TL Services, Inc. v. Campbell & Ford Construction, Inc.

Filing 17

OPINION AND ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Honorable P. K. Holmes, III on May 18, 2017. (hnc) Modified on 5/18/2017 (hnc).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
TL SERVICES, INC.
v.

PLAINTIFF
No. 2:17-CV-02029

CAMPBELL & FORD
CONSTRUCTION, INC.

DEFENDANT
OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Campbell & Ford Construction, Inc.’s motion (Doc. 9) to
dismiss and brief in support (Doc. 10). Defendant has also filed an affidavit (Doc. 11) from
Michael Campbell, a shareholder and officer, in support of its motion. Plaintiff TL Services, Inc.
has filed a response (Doc. 13) and brief in support (Doc. 14). Plaintiff has also submitted the
applicable contracts (Doc. 13-1) between the parties and copies of invoices (Doc. 13-2) submitted
to Plaintiff by Defendant. Defendant argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it and
seeks dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Plaintiff does not contest
the facts set out in the affidavit, but argues that personal jurisdiction still exists. The motion to
dismiss will be GRANTED.
I.

Jurisdictional Facts
The relevant undisputed facts are as follows: Plaintiff is an Arkansas corporation with its

principal place of business in Arkansas and Defendant is a Tennessee corporation with its principal
place of business in Tennessee. Plaintiff is a contractor renovating and expanding a VA Medical
Center in Houston, Texas. Defendant previously subcontracted to perform concrete work for
Plaintiff on a VA Medical Center in Memphis, Tennessee. In 2015, one of Plaintff’s employees,
Scott Cuningham (who was superintendent on the Memphis project), contacted Defendant.
Cunningham described Plaintiff’s Houston project, explained that problems had arisen with the
1

concrete subcontractor and a replacement subcontractor was needed, and inquired whether
Defendant wanted to submit a bid for the Houston VA Medical Center. Defendant was interested,
and was told to contact another of Plaintiff’s employees to learn more about the project. After a
series of emails regarding project specifications and bid requirements, Defendant traveled to
Houston to meet with Cunningham and another of Plaintiff’s employees, and subsequently
submitted a successful bid. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff and Defendant contracted for Defendant
to perform concrete work for the Houston project. Until the events giving rise to the breach of
contract claim, Defendant performed all services in Texas and did not travel to Arkansas, but did
send billing invoices to Plaintiff in Arkansas.
II.

Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
Whether the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant requires an analysis

of two issues: (1) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is allowed under
the forum state’s long-arm statute; and (2) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Defendant comports with due process. Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d
1384, 1387–88 (8th Cir. 1991). “Arkansas’s long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction over
persons and claims to the maximum extent permitted by constitutional due process.” Pangaea,
Inc. v. Flying Burrito LLC, 647 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-4-101).
The sole issue for analysis, then, is whether the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over
Defendant consistent with due process. Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on this issue:
When personal jurisdiction is challenged by a defendant, the plaintiff bears the
burden to show that jurisdiction exists. To successfully survive a motion to dismiss
challenging personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of
personal jurisdiction over the challenging defendant. A plaintiff’s prima facie
showing must be tested, not by the pleadings alone, but by affidavits and exhibits
supporting or opposing the motion. Where no hearing is held on the motion, we
must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve factual
conflicts in the plaintiff’s favor; however, the party seeking to establish the court’s
2

personal jurisdiction carries the burden of proof and that burden does not shift to
the party challenging jurisdiction.
Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs. Corp., 760 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotations
omitted). Because the Court is not holding a hearing on this motion, the evidence is viewed and
factual conflicts are resolved in Plaintiff’s favor.
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant consistent with
due process so long as the defendant has minimum contacts with the state such that maintaining
the lawsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int’l Shoe Co.
v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Where the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are so systematic and continuous that the
defendant can fairly be said to be “at home” in the state, then courts in that state may exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in any case or controversy. Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).

When the defendant’s contacts are this

substantial, a court is said to be exercising “general jurisdiction.” Id. Where the defendant’s
contacts are too minimal for a court to exercise general jurisdiction, it may still exercise “specific
jurisdiction” over those cases or controversies that arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum (provided that exercising jurisdiction on the basis of those contacts does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice). Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.--, 134
S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014).
A.

General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction may be exercised over a corporation whose “continuous corporate
operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 318. For a corporation’s contacts with a forum state to reach this level, the corporation must
3

essentially be “at home” in the state. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 928–29 (comparing general
jurisdiction analyses in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
and Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), and focusing on the fact that the
defendant in Perkins conducted its sole wartime business activity in the forum state). In all but
the “exceptional case,” a corporation will likely be at home, and therefore subject to general
jurisdiction, only in “its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business.” Bauman,
134 S.Ct. at 762 n.19 (2014).
Defendant is incorporated in and maintains its principal place of business in Tennessee. It
may fairly be said to be “at home” in Tennessee, and courts in that forum may exercise personal
jurisdiction over it in any matter. Plaintiff notes that Campbell’s affidavit “does not speak to
[Defendant]’s history with the other previous contract with [Plaintiff] and whether other business
dealings brought [Defendant] or its representatives or agents to Arkansas.” (Doc. 13, pp. 3–4).
One previous contract with Plaintiff and speculation that other activities have occurred are not
enough to fairly say that Defendant is “at home” in Arkansas. This Court does not have general
jurisdiction over Defendant.
B.

Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction may be exercised over a corporation when a case or controversy arises

out of that corporation’s contacts with the forum. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (“[T]o the extent that
a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits
and protections of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations;
and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a
procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most
instances, hardly be said to be undue.”). The Eighth Circuit has traditionally employed a five-

4

factor test to determine whether the alleged contacts a defendant has with a forum state are
sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant comporting with due process.
Fastpath, Inc., 760 F.3d at 821. The Eighth Circuit analyzes “1) the nature and quality of contacts
with the forum state; 2) the quantity of the contacts; 3) the relation of the cause of action to the
contacts; 4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and 5) convenience
of the parties.” Id. The first three factors have been considered the most significant. Id. Indeed,
Supreme Court decisions like Bauman and Goodyear clarify that the third factor is of primary
importance. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 754 (explaining that specific jurisdiction is the adjudicatory
authority in suits arising out of or relating to a defendant’s contacts with the forum state);
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923–24 (same). The Eighth Circuit test can be used by the Court to
determine “whether the suit arises out of or is related to the Defendants’ contacts with the forum
and whether Defendants engaged in activities in the forum that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit
from the protection of its laws.” Pangaea, Inc., 647 F.3d at 746. It is not mechanically applied.
Id. at n.4.
In support of its argument that the Court has specific jurisdiction over Defendant, Plaintiff
points out that Plaintiff is an Arkansas corporation doing business in Arkansas. Plaintiff argues
that “Arkansas has a primary interest in protecting its corporations.” (Doc. 13, p. 4). Plaintiff also
points out that Defendant had previously worked on a project for Plaintiff and knew Plaintiff was
in Arkansas. For a personal jurisdiction analysis, this is essentially immaterial. The “‘minimum
contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s
contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014). “[T]he
plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.” Fastpath, Inc., 760 F.3d
at 823 (quoting Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1125).

5

Plaintiff notes that by their terms the contracts with Defendant are to be applied using
Arkansas law, and Defendant sent billing invoices to Plaintiff in Arkansas. 1 The Court also notes
that Defendant sent its bid for the Houston project to Plaintiff in Arkansas. Other than this,
Defendant’s activities giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in Texas. The nature, quality, and
quantity of these contacts is minimal. Furthermore, the cause of action is not strongly related to
those contacts, but instead arises out of Defendant’s contacts with Texas. That the contracts select
a forum’s law does not mean that the parties to the contracts have also selected a forum’s courts.
Defendant’s bid may have been sent to Plaintiff in Arkansas, but it was in direct response to
Plaintiff’s solicitation of that bid. Likewise, Defendant’s billing invoices may have been sent to
Arkansas, but that is because that is where Plaintiff chose to locate. Nothing in the contract
directed that invoices be sent to Arkansas—only to Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s actions dictated that these
events be directed into Arkansas. A plaintiff’s “unilateral performance in the forum state is
insufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over” a defendant. Mountaire Feeds,
Inc. v. Agro Impex, S. A., 677 F.2d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 1982). Any activities Defendant directed at
Arkansas primarily comprise use of the arteries of interstate commerce. That Arkansas was the
terminus for the arteries of interstate commerce used by Plaintiff and Defendant does not render
this state an appropriate forum. See Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co.,
KG, 646 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that when communications and payments into
a state are incidental, rather than purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the forum
state, those activities are too attenuated to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction).
This is a dispute that arises out of Defendant’s contacts with Texas, not Arkansas.

1

Plaintiff’s speculation about Defendant’s other business dealings in Arkansas, and
whether Defendant’s representatives or agents have come to Arkansas, are immaterial to the
specific jurisdiction analysis because the dispute does not arise out of or relate to those contacts.
6

Defendant’s performance of its obligations was to be in Texas. Whether Defendant’s conduct
breached the contracts is the focus of this lawsuit. The bid and billing invoices are incidental to
that conduct. This Court does not have specific jurisdiction over Defendant.
Because the Court is granting the motion to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction, it
does not reach the alternative relief requested in the motion.
III.

Conlcusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is

GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Judgment will be entered
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of May, 2017.

/s/P. K. Holmes, III
P.K. HOLMES, III
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

7