Young et al v. Holloman et al
Filing
93
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 91 Motion to Set Aside Default; the Clerk's entry of default 68 is SET ASIDE. Signed by Honorable P. K. Holmes III on September 30, 2019. (hnc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
TRINA MARIE YOUNG, et al.
v.
PLAINTIFFS
No. 2:18-CV-02055
CRAIG ANTHONY HOLLOMAN, et al.
DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a motion (Doc. 91) to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default of H&P
Leasing, Inc. (“H&P”) and a brief (Doc. 92) in support of the motion. No response has been filed
but no response is necessary. The motion will be granted.
Plaintiffs initiated this action on March 16, 2018 against three defendants. At multiple
times during discovery, Plaintiffs identified other parties they allege may have liability in this
action. As a result, Plaintiffs have amended their complaint four times—the last to cure a
jurisdictional deficiency identical to one that the Court previously ordered to be corrected.
Plaintiffs served H&P with the second amended complaint on April 1, 2019. H&P failed to appear,
answer, or otherwise respond, and the Clerk entered H&P’s default on May 30, 2019. (Doc. 68).
H&P filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint and now moves to set aside its
default, arguing that its earlier default is mooted by the filing of an amended complaint, or in the
alternative, that good cause exists to set aside its default.
With respect to H&P’s argument that its default is moot, because H&P was properly served
with the second amended complaint and had not appeared by the deadline to do so, the fourth
amended complaint was not required to be served upon them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2). It makes
little sense that an entry of default be moot as a matter of law when a plaintiff need not re-serve a
defaulting defendant. Such a rule would run counter to the Rule 5. Moreover, though the Court
1
denied default judgment with respect to H&P, the Clerk properly entered H&P’s default for its
failure to timely appear. Procedurally speaking, the law is clear that H&P remains in default even
though Plaintiff filed two additional amended complaints.
However, the entry of default may be set aside for good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). This
stems from a strong preference for adjudication on the merits and an interest in preserving the
“fundamental fairness of the adjudicatory process.” Oberstar v. F.D.I.C., 987 F.2d 494, 504 (8th
Cir. 1993). “When examining whether good cause exists, the district court should weigh whether
the conduct of the defaulting party was blameworthy or culpable, whether the defaulting party has
a meritorious defense, and whether the other party would be prejudiced if the default were
excused.” Stephenson v. El-Batrawi, 524 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
omitted). Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced if the default is set aside as Plaintiffs themselves have
amended their complaint four times—the last amendment as recently as one month ago. H&P’s
defense appears not only meritorious, but compelling. Finally, though H&P is responsible for its
own lack of diligence, its culpability in this case does not overcome the Court’s strong preference
for adjudication on the merits. The Court finds this good cause to set aside the default of H&P.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant H&P Leasing Inc.’s motion to set aside
the entry of default (Doc. 91) is GRANTED, and the Clerk’s entry of default (Doc. 68) is SET
ASIDE.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of September, 2019.
/s/P. K. Holmes, III
P.K. HOLMES, III
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
2
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?