Biggs v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable James R. Marschewski on August 23, 2012. (lw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
Civil No. 11-3066
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
Social Security Administration
Plaintiff, Jennifer Biggs, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of
a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying her claim
for supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “the
Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). In this judicial review, the court must determine
whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner’s
decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The plaintiff filed her application for SSI on October 8, 2008, alleging an onset date of March
2 2002, due to chiari malformation1, anxiety disorder, and lower back problems. Tr. 131-135, 153, 161162 189-197, 202-208, 209, 210. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application initially and on
reconsideration. Tr. 75-80, 131-137. An administrative hearing was held on December 1, 2009. Tr. 2366. Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel.
At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 33 years old and possessed a high school education. Tr.
27. She had past relevant work experience as a data entry clerk during the last fifteen years, although
she spent most of the relevant time period as a homemaker. Tr. 29-31, 154, 171, 211.
Chiari Malformation is a condition in which the brain tissue protrudes into the spinal canal. Mayo
Foundation for Medical Education and Research, Chiari Malformation, www.mayoclinic.com (Last visited
August 20, 2012). It occurs when part of the skull is abnormally small or misshape, pressing on the brain and
forcing it downward. Id. Symptoms include headaches, neck pain, an unsteady gait, poor hand coordination,
numbness and tingling of the hands and feet, dizziness, difficulty swallowing, visual problems, and slurred
On May 19, 2010, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s Chiari malformation, degenerative disk disease
(“DDD”), obesity, headaches, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), anxiety, bipolar
disorder, and depression were severe, but concluded they did not meet or medically equal one of the
listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. Tr. 11. After partially discrediting
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ determined that plaintiff retained the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work that does not involve sustained driving; climbing scaffolds,
ladders, or ropes; and, work near unprotected heights and/or dangerous equipment and requires only
occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, stooping, bending, crouching, crawling, kneeling, and balancing.
Tr. 12. With regard to her mental impairments, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could perform routine,
repetitive work in which superficial contact is incidental to work with the public and co-workers and
such work has non-complex, simple instructions and is learned and performed by rote with few variables,
little required judgment, and concrete, direct, and specific supervision. Tr. 12. With the assistance of
a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work as a poultry eviscerator and
production line assembler. Tr. 16.
Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council, but said request for review was denied
on June 6, 2011. Tr. 1-5. Subsequently, plaintiff filed this action. ECF No. 1. This case is before the
undersigned by consent of the parties. Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready
for decision. ECF Nos. 6, 7.
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments are
presented in the parties’ briefs and the ALJ’s opinion, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.
This court’s role is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it
adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. The ALJ's decision must be affirmed if the record
contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome, or because the court would have decided the case differently. Haley v.
Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings
of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and
that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d
1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her
disability, not simply their impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.
The Commissioner’s regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process
to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity
since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment or
combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment in the listings;
(4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the
claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy given his age, education, and experience.
See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)- (f)(2003). Only if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider
the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her residual functional capacity. See
McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C .F.R. § § 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by substituting ALJ’s without holding a supplemental
hearing, failing to properly consider her subjective complaints and all of her impairments in combination,
concluding that she retained the RFC to perform a significant range of light work, failing to evaluate her
obesity in accordance with Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 02-1p, and failing to undertake the functionby-function analysis of Plaintiff’s restrictions as is required by SSR’s 96-8p and 96-7p.
Substitution of ALJ Shepherd:
The Administrative hearing was held before ALJ Smith, but the opinion was issued by ALJ
Shepherd. Plaintiff contends that a supplemental hearing was necessary because observation of the
witnesses is a critical element in a credibility determination. And, without a supplemental hearing, ALJ
Shepherd did not have the opportunity to make such observations. However, “[a] change in personnel
occurring during the course of or at the close of an administrative hearing does not as such give rise to
constitutional repugnance in a decision or order made by the administrative tribunal on the basis of the
previous hearing.” Gamble–Skogmo v. FTC, 211 F.2d 106, 112 (8th Cir. 1954) (citations omitted); see
also Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n v. McNutt, 122 F.2d 564, 569 (8th Cir. 1941) (“It is well settled that
a change of personnel in an administrative agency or tribunal during the course of a hearing, or at any
time before the issuance of a final order on the hearing, does not invalidate the order.”).
Plaintiff also is unable to show the substitution of ALJ Shepherd prejudiced her. See
Briones–Sanchez v. Heinauer, 319 F.3d 324, 327 (8th Cir. 2003) (“In order to succeed on a due process
claim, an alien must prove that he was actually prejudiced by the lack of process afforded to him.”);
Southard v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1459 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion) (reasoning the
claimant did not show prejudice from the Department of Health and Human Services’ alleged failure to
provide notice). A review of ALJ’s opinion makes clear that he properly discharged his official duties
and reviewed the testimony from the administrative hearing. See United States v. Chem. Found., Inc.,
272 U.S. 1, 14–15, 47 S.Ct. 1, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926) (“The presumption of regularity supports the official
acts of public officers, and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they
have properly discharged their official duties.”); United States v. Ahrens, 530 F.2d 781, 785–86 (8th Cir.
1976) (applying the presumption of regularity to conclude an IRS employee properly recorded tax
information on notice provided to the claimant); Cupples Co. Mfrs. v. N.L.R.B., 103 F.2d 953, 958 (8th
Cir. 1939) (applying the presumption of regularity to conclude members of the National Labor Relations
Board sufficiently considered all evidence before making a decision). More importantly, however, his
conclusion that Plaintiff was not “disabled” relied predominately upon inconsistencies in the medical
record as opposed to credibility determinations based upon witness testimony, thus diminishing the need
to observe the testimony personally. See Gamble–Skogmo, Inc., 211 F.2d at 115 (noting de novo review
by substituted examiner would have been unnecessary had the decision not relied upon credibility
determinations requiring seeing and hearing witnesses’ testimony). For these reasons, we conclude the
substitution of ALJ Shepherd for ALJ Smith did not violate Plaintiff’s due process rights. Wilburn v.
Astrue, 626 F.3d 999, 1003 (8th Cir. 2010).
Subjective Complaints and Combination of Impairments:
The ALJ was required to consider all the evidence relating to Plaintiff’s subject complaints,
including evidence presented by third parties that relates to: 1) Plaintiff’s daily activities; 2) the duration,
frequency, and intensity of his pain; 3) precipitation and aggravating factors; 4) dosage, effectiveness,
and side effects of her medication; and, 5) function restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320,
1322 (8th Cir. 1984). While an ALJ may not discount the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints solely
because the medical evidence fails to support them, an ALJ may discount those complaints where
inconsistencies appear in the record as a whole. Id. As the Eighth Circuit has observed, “Our touchstone
is that [a claimant’s] cerdibilty is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide.” Edwards v. Barnhart, 314
F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003).
Likewise, the ALJ must consider a claimant’s impairments in combination and not fragmentize
them in evaluating their effects. Delrosa v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Johnson
v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 872 F.2d 810, 812 (8th Cir. 1989)). In the present case,
therefore, the ALJ was obligated to consider the combined effect of [Plaintiff]’s physical and mental
impairments. Id. at 484 (citing Reinhart v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 571, 573 (8th
Cir. 1984) and Wroblewski v. Califano, 609 F.2d 908, 914 (8th Cir. 1979)). It should be noted that
Plaintiff alleged numerous impairments. Under these circumstances, the Social Security Act requires
the Commissioner to consider all impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if
considered separately, would be of sufficient medical severity to be disabling. Cunningham v. Apfel, 222
F.3d 496, 501 (8th Cir. 2000); Hajek v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1994) (where ALJ found that
claimant did not have impairment or combination equaling listing-level impairment and referred to
evidence as a whole, ALJ properly considered combined effect of impairments).
The ALJ noted that the medical records from Plaintiff’s treating physicians showed that her
chiari malformation, headaches, and chronic back and neck pain were effectively treated with
conservative measures with no evidence of symptom progression. See Smith v. Shalala, 987 F.2d 1371,
1374 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that treating physician’s conservative treatment was inconsistent with
plaintiff’s allegations of disabling pain). An MRI of her cervical spine conducted in February 2008
showed focal disk protrusion at the C5-6 level with no significant spinal stenosis or neuroforaminal
encroachment. In April 2008, Dr. David Brown, a neurologist noted that Plaintiff’s chiari malformation
did not require surgery, and assessed Plaintiff with chronic daily headaches of uncertain etiology, for
which he prescribed Topamax Tr. 263-265. At a follow-up visit in May 2008, Plaintiff reported that her
headaches had improved “quite a bit.” Tr. 280. An MRI of her cervical spine taken at this time showed
C5-6 level disc disease with only mild bulging disc and slight kyphosis of the cervical spine, and “very
minimal” chiari malformation, which Dr. Brown considered to be within “normal limits.” Tr. 470.
Chiropractic notes from May 2008, also indicate that Plaintiff’s progress was better than expected with
regard to treatment of her lower back and neck pain. Tr. 221-224. See Forte v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 892,
895 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that lack of objective medical evidence is a factor an ALJ may consider).
And, Plaintiff reported improvement from a series of facet nerve block injections administered by Dr.
Jared Ennis between February 2009, through November 2009 for degenerative cervical facet spondylosis
and cervical spine pain. Tr. 296-305, 569-577. Patrick v. Barnhart, 323 F.3d 592, 596 (8th Cir. 2003)
(holding if an impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be considered
disabling). In fact, she reported both pain relief and improvement in her level of activity following the
injections. Tr. 302-305, 572-573.
Further, in June 2009, Plaintiff reported bilateral calf pain after roping a steer, and she also
reported the ability to care for her dog, care for children, care for personal hygiene, prepare simple meals
daily, do the laundry, wash the dishes, perform general household clean up chores, drive, ride in a car,
go outside, shop for groceries and toiletries, read, play on the internet, listen to music, visit friends, play
cards, and attend school activities and functions. Tr. 52, 163-167, 566-567. See Pena v. Chater, 76 F.3d
906, 908 (8th Cir. 1996) (ability to care for one child, occasionally drive, and sometimes go to the store);
Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1996) (ability to visit neighbors, cook, do laundry, and
attend church); Novotny v. Chater, 72 F.3d at 671 (ability to carry out garbage, carry grocery bags, and
drive); Johnston v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1994) (claimant’s ability to read, watch television,
and drive indicated his pain did not interfere with his ability to concentrate); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d
1210, 1213-1214 (8th Cir. 1993) (ability to live alone, drive, grocery shop, and perform housework with
some help from a neighbor). Clearly, these are not the daily activities one would expect a disabled
person to be able to perform.
With respect to Plaintiff’s mental limitations, the ALJ noted that the medical evidence of record
indicates Plaintiff’s anxiety, bipolar disorder, and ADHD were also effectively treated with conservative
measures, with no evidence of episodes of decompensation. In April 2009, Dr. Thomas Lawson
administered a battery of psychological tests and concluded that her anxiety, depression, and inattention
ratings fell within the clinical range. Further, her hyperactivity impulsivity ratings fell within the normal
to borderline range with bipolar ratings in the clinical range. He recommended behavioral and
counseling strategies and consultation with her physician for possible medication management,
beginning with the bipolar concerns. Tr. 289-292. In May 2009, Dr. Kathleen Wong found that Plaintiff
had no auditory or visual hallucinations, and no current suicidal or homicidal ideation. Tr. 459-462.
Additionally, her thought processes were “mostly” logical and sequential with fair judgment and limited
insight. Tr. 461. She diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar disorder, PTSD, and ADHD, and assessed her
with a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 51, which is indicative of only moderate
symptomology. Tr. 461. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS IV-TR
34 (4th ed. 2000). And, repeated exams with treating doctor, Dr. Steve Shrum revealed an appropriate
affect with normal speech and thought content/perception, although she carried a diagnosis of ADHD.
Tr. 242-243, 560-561, 564-565, 566-567.
In October 2009, notes from Vista Health Outpatient Services revealed reports of mood swings,
anxiety, depression, poor concentration, impulsiveness, risk taking behaviors, and fatigue. Tr. 332-339.
Medical staff found Plaintiff fully oriented with normal affect, a cooperative attitude, intact thought
processes, appropriate thought content, and normal judgment, insight, and memory. She was alert with
no indication of suicidality. Tr. 334. They recommended individual and marital therapy, but there is no
evidence of a regular course of treatment by any mental health professional. Tr. 332. And, by November
2009, Plaintiff reported adequate mood management, and it was noted that she should return on an as
needed basis. Tr. 580, 581. Further, we note that Plaintiff remained able to visit friends and attend her
children’s school activities and functions. Tr. 163-167.
There is also contradictory evidence as to why Plaintiff quit work and stopped attending college
in 2008. And, “[t]he ALJ may discount subjective complaints of pain if inconsistencies are apparent
in the evidence as a whole.” Gray v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir.1999). Plaintiff testified that she
had to take Xanax daily to attend college and that it was extremely difficult for her to maintain attention
and concentration. Tr. 57. However, she told Dr. Lawson that she quit school after passing out due to
her pain. Tr. 459-462. And, Plaintiff also admitted that she stopped working to take care of her disabled
daughter, who suffers from cerebral palsy, rather than due to her own disability, but later told an
examiner at Vista Health that she had lost her job due to extreme fear/anxiety/panic. Tr. 153. Pearsall
v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1218(8th Cir. 2001) (“A lack of work history may indicate a lack of
motivation to work rather than a lack of ability.” (citation omitted)). These inconsistencies distract from
her credibility. Accordingly, we feel that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
and their combined effects.
RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical records, observations
of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of his limitations. Guilliams v.
Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir.
2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a
“claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th
Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by
medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart,
353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically a claimant’s
limitations and to determine how those limitations affect his RFC.” Id.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, in the instant case the ALJ conducted a thorough analysis of
the evidence of record, including the objective medical evidence and other evidence, as well as Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints. On November 11, 2008, Dr. David Hicks reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records
and concluded that Plaintiff could perform a full range of light work. Tr. 268-275. However,
considering all of the evidence, including the limiting effects of her obesity, the ALJ limited her to light
work that did not involve sustained driving; climbing scaffolds, ladders, or ropes; and, work near
unprotected heights and/or dangerous equipment and requires only occasional climbing of ramps and
stairs, stooping, bending, crouching, crawling, kneeling, and balancing.
Further, due to Plaintiff’s ADHD, anxiety, bipolar disorder, and depression, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff could perform routine, repetitive work in which superficial contact is incidental to work with
the public and co-workers and such work has non-complex, simple instructions and is learned and
performed by rote with few variables, little required judgment, and concrete, direct, and specific
supervision. After reviewing the medical evidence indicating that Plaintiff’s condition was responsive
to medication and therapy, that her mood swings were under adequate control, that she and her husband
were involved in an open marriage2, and that she was able to visit with friends and attend her children’s
school related activities and events, we find substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination in
We note that the ALJ specifically addressed the weight given to the examining, non-examining,
and treating physicians, and the Court finds that the RFC took into consideration all of the limitations
which were supported by the record.
Plaintiff has indicated that she and her husband have an open marriage, allowing for each of them to
have intimate relations with other people. Tr. 581. We find that her ability to be around others in this capacity
calls into question her reports of anxiety that prevents her from being around strangers and/or crowds.
SSR 02-1p provides guidance for evaluating obesity. It recognizes that obesity can cause
limitation of function. The functions likely to be limited depend on many factors, including where the
excess weight is carried. However, an individual may have limitations in any of the exertional functions
such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling. It may also affect the
individual’s ability to do postural activities, such as climb, balance, stoop, and crouch. SSR 02-1p
further explains that the combined effects of obesity with other impairments may be greater than might
be expected without obesity providing “[f]or example, someone with obesity and arthritis affecting a
weight-bearing joint may have more pain and limitation than might be expected from the arthritis alone.”
In the present case, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s obesity clearly contributed to the severity of
her condition and resulted in limited mobility and increased health risk, highlighting the medical
evidence documenting her morbid obesity and BMI of 47. He also concluded that her obesity was a
severe impairment and incorporated it into his residual functional capacity assessment, prohibiting her
from climbing scaffolds, ladders, or ropes, and limiting her to only occasional climbing ramps and stairs,
stooping, bending, crouching, crawling, kneeling, and balancing. And, after reviewing the evidence,
while we do agree that Plaintiff’s physical limitations were exacerbated by her obesity, we can find no
evidence to indicate that her obesity prevented her from performing the range of light work identified
by the ALJ.
Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ failed to undertake a “function by function” analysis as is
required by SSR’s 96-8p and 96-7p. SSR 96-8p requires a function-by-function analysis of the
claimant’s restrictions. The RFC assessment must not only identify the individual’s functional
limitations or restrictions, but also assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function
basis, including the functions in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 20 CFR 404.1545 and 416.945.
SSR 96-7p states that “[i]t is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a single, conclusory
statement that ‘the individual's allegations have been considered’ or that ‘the allegations are (or are not)
credible.’ It is also not enough for the adjudicator simply to recite the factors that are described in the
regulations for evaluating symptoms. The determination or decision must contain specific reasons for
the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific
to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the
individual's statements and the reasons for that weight.”
Plaintiff states that Judge Shepherd merely made broad unsupportive statements discrediting her
pain and its limitations stating her “. . . degree of pain relief seeking behavior and treatment is not
indicative of a degree of pain that would limit activities beyond the scope of the residual functional
capacity as determined in this decision.” We do not agree. As discussed above, the ALJ evaluated the
objective evidence coupled with her Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and based his RFC assessment on
substantial evidence. And. the fact that Plaintiff’s condition was treated via conservative measures,
rather than requiring surgical intervention, is certainly a fact that the ALJ may take into consideration.
See Smith, 987 F.2d at 1374 (holding that treating physician’s conservative treatment was inconsistent
with plaintiff’s allegations of disabling pain).
The Eighth Circuit has held that an ALJ can meet the requirements of SSR 96-8p without making
explicit findings with respect to every possible functional limitation. See Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d
653, 567 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding no violation of SSR 96-8p where ALJ made explicit findings in the
residual functional capacity assessment, despite not making explicit findings with respect to sitting,
standing and walking). Although not defined in the opinion, the regulations provide that light work
involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing
up to 10 pounds and standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour
workday. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (1990). He then goes on to conclude that, based on all of the
evidence of record, she can not perform work involving sustained driving; climbing scaffolds, ladders,
or ropes and, work near unprotected heights and/or dangerous equipment; can only occasionally
occasional climb ramps and stairs, stoop, bend, crouch, crawl, kneel, and balance; and could perform
routine, repetitive work in which superficial contact is incidental to work with the public and co-workers
and such work has non-complex, simple instructions and is learned and performed by rote with few
variables, little required judgment, and concrete, direct, and specific supervision. As such, we find no
merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to appropriately conduct a function-by-function analysis.
Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ's decision denying the plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision should be affirmed.
The undersigned further finds that the plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 23rd day of August 2012.
HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?