Black v. Valley Behavioral Health System LLC et al
Filing
47
ORDER granting 29 Motion for Summary Judgment; Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Further, denying as moot 39 Motion; denying as moot 43 Motion to Bifurcate; denying as moot 45 Motion in Limine. Signed by Honorable P. K. Holmes, III on June 16, 2016. (hnc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
JENNIFER K. BLACK
v.
PLAINTIFF
Case No. 2:15-CV-02130
VALLEY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
SYSTEM, LLC; ACADIA HEALTHCARE
COMPANY, INC.
DEFENDANT
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants’ Valley Behavioral Health System, LLC’s (“Valley”) and
Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc.’s (“Acadia”) motion for summary judgment (Doc .29), Plaintiff
Jennifer K. Black’s response, Defendants’ reply, and the parties’ supporting documents; Black's
motion for leave (Doc. 39) to file her separate statement of facts in opposition to Defendants’
motion for summary judgment out of time, and Defendants’ response; Defendants’ motion to
bifurcate any punitive damages phase of the jury trial (Doc. 43); and Defendants’ motion in limine
(Doc. 45). Having thoroughly reviewed the filings and exhibits on record in this case, the Court
finds that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 29) should be GRANTED.
Accordingly, all other pending motions (Docs. 39, 43, and 45) are DENIED AS MOOT. 1
I.
Background
In June 2013, Black started working as a registered nurse at Valley’s acute psychiatric
facility in Barling, Arkansas. 2 Throughout her employment with Valley, Black was subject to
1
The Court notes that allowing Black’s statement of facts to be filed out of time would not save
Black’s case from dismissal, as the responses therein consisted primarily of general denials or
disagreements without citation to any fact of record.
2
The Court recognizes that Black disputes whether she should be considered an employee of
Valley rather than Acadia; however, because neither Valley nor Acadia is liable under the causes
of action asserted by Black, the Court refers to Valley as Black’s employer for simplicity.
disciplinary actions on multiple occasions. In July 2013, Black was issued a written warning for
potentially neglectful behavior toward a minor patient Black had been tasked with preparing for
discharge from the facility.
In October 2013, observations and complaints about Black’s
communications and dealings with her coworkers led her to receive a performance evaluation that
noted the need to improve in how she treated and communicated with her coworkers. In January
2014, Black was again issued a written warning for unacceptable behavior, at least some of which
she admitted to in her deposition. Black received yet another written warning in April 2014 for
yelling at a coworker, and one week later was placed on a 90-day probationary period due to
continued complaints about her inappropriate behavior toward coworkers. Similar altercations
continued through July 17, 2014, when the Clinical Director counseled Black for her interactions
with coworkers. On September 2, 2014, after Black’s behavior continued throughout August 2014,
the Director of Nursing, Cynthia Ellis, approached Black with the most recent coworkers’
complaints in an attempt to have Black improve her behavior.
Black contends that during her meeting with Ellis, Ellis forced Black to pray with her and
several others, and assigned Black to bring Bible verses to work every day thereafter. Apparently,
Black brought Bible verses to work on three or four occasions after that meeting. In addition,
Black contends that on a separate occasion a coworker attempted to grab Black’s hand as Black
was walking down a hall, which Black believes was an effort to again force Black into prayer.
On October 14, 2014, Black made a call to Valley’s Compliance Hotline to submit a
complaint about Ellis having required Black to bring Bible verses to work approximately five
weeks prior. Black contends that Ellis implied Black’s job would be terminated if she did not
bring in the Bible verses. Black did not inform Ellis or any other supervisor about having made
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this call, and Black has otherwise provided no evidence that Ellis or any other supervisor was
aware of it having been made.
On October 15, 2014, Ellis met individually with Black, as well as other employees, about
attendance issues. 3 Ellis noted that Black had eight absences, but Black countered that she had
made arrangements to switch workdays with coworkers and otherwise had been excused. Black
contends that Ellis was unware of the arrangements because Ellis had not taken on the role of
nursing director until after certain absences had occurred. Ultimately, Ellis informed Black that
further absences would result in her termination.
On October 26, 2014, Black went to an emergency room with gastrointestinal problems
and was ultimately hospitalized for five days. Black soon after inquired about receiving FMLA
leave for time missed related to her treatment and was advised of the appropriate procedure to
follow. On November 5, 2014, Black’s supervisors received another complaint about Black’s
behavior toward a pediatric patient, and an anonymous complaint was made through the
Compliance Hotline.
On November 11, 2014, Black’s supervisor conferred with Valley’s Chief Executive
Officer, and they ultimately decided to terminate Black’s employment. Coincidentally, also on
November 11, 2014, Black was hand-delivering her FMLA paperwork—which she mistakenly
believed was already faxed to Valley from her doctor’s office—when she was informed of her
termination.
II.
Legal Standard
3
Apparently, the report from Ellis’s meeting with Black is dated October 14, 2014; however, Black
is certain that this was in error because she remembered being called in the day after making her
call to the Compliance Hotline. The Court will give Black the benefit of the doubt here, but it does
not change the Court’s analysis.
3
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In order to grant summary judgment, the
evidence must be such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Therefore, the moving party must
demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must resolve
all controversies in favor of the non-moving party, take the non-moving party’s evidence as true,
and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of that party. Matsushita Elect. Indus. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest on allegations or denials in its pleadings but must “set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. These specific
facts showing a genuine issue for trial are to be established by “citing to particular parts of
materials in the record . . . or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Ultimately, “[w]hile employment
discrimination cases are often fact intensive and dependent on nuance in the workplace, they are
not immune from summary judgment, and there is no separate summary judgment standard for
employment discrimination cases.” Fercello v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir.
2010) (rejecting prior assertions that summary judgment should rarely be granted in employment
discrimination cases). In addition, the Court agrees with the principle propounded by the Seventh
Circuit that “a lawsuit is not a game of hunt the peanut. Employment discrimination cases are
extremely fact-intensive, and neither appellate nor district courts are obliged in our adversary
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system to scour the record looking for factual disputes . . . .” Greer v. Bd. of Educ. of City of
Chicago, Ill., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
III.
Analysis
Throughout this case, Black’s theories of liability have been unclear. As best the Court
can discern, however, Black has asserted claims for: (1) discriminatory retaliation under Title VII
for having been terminated after complaining about forced religious-based practices; (2)
discriminatory retaliation under the FMLA by being terminated in retaliation for submitting FMLA
paperwork; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress. 4
A.
Title VII and FMLA Discriminatory Retaliation
When, as here, a plaintiff presents no direct evidence to support a claim of retaliatory
discrimination under either Title VII or the FMLA, each respective claim is analyzed under the
burden shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 856 (8th Cir. 2012) (applying McDonnell
Douglas to a Title VII retaliation claim); Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905, 912 (8th Cir. 2008)
(applying McDonnell Douglas to an FMLA retaliation claim). Under this framework, the plaintiff
must first present a prima facie case of Title VII or FMLA retaliation. Id. Once the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id.; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. The
plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason is a pretext for unlawful
discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507–08 (1993); Miners v. Cargill
4
Black makes vague reference to some kind of hostile work environment theory and attempts to
use the act of being forced to pray as its own Title VII violation, rather than using her termination
for complaining about such practices as the action giving rise to liability. Because there is a
complete lack of factual basis and comprehensible legal reasoning supporting any such claims, the
Court will not address them further.
5
Comms., Inc., 113 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1997). To demonstrate pretext, the plaintiff must offer
sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to infer discrimination. Lors v. Dean, 595 F.3d
831, 834 (8th Cir. 2010). Specifically, “[a] plaintiff may show pretext, among other ways, by
showing that an employer (1) failed to follow its own policies, (2) treated similarly-situated
employees in a disparate manner, or (3) shifted its explanation of the employment decision.”
Gibson, 670 F.3d at 854. The Eighth Circuit has also provided that there are “at least two routes
for demonstrating a material question of fact as to pretext. First a plaintiff may succeed indirectly
by showing the proffered explanation has no basis in fact. Second, a plaintiff can directly persuade
the court that a prohibited reason more likely motivated the employer.” Id. (citations and internal
quotations omitted). “[T]he evidence produced to show a prima facie case and the ‘inferences
drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant’s
explanation is pretextual.’” Miners, 113 F.3d at 823 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 10 (1981).
Even assuming Black can make a prima facie showing of retaliatory discrimination under
both Title VII and the FMLA, which is a generous assumption to make, the Court finds that she
has not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate or even give rise to a favorable inference that
Valley’s actions were merely pretext for discrimination. For both claims, Valley has presented a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Black’s termination supported by the extensive records
of Black’s disciplinary history and conflicts with coworkers and patients. In contrast, Black has
not presented any evidence, other than her own allegations and general denials of Defendants’
evidence, to demonstrate that her disciplinary history was somehow not based in fact or was
otherwise illegitimate. Black points to the correlation in time between her complaint and being
called in to discuss absences, as well as her turning in FMLA paper work and termination.
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However, “[w]here timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job
actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity, an inference of
retaliation does not arise.” Hervey v. Cnty. of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711, 723 (8th Cir. 2008).
Nothing about the timing in this case calls into question Black’s significant disciplinary history or
whether Valley legitimately relied on that disciplinary history as a basis for Black’s termination.
Because Black presented no evidence from which a jury could possibly conclude that Valley’s
proffered legitimate reason for her termination was pretextual, and because that legitimate reason
for Black’s termination is applicable to Black’s claims under both Title VII and the FMLA, the
Court finds that each of those claims should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress—The Tort of Outrage
In Arkansas, intentional infliction of emotional distress is referred to as the tort of outrage.
To establish liability for the tort of outrage, the plaintiff must show:
(1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known
that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was
extreme and outrageous, was beyond all possible bounds of decency, and was
utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the actions of the defendant were
the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the
plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 103 S.W.3d 671, 681 (Ark. 2003) (citing Faulkner v. Ark. Children’s
Hosp., 69 S.W.3d 393 (Ark. 2002)). “The Arkansas Supreme Court has explained that the tort of
outrage is found ‘only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.’” Westphal v. Lase Med Inc., 2011 WL 1374729, at * 5 (E.D.
Ark. April 11, 2011) (quoting Palmer v. Ark. Council on Econ. Educ., 40 S.W.3d 784, 791–92
(Ark. 2001)). Black admits that there is “not specific testimony or statement of the actor’s
intention” for this cause of action, but asserts that there remains a question of fact for
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determination. The Court disagrees and finds no evidence supporting any of the above-mentioned
elements required to prove the tort of outrage. In addition, having sufficient knowledge of the
underlying facts of this case, the Court is satisfied that no reasonable juror could possibly find the
occurrence of outrageous and extreme conduct to the degree necessary to impose liability.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Black’s claim for the tort of outrage should also be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
IV.
Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 29)
is GRANTED and the Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave (Doc. 39) to file her separate
statement of facts in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment out of time;
Defendants’ motion to bifurcate any punitive damages phase of the jury trial (Doc. 43); and
Defendants’ motion in limine (Doc. 45) are each DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of June 2016.
/s/P. K. Holmes, III
P.K. HOLMES, III
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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