Compton v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 14

ORDER granting 11 Motion for Attorney Fees in the amount of $2,525.38, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. Signed by Honorable James R. Marschewski on August 19, 2011. (sh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HARRISON DIVISION

TRACY COMPTON
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL NO. 09-3089

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT
ORDER

Plaintiff, Tracy Compton, appealed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits to this court.
ECF No. 1. On February 16, 2011, judgment was entered remanding Plaintiff’s case to the
Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 10. Plaintiff now
moves for an award of $3,330.98 in attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), requesting compensation for 20.83 attorney hours at an hourly
rate of $152.00 and $55.38 in expenses. ECF Nos. 11, 12. Defendant filed a response objecting
not to an award of fees, but to the method of payment.1 ECF No. 13.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney’s fees to a
prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner’s position in denying benefits was
substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for
the government’s denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After
reviewing the file, we find Plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v.
Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four
judgment reversing the Commissioner’s denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

1

On June 14, 2010, the Supreme Court held that an EAJA fee award is payable to the prevailing
litigant, not the prevailing litigant’s attorney. Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521, 2252-2253 (2010). Therefore,
any EAJA fee awarded by this court should be payable directly to Plaintiff.

AO72A
(Rev. 8/82)

proceedings is a prevailing party.
An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion
of the case, Plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)
was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,
535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99
Stat. 186 (1985).
To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary
standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a
claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or
her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.
Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under
both acts facilitates the purpose of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the prevailing
party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action. Id. See
also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).
The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit “an itemized
statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were
computed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting
statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with “contemporaneous time
records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of
the work.” Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).

-2-

AO72A
(Rev. 8/82)

In determining a reasonable attorney’s fee, the court will in each case consider the
following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required
to handle the problems presented; the attorney’s experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits
resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency
or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,
588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is “in the best position to evaluate counsel’s
services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand
counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim.” Hickey v. Secretary
of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir.
1989)). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in the
absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th
Cir. 1992) (“Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an
accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.”).
The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,
amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to
$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the
EAJA at an hourly rate of $152.00. ECF No. 11.
Attorney’s fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour, the maximum
statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A), unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living
or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28
-3-

AO72A
(Rev. 8/82)

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains
at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In
Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be
increased when there is “uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify
hourly attorney’s fees of more than $75.00 an hour,” such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index.
In this case, counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit and has
presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. ECF No. 11, Ex. B. Accordingly, the
undersigned finds that counsel is entitled to an hourly rate of $152.00.
Attorney Hours
The court next addresses the number of hours Plaintiff’s counsel claims he spent working
on this case. Counsel seeks reimbursement for .75 hours for serving the complaint and 2.50
hours for preparing and filing the EAJA petition, memorandum, and exhibits. This court
concludes that it should not have taken an attorney experienced in handling social security cases
this amount of time to perform this task. Bowman v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp. 898
(E.D.Ark. 1989). Moreover, serving the complaint is a task that could have been performed by
support staff. See Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.
1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff is not compensable under the
EAJA). The court grants counsel 1.50 hours for preparing the EAJA motion and accompanying
documents. Accordingly, the undersigned deducts 1.75 hours from the total number of
compensable hours.
Counsel also requests compensation for a total of 15.55 hours for reviewing the
transcript, analyzing the law, and drafting and editing the appeal brief. However, there were no

-4-

AO72A
(Rev. 8/82)

unique or complex issues to be developed in this particular case, and the transcript was
approximately 270 pages in length. Plaintiff’s counsel frequently represents social security
claimants before this court and should be well versed in social security law. Accordingly, the
court finds that the time submitted for preparing the appeal brief is excessive. Therefore, the
court will reduce the number of hours submitted for the preparation of Plaintiff’s brief to 12.00
hours. Accordingly, the undersigned deducts 3.55 hours from the total number of compensable
hours.
Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $55.38 in expenses incurred with regard to
postage and copies. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and the court finds $55.38
to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).
Based on the above, we award Plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA for: 16.25 (21.555.30) attorney hours, at the rate of $152.00 per hour, plus expenses in the amount $55.38, for a
total attorney's fee award of $2,525.38. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out
of, any past due benefits which Plaintiff may be awarded in the future. Further, this award
should be paid directly to Plaintiff. See Astrue, 130 S.Ct. at 2529.
The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account
at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent
double recovery by counsel for the Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 19th day of August 2011.

/s/ J. Marschewski
HONORABLE JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-5-

AO72A
(Rev. 8/82)