Scott v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on April 7, 2017. (mjm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
CRYSTAL A. SCOTT
vs.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 2:16-cv-02090

NANCY A. BERRYHILL
Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Crystal A. Scott (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her applications for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and a period of
disability under Titles II and XVI of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 6.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues
this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1.

Background:
Plaintiff filed her disability applications on May 9, 2013. (Tr. 60). In her applications,

Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to bulging discs in her lower back with spurs, depression,
degenerative disc disease, major migraines, blood pressure problems, knee problems, memory
problems, and anxiety. (Tr. 272). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of December 23, 2010. (Tr. 60).

1

The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___.” The
transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

1

These applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 81-94).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her denied applications. The
ALJ granted that request and held an administrative hearing on August 28, 2014 in Fort Smith,
Arkansas. (Tr. 76-118). At this hearing, Plaintiff was present and was represented by Matthew
Ketcham. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Deborah Steele testified at this hearing. Id.
At this hearing, Plaintiff testified she was thirty-five (35) years old, which is defined as a “younger
person” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (DIB) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c) (SSI). (Tr. 83-84). As
for her level of education, Plaintiff testified she completed high school and “about 2 ½ years of
college.” (Tr. 84).
After this hearing, on January 16, 2015, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying
Plaintiff’s applications for SSI and DIB. (Tr. 56-71). In this decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff met
the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2015. (Tr. 62, Finding 1). The
ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since February 10,
2012, her amended alleged onset date. (Tr. 62, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the
following severe impairments: musculoskeletal disorders (back disorder, osteoarthritis, and related
disorders); obesity; hypertension; somatoform pain disorder; dependent personality traits; and
depression secondary to medical conditions. (Tr. 62-63, Finding 3). Despite being severe, the ALJ
determined these impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the
Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 63-65,
Finding 4).
The ALJ then considered Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 65-69,
Finding 5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found her claimed
2

limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC
to perform the following:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined
in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except as follows: The claimant can
frequently lift and/or carry less than ten pounds and occasionally ten pounds, sit for
a total of six hours in an eight hour workday, and stand and/or walk for a total of at
least two hours in an eight hour workday. The claimant can occasionally climb
ramps or stairs. She cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can
occasionally balance, crouch, or crawl. The claimant is able to work where
interpersonal contact is routine but superficial, the complexity of tasks is learned by
experience and the supervision is little for routine tasks, but detailed for non-routine
tasks. The claimant must use an assistive device for prolonged ambulation.
Id.
The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and found Plaintiff is
unable to perform her PRW. (Tr. 69, Finding 6). The ALJ also considered whether Plaintiff retained
the capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 7071, Finding 10). The VE testified at the administrative hearing regarding this issue. Id. Based upon
that testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform the following: (1) credit
card clerk (sedentary, semi-skilled) with 360,600 such jobs in the United States and 3,200 such jobs
in Arkansas; (2) order clerk (sedentary, semi-skilled) with 77,770 such jobs in the United States and
460 such jobs in Arkansas; and (3) information clerk (sedentary, semi-skilled) with 610,300 such
jobs in the United States and 4,200 such jobs in Arkansas. (Tr. 70). Because Plaintiff retained the
capacity to perform this work, the ALJ also determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as
defined by the Act, from February 10, 2012 through the date of his decision or through January 16,
2015. (Tr. 71, Finding 11).

3

Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a review by the Appeals Council. (Tr. 52). On March 22,
2016, the Appeals Council denied this request. (Tr. 1-3). On April 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed the
present appeal with this Court. ECF No. 1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court
on April 21, 2016. ECF No. 6. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 14-15. This case
is now ripe for determination.
2.

Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s
decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that
would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case
differently. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the
record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions
represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel,
221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,

4

160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3.

Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff raises three arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ erred by failing

to develop the record as to her RFC; (2) the ALJ improperly discounted her subjective complaints

5

of disabling pain; and (3) the ALJ erred in his credibility assessment. ECF No. 14 at 11-16. Upon
review, the Court agrees that the ALJ improperly evaluated her subjective complaints. Accordingly,
the Court will only address the final two arguments Plaintiff raised.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are
as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;
(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
2

Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 r equire the analysis
of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of
your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board,
etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of
these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not
require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

6

When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. Instead of
complying with Polaski and considering the Polaski factors, the ALJ only focused on Plaintiff’s
medical records. (Tr. 65-69). Notably, the ALJ recited he had considered Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints and then made the following finding:
In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by credible
medical evidence which supports a finding that even with the back conditions
verified by the evidence, the claimant has remained able to perform sedentary
exertional level work within the limits set out in detail in Paragraph 5, above3. Her
psychologically based symptoms are shown to be adequately treated with the medical
regime prescribed.
(Tr. 69) (emphasis added).
The Court finds the ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints without a
sufficient basis was improper under Polaski. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding a claimant’s
subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical evidence does not
fully support them [the subjective complaints]”). Accordingly, because the ALJ provided no valid
reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, this case must be reversed and remanded.

7

4.

Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits

to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded.3 A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 7th day of April 2017.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3

This remand is ordered solely for the purpose of permitting the ALJ the opportunity to comply
with the requirements of Polaski. No part of this remand should be interpreted as an instruction that
disability benefits be awarded. Upon remand, the ALJ should further evaluate the evidence and make a
disability determination, subject to this Court’s later review.

8