Hendrix et al v. Fredonomics, LLC

Filing 35

ORDER GRANTING (in part) 28 Plaintiffs' Motion for Statutory Attorney Fees. Signed by Honorable Timothy L. Brooks on March 7, 2025. (Brooks, Timothy)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
LANCE HENDRIX and LACEY HENDRIX
V.

PLAINTIFFS

CASE NO. 2:23-CV-2144

FREDONOMICS, LLC

DEFENDANT
ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Petition for Statutory Attorney Fees (Doc. 28).
According to Arkansas Code § 18-60-419(a), “when a judgment is rendered for partition
in kind, or a sale and a partition of the proceeds, the court rendering the judgment or
decree shall allow a reasonable fee to the attorney bringing the suit.” However, according
to subsection (b):
(1) When judgment is rendered by a court of this state for partition of realty
in kind, or for the sale of realty and partition of the proceeds of the sale,
the court in assessing a reasonable fee to be allowed the attorney
bringing the action shall consider only those services performed by the
attorney requesting a fee which are of common benefit to all parties.
(2) The court shall assess no fee for services which benefit only one (1)
party, such as services necessary for the preparation and trial of
contested issues of title or services for which payment has been made
by the agreement of the parties.
(emphasis added).
Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to the payment of their reasonable
attorney’s fees since they brought this partition action and it resulted in this Court’s entry
of a judgment of sale—albeit by consent of the parties and on the eve of trial. Defendant’s
Response in Opposition to the Motion (Doc. 3) argues that only a state court may award
fees under this statute; in the alternative, Defendant argues that if this Court were

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empowered to award fees, none of Plaintiff’s counsel’s services benefited “all parties,” as
the statute requires.
Preliminarily the Court finds that it possesses the legal authority to award fees
under § 18-60-419 because it is settled law that a federal court sitting in diversity may
apply and enforce state substantive law. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965)
(citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)); see also Hortica-Florists’ Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Pittman Nursery Corp., 729 F.3d 846, 852 (8th Cir. 2013) (observing that in
diversity cases, “[s]tate law governing attorneys’ fees is generally ‘substantive’”). Plaintiffs
filed this action in Crawford County Circuit Court requesting either the partition or sale of
real property under Arkansas law, and Defendant removed the case under the diversity
statute. See Doc. 2 (Notice of Removal). If a federal court were barred from enforcing
state attorney’s fee statutes, this would certainly encourage forum shopping, which the
Erie doctrine was put in place to avoid. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467–68 (citing Erie, 304
U.S. at 73–74).
Given that the Court could award fees under § 18-60-419, if appropriate, the only
remaining issue is whether fees should be awarded here. Defendant maintains that an
award would be inappropriate because all parties did not benefit from Plaintiff’s counsel’s
services. The Court generally agrees. This matter was highly adversarial in nature from
its inception, and none of the services listed on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s invoice leading up to
the parties’ settlement benefited Defendant. Instead, the only services that Plaintiffs’
counsel rendered for the benefit of all parties concerned the preparation of the consent
judgment and order of sale, which the Court received by email on January 31, 2025. The

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parties agreed that the property at issue should be sold at public auction by the United
States Marshals Service.
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s bill states that on January 20, he prepared and reviewed
“Finding[s] of Fact” and revised and edited “stipulated Facts,” (Doc. 28, p. 8); but these
task descriptions are not detailed enough to permit the Court to infer that this work was
done in preparation of settlement as opposed to trial. By contrast, the entry on February
10 for one hour’s time to “Prepare & review Order for Sale” is just descriptive enough to
show an intent to benefit all parties. Id. Plaintiff’s counsel charged his clients $350.00 for
this work. See id. 1
The only task left is to set the amount of the fee award. The following factors are
relevant: (1) the experience and ability of counsel; (2) the time and labor required to
perform the legal service properly; (3) the amount involved in the case and the results
obtained; (4) the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved; (5) the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar services; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)
the time limitations imposed upon the client or by the circumstances; and (8) the likelihood
that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer. Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 229 (1990).
In analyzing these factors, the Court is persuaded that one hour of time was
reasonable to complete the work. The issues involved were not particularly novel or
difficult. The Court has no information about counsel’s other work or priorities. As for an
appropriate hourly rate, the Court finds that the rate customarily charged in the Fort Smith

1 As for the two time entries on February 11, there is no description of the services

rendered except “emails to/from,” which is too vague to permit an inference that the work
benefited all parties. (Doc. 28, p. 8).
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legal market for similar services by a qualified attorney is $250.00, not $350.00.
Accordingly, the Court will award Plaintiffs $250.00 in fees.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Petition for Statutory Attorney Fees
(Doc. 28) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as explained above. Defendant
is to pay Plaintiffs $250.00 in fees under § 18-60-419.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 7th day of March, 2025.
_____________________________
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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