Alverson v. White

Filing 7

ORDER re 1 Complaint Referred (42:1983) filed by David Conrad Alverson, Sr., Plaintiff's claims against Separate Defendants Sheriff Ron Brown and Lt. Vena Cupp are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The claims as against Separate Defendant Dr. Jonathan White remain. Signed by Honorable P. K. Holmes, III on April 24, 2018. (hnc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION

DAVID CONRAD ALVERSON, SR.
v.

PLAINTIFF

Civil No. 2:18-cv-02067

SHERIFF RON BROWN, Crawford County, Arkansas;
DR. JONATHAN WHITE; and LT. VENA CUPP

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The case is before the Court for preservice screening under
the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 5, 2018. (ECF No. 1). That same day, the Court
granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4).
According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, he is currently in jail in the Crawford County Justice
Center, serving six (6) months on a misdemeanor charge. (ECF No. 1). With respect to each
claim, the Plaintiff names each Defendant in his or her personal capacity only. On eight different
dates, spanning from February 12, 2018 to March 23, 2018, the Plaintiff asserts that he was denied
medical care. Initially, the Plaintiff states that he “notified them that I could barely urinate, that I
had blood in my urine, and that I was in a lot of pain they sent me back to the Pod and said they
would send for my medical records. No treatment given.” (ECF No. 1, p. 4). The Plaintiff
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complained again of pain on February 13, 2018; he was put on doctor’s call and was asked to sign
a release for the receipt of his medical records.
On February 19, 2018, the Plaintiff states he “was put on flomax. No further treatment.
Nothing done bout bleeding and pain.” (ECF No. 1, p. 8). The Plaintiff complained again of
bleeding and pain on February 25, 2018 and no treatment was given. (ECF No. 1, p. 8). The
Plaintiff states that he was examined again on March 17, 2018. The doctor increased his Flomax
but no other treatment was given. (ECF No. 1, p. 9). Finally, the Plaintiff states that he again
notified “medical” of his same complaints and asked, on two occasions, to file a grievance. (ECF
No. 1, p. 9, 10). The Plaintiff was given no further treatment.
As previously stated, the Plaintiff is suing each Defendant in their personal capacities only.
He is seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
II.

APPLICABLE LAW

Under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or, (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it
does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted
sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537,
541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Even a pro se Plaintiff

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must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8
Cir. 1985).
III.

DISCUSSION

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a
citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that the defendant
acted under color of state law and that he violated a right secured by the Constitution. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999). The
deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation
of a constitutional right under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert a negligence claim, it is
insufficient as a matter of law.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel
and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
of the Eighth Amendment forbids conditions that involve the “wanton and unnecessary infliction
of pain,” or are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety
and general well-being.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998) (citation
omitted). The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit
inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In order to prevail on a claim

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for deprivation of medical care, an inmate must show that a prison official was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical need. Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997).
“‘The [Plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious medical
needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs.’”
Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d
1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)).
Here Plaintiff states that he was denied appropriate medical care on several instances. With
the exception of claims 5 and 7, the Plaintiff lists all three Defendants on his claims. However,
nowhere in the Complaint has the Plaintiff alleged that either Separate Defendant Sheriff Ron
Brown or Lt. Vena Cupp directly participated in the alleged unconstitutional violations. “Liability
under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”
Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “A supervisor is not
vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional activity.” White v.
Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994). Instead, the supervisor must be personally involved in
the alleged constitutional violation or his . . . inaction must constitute deliberate indifference
towards the constitutional violation. Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995).
Because the Plaintiff has failed to include any allegations against either Separate Defendant
Sheriff Ron Brown or Lt. Vena Cupp, who are both named in their personal capacities only,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against them. All claims against Separate Defendants Sheriff
Ron Brown and Lt. Vena Cupp are dismissed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Separate Defendants Sheriff Ron
Brown and Lt. Vena Cupp are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

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The claims as against Separate Defendant Dr. Jonathan White remain for resolution.
Service will be addressed by separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of April 2018.
/s/P. K. Holmes, III
P.K. HOLMES, III
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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