant
work. (Doc. 10, pp. 1-4)
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments are
presented in the parties’ briefs and the ALJ’s opinion, and they are repeated here only to the extent
necessary.
RFC Determination:
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in his RFC determination. (Doc. 10, pp. 3-4) The Court
disagrees.
RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
A disability claimant has the burden of establishing his or her RFC. See Masterson v. Barnhart,
363 F.3d 731, 737 (8th Cir. 2004). “The ALJ determines a claimant’s RFC based on all relevant
evidence in the record, including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others,
and the claimant’s own descriptions of his or her limitations.” Davidson v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 838,
844 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2010) (ALJ is responsible
for determining RFC based on all relevant evidence, including medical records, observations of
treating physicians and others, and claimant’s own description of his limitations). Limitations
resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(3).

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The Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical
question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, a claimant’s RFC
assessment “must be based on medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function
in the workplace.” “An administrative law judge may not draw upon his own inferences from
medical reports.” Nevland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2000). Instead, the ALJ should
seek opinions from a claimant’s treating physicians or from consultative examiners regarding the
claimant’s mental and physical RFC. Id.; Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F. 3d 1066, 1070 (8th Cir.
2004.)
Plaintiff was diagnosed by Dr. John Pulliam, neurologist, on August 16, 2011 with
displacement of lumbar intervertebral disc without myelopathy; spinal stenosis, lumbar region,
with neurogenic claudication; and, morbid obesity. (T. 343) Plaintiff’s x-rays from August
revealed moderate loss of interspace height at L5-S1; the alignment of the lumbar spine was
normal. There were five lumbar non-rib-bearing vertebrae. (T. 196) The MRI showed partial
segmentation at the S1-S2 level. It was very rudimentary disc space. There was an extremely
large disc herniation located centrally to the right at L4-5 level. A moderate disc bulge centrally
and to the left at L5-S1. The disc herniation at L4-5 resulted in severe canal stenosis. There might
have been slight effacement on the left at S1 nerve root at the L5-S1 level. Overall, the Plaintiff
had a generalized constriction of the thecal sac beginning at L4 and extending through the sacrum
which was due to epidural lipomatosis. Plaintiff appeared to have some degree of canal stenosis.
Specific visualization of the conus was difficult on T2 sagittal images. The doctor did not see any
mass lesions or stenosis in the region of the conus. On T2 weighted sagittal images, desiccation
of both the L4-5 and L5-S1 interspaces were noted. The Plaintiff was morbidly obese with a
subcutaneous fat layer measuring at least 7 centimeters at the L4-5 level. (T. 196)

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Dr. Pulliam recommended and performed a L4-5 decompressive laminectomy and discectomy
on August 24, 2011. (T. 346, 191) Following the surgery, Plaintiff was restricted to lifting no more
than fifteen pounds, no strenuous manual labor, and no repeated bending or stooping. (T. 199) At
Plaintiff’s follow up appointment on September 6, 2011 he appeared well and was in no apparent
distress. Plaintiff’s wound was healing and his staples were removed from the low back. (T. 380)
On September 22, 2011, Plaintiff related he was doing extremely well, although he continued to
have chronic aching in his back. Plaintiff’s lower extremity symptomatology, primarily the
numbness, had resolved. He continued to take two Aleve per day, but was not taking other
medications. (T. 339) Dr. Pulliam limited Plaintiff’s physical activity and lifting until December
and ordered Plaintiff to begin a slow progressive walking program. (T. 340, 382)
At Plaintiff’s December 12, 2011 appointment, Plaintiff had complete resolution of numbness;
however, he still continued to have chronic low back pain. (T. 335) Plaintiff had not begun the
walking program as advised by Dr. Pulliam. (T. 336) Dr. Pulliam removed all of Plaintiff’s activity
restrictions and work limitations and discontinued Plaintiff’s Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen and
Robaxin. (T. 336-337)
Plaintiff began physical therapy in December 2011. By January 2012 the physical therapy
notes indicated his tolerance to therapy was excellent, he reported no pain, and was discharged.
(T. 260) Plaintiff next sought treatment in June 2012, where the notes indicated Plaintiff had severe
pain and limited range of movement in his back. (T. 334) Some of the doctor’s notes are illegible,
but it is clear Plaintiff was advised to lose weight. (T. 334)
Dr. Karmen Hopkins, state agency medical consultant, performed an RFC assessment on July
16, 2012. Dr. Hopkins determined Plaintiff was capable of occasionally lifting twenty pounds,
frequently lifting ten pounds, and he could sit, stand, and walk about six hours in an eight hour

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workday. (T. 361) Plaintiff was not limited in pushing or pulling and he could only occasionally
stoop and crouch. (T. 362) Dr. Hopkins opined Plaintiff’s credibility was diminished by his lack
of treatment sought or obtained for pain and the physical therapy notes reporting no pain. (T. 367)
Due to the medically determinable impairments of lumbar degenerative disc disease post
laminectomy/discectomy and morbid obesity, Dr. Hopkins determined Plaintiff retained the RFC
to perform light work with postural limitations. (T. 367) Dr. Bill Payne, state agency medical
consultant, reviewed the medical evidence of record on October 12, 2012 and affirmed Dr.
Hopkins’ assessment. (T. 370)
In assessing the Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered the Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing,
testimony of his mother, disability and function reports, the MRI performed in 2012, the x-rays
taken in 2012, his physical therapy records, medical records from Dr. Pulliam, and the state agency
medical consultative examinations. (T. 9-15)
In additional to the medical evidence, the ALJ took into consideration other factors in
evaluating Plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff failed to follow Dr. Pulliam’s treatment plan regarding
the walking program. (T. 336) See Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 2005) (“A
failure to follow a recommended course of treatment . . . weighs against a claimant’s credibility.”).
Furthermore, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s daily activities were not congruent with the Plaintiff’s
allegations. (T. 14) Plaintiff indicated he cared for his dog, went into town on a weekly basis,
shopped at Wal-Mart, watched television, folded clothes, vacuumed, made simple meals, put away
the dishes, mowed the lawn on a riding mower, drove a car, and was able to handle finances. (T.
145, 147-148) Plaintiff’s lifestyle was not indicative of someone who was disabled. See, e.g.,
Roberson v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that substantial evidence
supported ALJ’s denial of disability benefits in part because claimant “engaged in extensive daily

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activities,” including taking care of her child, driving a vehicle, preparing meals, performing
housework, shopping for groceries, handling money, and visiting family); Wagner v. Astrue, 499
F. 3d 842, 852 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that substantial evidence supported ALJ’s denial of
disability benefits in part because claimant “engaged in extensive daily activities, such as fixing
meals, doing housework, shopping for groceries, and visiting friends”).
The Plaintiff argues his weight and history of low chronic back pain post-surgery would
prohibit him from frequently climbing ramps or stairs and he could never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds at a weight of 400 pounds. (Doc. 10, pp. 3-4) The Plaintiff is mistaken. The Eight Circuit
has upheld the denial of disability and found claimants suffering from degenerative disc disease
retained the RFC return to their past relevant work. See Medhaug v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 816817 (8th Cir. 2009) (substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision that an individual with
degenerative disc disease could perform light work and return to his past work.); Woolf v. Shalala,
3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993) (substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision that an
individual diagnosed with degenerative disc disease could return to past relevant work.).
Furthermore, the records showed Plaintiff did not experience any pain following his physical
therapy. (T. 260) Plaintiff only took over-the-counter medications for pain. See Hepp v. Astrue,
511 F.3d 798, 807 (8th Cir. 2008) (moderate, over-the-counter medication for pain does not
support allegations of disabling pain). Finally, Dr. Pulliam lifted all of Plaintiff’s activity and work
restrictions.
The ALJ also noted Plaintiff had not sought treatment for his back for nine months. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1530, 416.930 (A claimant who fails to treat a remediable condition without good
reason is barred from entitlement to benefits.); Shannon v. Chater, 54 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1995)
(given the Plaintiff’s alleged pain, Plaintiff’s failure to seek medical treatment may be inconsistent

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with a finding of disability). Plaintiff alleges he had not sought treatment due to financial restraints.
Failure to seek treatment due to a lack of funds may justify a failure to receive medical care.
Osborne v. Barnhart, 316 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 2003). However, a lack of funds alone will not
excuse a Plaintiff’s failure to obtain treatment or follow medical advice. Generally speaking, a
lack of evidence that the claimant attempted to find any low cost or no cost medical treatment for
her alleged pain and disability is inconsistent with a claim of disabling pain. Murphy v. Sullivan,
953 F.2d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s failure to contact Good Samaritan
Clinic or any other clinics offering services to the uninsured or underinsured prevents the Court
from concluding that his financial status excuses his failure to obtain consistent treatment. The
Court also notes that the record contains no evidence to indicate that Plaintiff was ever turned
down for treatment due to his inability to pay for services.
Regarding Plaintiff’s obesity, Social Security Regulation 02-1p provides guidance for
evaluating obesity. It provides, in part, that obesity can cause limitation of function. The functions
likely to be limited depend on many factors, including where the excess weight is carried. An
individual may have limitations in any of the exertional functions such as sitting, standing,
walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling. It may also affect ability to do postural functions,
such as climbing, balance, stooping, and crouching. Although there is some evidence in the record
to show that plaintiff was obese, the Court finds no evidence to indicate that Plaintiff’s obesity
prevented him from performing work-related activities. None of his treating doctors suggested his
weight imposed any additional work-related limitations, and he did not testify that his weight
imposed additional restrictions. See Anderson v. Barnhart, 344 F.3d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 2003).
While it is the ALJ’s duty to develop the record, the burden of persuasion to prove disability
and demonstrate RFC remains on the claimant, even when the burden of production shifts to the

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Commissioner at step five. Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 931 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2004). Based on
the objective medical evidence, opinion evidence, state-agency evidence, and the testimony of the
Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the RFC determined by the ALJ is supported by substantial
evidence.
Step-four analysis:
Plaintiff’s final argument is the ALJ erred at step four of his analysis when he determined
Plaintiff could return to his past relevant work as a production worker and a security guard. (Doc.
10, p. 3) At step four, the ALJ determines “whether a claimant’s impairments keep [him] from
doing past relevant work.” Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d at 853 (quoting Jones v. Chater, 86 F.3d
823, 826 (8th Cir. 1996)). If “the claimant has the [RFC] to do either the specific work previously
done or the same type of work as it is generally performed in the national economy, the claimant
is found not to be disabled.” Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 2000). The burden at step
four remains with the claimant to prove his RFC and establish that he cannot return to his past
relevant work. Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2009); Dukes v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d
923, 928 (8th Cir. 2006); Vandenboom v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 2005).
In determining whether Plaintiff could return to his past relevant work, the ALJ considered
both what Plaintiff performed and the vocational expert’s testimony, which was consistent with
the DOT, as to what was generally performed in the national economy. With the aid of the
vocational expert and Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was capable of
performing light, unskilled, past relevant work as a production worker and security guard. (T. 4346).

See Wright v. Astrue, 489 Fed. Appx. 147, 149 (8th Cir. 2012), citing 20 C.F.R.

§404.165060(b)(2), 416.960(b); Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d at 853-854 (an ALJ can “consider the
demands of the claimant’s past relevant work either as the claimant actually perform it or, as here,

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as performed in the national economy.”) The undersigned finds substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a production worker
and security guard. The ALJ’s determination was supported by objective medical evidence,
including opinions of treating physicians, and state agency medical consultants, which expressed
the opinion Plaintiff could perform light work with postural limitations.
IV.

Conclusion:

Having carefully reviewed the record as a whole, the undersigned finds that substantial
evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff benefits, and the
Commissioner’s decision should be affirmed. Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with
prejudice.
Dated this 28th day of July, 2015.
/s/ Mark E. Ford
HONORABLE MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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