Blevins v. Crawford County Detention Center

Filing 8

ORDER re 7 Amended Complaint, filed by Daniel Lee Blevins. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Honorable P. K. Holmes, III on March 2, 2018. (mjm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION

DANIEL LEE BLEVINS
v.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 2:18-CV-02020

LT. CUPP and SHERIFF RON BROWN

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
The case is before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to
screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on February 1, 2018. (ECF No. 1). He was directed to file an
Amended Complaint, and did so on February 20, 2018. (ECF No. 7). He alleges his constitutional
rights were violated when he was incarcerated in the Crawford County Detention Center. (ECF
No. 1, 7). Plaintiff alleges that on August 17, 2017, Defendants opened his legal mail without
Plaintiff being present. Plaintiff alleges they cut open the envelope, put scotch tape over the
postmark, and “told me the sender done it.” (ECF No. 7 at 4).
Plaintiff proceeds against all Defendants in their official capacities only. (ECF No. 7 at 4).
Plaintiff did not indicate what damages he seeks. (ECF No. 7 at 7).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are

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frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or, (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it
does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted
sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537,
541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Even a pro se Plaintiff
must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337
(8th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff failed to state any plausible official capacity claims. Under Section 1983, a
defendant may be sued in either his individual capacity, or in his official capacity, or in both. In
Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed
the distinction between individual and official capacity suits. As explained by the Court in
Gorman:
“Claims against government actors in their individual capacities differ from those
in their official capacities as to the type of conduct that is actionable and as to the
type of defense that is available. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358,
116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). Claims against individuals in their official capacities are
equivalent to claims against the entity for which they work; they require proof that
a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the only type of
immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself. Id. 502 U.S. at 24-27, 112
S.Ct. at 361-62 (1991). Personal capacity claims, on the other hand, are those which
allege personal liability for individual actions by officials in the course of their
duties; these claims do not require proof of any policy and qualified immunity may
be raised as a defense. Id. 502 U.S. at 25-27, 112 S.Ct. at 362.”
Gorman, 152 F.3d at 914.
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Here, Plaintiff failed to allege that his rights were violated by a custom or policy of
Crawford County, and the Court can infer none from a single incident of opened mail. He therefore
failed to state a plausible official capacity claim.
If Plaintiff had intended to state a personal capacity claim, his Complaint also failed to state
a plausible personal capacity claim. The Eighth Circuit has
never held or suggested that an isolated, inadvertent instance of opening incoming
confidential legal mail will support a § 1983 damage action. Rather, we agree with
other circuits that an “isolated incident, without any evidence of improper motive
or resulting interference with [the inmate's] right to counsel or to access to the
courts, does not give rise to a constitutional violation.”
Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997). Further, “[t]o assert a successful
claim for denial of meaningful access to the courts ... an inmate must demonstrate that he suffered
prejudice.” Id.

Here Plaintiff has alleged a single incident of his mail being opened, and that

Defendants told him the mail arrived at the facility in that condition. Plaintiff provided no
allegation as to the contents of his legal mail, the existence of improper motive, or any resultant
prejudice to his case. Plaintiff therefore failed to state a plausible personal capacity claim.
For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 2nd day of March 2018.

/s/P. K. Holmes, III
P. K. HOLMES, III
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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