Computer Automation Systems, Inc. v. Intelutions, Inc.

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Honorable P. K. Holmes, III on February 8, 2013. (jas)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HARRISON DIVISION
COMPUTER AUTOMATION
SYSTEMS, INC.
v.

PLAINTIFF
Case No. 3:12-CV-03146

INTELUTIONS, INC.

DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Currently before the Court are Defendant Intelutions, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction, Improper Venue, and Failure to Join a Necessary Party (Doc. 13), and brief in support;
Plaintiff Computer Automation Systems, Inc.’s Response in Opposition (Doc. 19) and brief in
support; Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 23); and Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply (Doc. 28). For the reasons sets forth
below, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 13), without addressing
Defendant’s alternative bases for dismissal, including improper venue and failure to join a necessary
party.
I. Background
According to the Complaint (Doc. 1) and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2), both
filed on November 16, 2012, Plaintiff Computer Automation Systems, Inc. alleges that Defendant
Intelutions, Inc. illegally appropriated Plaintiff’s copyright-protected computer software program.
Plaintiff is an Arkansas corporation that creates and services educational software products for
various school districts across the nation. In 2006, Plaintiff entered into a contract with the Puerto
Rican Department of Education (“PRDE”) for the use of a copyrighted software product developed

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by Plaintiff called Special Education Automation Software (“SEAS”). School districts utilize SEAS
to manage and input data for students with special education needs.
Four years later, in 2010, the PRDE informed Plaintiff that it wished to build an electronic
data warehouse to store a complete back-up copy of all of the PRDE’s special education student data,
which was integrated with Plaintiff’s SEAS software. To accomplish its goal, the PRDE hired
Defendant, a Puerto Rican corporation, to design and build the back-up data warehouse. The PRDE
then asked Plaintiff to create a file transfer protocol to transmit a complete software back-up,
including updated student data, from Plaintiff’s server in Arkansas to the PRDE’s server in Puerto
Rico. Every week for the next two years, Plaintiff sent back-up files to the PRDE through a largely
automated process. Defendant would then access these files directly from the PRDE and use the
files to build the PRDE’s back-up data warehouse. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff gave
Defendant qualified permission to copy the SEAS database and operational platform, including the
copyright-protected Source Code, Stored Procedures, Schema, and Data Dictionary, with the
understanding that such copying would be done only for the purpose of building the PRDE’s back-up
data warehouse.
On September 26, 2012, the PRDE notified Plaintiff that it was cancelling its contract for
special education software services. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made an illegal copy of
Plaintiff’s SEAS program in order to pass the program off as Defendant’s own, in violation of
federal copyright law. Plaintiff further contends that the PRDE replaced Plaintiff’s SEAS program
with Defendant’s illegal copy, and that Defendant plans to market this illegal copy to other current
or potential clients of Plaintiff, thereby damaging Plaintiff’s reputation in the computer software
industry and depriving Plaintiff of profits through both copyright infringement and unfair
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competition.
Rather than respond on the merits to Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant filed a Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 13) on December 17, 2012, citing as alternative bases for dismissal the Court’s lack
of personal jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), improper venue
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), and failure to join a necessary party pursuant to Rule 19. The Court
determined that the issue of the Court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendant took precedence over
all other pending issues, and on January 25, 2013, ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction be held in abeyance until Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis of lack of personal
jurisdiction was decided. (Doc. 25). The Court now takes up this threshold matter of jurisdiction,
which has been fully briefed by the parties.
II. Legal Standard
“The party seeking to establish the court’s in personam jurisdiction carries the burden of
proof, and the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.” Epps v. Stewart Info.
Services Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2003). Considering that a plaintiff is only required to
make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction to defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2),
“the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all factual
conflicts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecomm. (PTE), Ltd., 89 F.3d
519, 522 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sports Wear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384,
1387 (8th Cir. 1991)). Nevertheless, “[t]he plaintiff’s ‘prima facie showing’ must be tested, not by
the pleadings alone, but by the affidavits and exhibits presented with the motions and opposition
thereto.” Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
In undertaking an analysis of personal jurisdiction, the Court must examine whether the
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exercise of such jurisdiction is proper under the long-arm statute of the forum state, Arkansas. The
Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223, 225 (8th Cir. 1987). Arkansas’ long-arm statute
provides for jurisdiction over persons and claims to the maximum extent permitted by the due
process clause of the United States Constitution. Pangaea Inc. v Flying Burrito LLC, 647 F.3d 741,
745 (8th Cir. 2011); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-4-101. “Due process requires ‘minimum contacts’
between [a] non-resident defendant and the forum state such that ‘maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples
Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980)). In addition, there must be evidence of “some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum [s]tate,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 475 (1985).
The Supreme Court has observed:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced
to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location of litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a
valid judgment.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.
There are two ways in which the due process clause may be satisfied such that minimum
contacts between the defendant and the forum state are established: the first way is through general
jurisdiction, and the second way is through specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction refers to the
power of a court to hear a lawsuit against a defendant who has “continuous and systematic” contacts

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with the forum state, regardless of where the cause of action actually arose. Helicopteros Nacionales
de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984). Here, Plaintiff concedes that the Court
cannot maintain general personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the Court
has the power to exert specific jurisdiction over Defendant, as Defendant has allegedly directed its
activities to Arkansas, and Plaintiff’s lawsuit “relates to” or “arises from” those activities. Johnson
v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 794-95 (8th Cir. 2010).
III. Discussion
“Specific personal jurisdiction, unlike general jurisdiction, requires a relationship between
the forum state, the cause of action, and the defendant.” Myers v. Casino Queen, Inc., 689 F.3d 904,
912 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414). The Eighth Circuit has established a fivefactor test to determine whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. These factors, from Land-O-Nod v. Bassett Furniture
Industries, Inc., 708 F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1983), are: (1) the nature and quality of contacts with
the forum state; (2) the quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the
contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the
convenience of the parties. “[The court] must look at all of the factors in the aggregate and examine
the totality of the circumstances in making a personal jurisdiction determination.” Johnson, 614 F.3d
at 794 (citation omitted).
In addition to the five Land-O-Nod factors, the Court must consider whether a defendant’s
intentional acts were performed “for the very purpose of having their consequences felt in the forum
state.” Dakota, 946 F.2d at 1390-91. This is known as the “effects test,” and it was first employed
by the Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), a case involving a libel claim made
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by Shirley Jones, a California-based entertainer, against reporters residing in Florida who wrote an
article about her in the National Enquirer magazine. The Calder court found that the Florida
defendants were subject to California’s personal jurisdiction because the defendants’ acts were
intentional, the allegedly libelous article they wrote was centered on the life and career of a
longstanding California resident, “and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of [Jones’s] emotional
distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California.” Id. at 789.
Because the defendants’ acts were “expressly aimed at California,” and they knew that “injury would
be felt by [Jones] in the State in which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has
its largest circulation,” the defendants were assumed to have reasonably anticipated being haled into
court in the forum state. Id. at 789-90.
Turning to the case at bar, Plaintiff contends that specific jurisdiction is proper because
“[Defendant’s] actions at issue in this case were expressly aimed at Arkansas, and Arkansas is where
the brunt of the harm and injury would be felt by [Plaintiff].” (Doc. 20, p. 1). In other words,
Plaintiff relies primarily on the “effects test” articulated in Calder in making its prima facie showing
of personal jurisdiction. Although the holding in Calder may certainly constitute a basis for a court’s
finding of personal jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that the five Land-O-Nod factors
listed above must still be weighed in every personal jurisdiction analysis. Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796.
The Calder test is “merely . . . an additional factor to consider when evaluating a defendant’s
relevant contacts with the forum state.” Id.; Dakota, 946 F.2d at 1391 (“In relying on Calder, we do
not abandon the five-part test . . . We simply note that Calder requires the consideration of additional
factors when an intentional tort is alleged.”). Accordingly, as the Complaint’s allegations of
copyright infringement and unfair competition are intentional and tortious in nature, the Court will
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explore the five Land-O-Nod factors as well as the Calder test in assessing the Court’s personal
jurisdiction over Defendant.
A. Land-O-Nod Factors
1. Nature and Quality of Contacts
The first Land-O-Nod factor concerns the nature and quality of a defendant’s contacts with
the forum state, which in this case is Arkansas. Initially, the Court finds that Defendant did not have
a contractual or other business relationship with Plaintiff. In addition, the alleged copying of
Plaintiff’s software was done entirely in Puerto Rico. Defendant was only able to access Plaintiff’s
proprietary software in Puerto Rico, through files provided to Defendant by Plaintiff’s own client,
the PRDE. Finally, it is undisputed that Defendant has never maintained business, property, offices,
employees, or agents in Arkansas, and none of Defendant’s agents or employees have ever traveled
to Arkansas for business.
It appears that many of the contacts alleged between Plaintiff in Arkansas and Defendant in
Puerto Rico were made indirectly, through the parties’ mutual client, the PRDE. Once the PRDE
determined that it needed a back-up data warehouse for its special education student data, the
protocol was established wherein Plaintiff would make an electronic transfer of files to the PRDE
each week. Once the files were received, the PRDE would provide them to Defendant. At that
point, if there were a question or a problem with the files, or if work needed to be done on the files,
such a request for assistance would be conveyed from Defendant to Plaintiff through (1) the PRDE’s
representatives in Puerto Rico, (2) a third party contractor named NuStream Consulting Corporation
(“NuStream”), which was based in Puerto Rico, or (3) Plaintiff’s Puerto Rico Project Manager,
Lourdes Abellas (“Abellas”), who was also based in Puerto Rico.
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Plaintiff contends that Defendant “was intricately involved in the request for [Plaintiff’s]
copyrighted materials and for [Plaintiff] to engage in work to accommodate [Defendant’s] needs.”
(Doc. 28, p. 6). However, being “involved” in a request for work is not the same as making direct
contact with Plaintiffs in Arkansas to secure copyright-protected information in order to make an
illegal copy of Plaintiff’s software. It is undisputed that Defendant was a contractor working for the
PRDE. To the extent that Defendant was given access to Plaintiff’s data files or directed that
changes be made to the files, the Court observes that the entity that actually commissioned the backup data warehouse project was the PRDE.
Plaintiff gives two examples of direct contacts between Defendant and Plaintiff. The first
is in the form of email communications directed to Plaintiff concerning the copying of data files for
the PRDE’s data warehouse. These emails, however, are addressed not only to Plaintiff’s employees
but to representatives of the PRDE (Docs. 28-1, 28-2). These emails only serve to reinforce the
Court’s conclusion that Defendant had no meaningful, direct contact with Plaintiff in Arkansas, but
instead Defendant would pass work requests to the PRDE, which in turn would make those requests
to Plaintiff, or, alternately, Defendant would pass requests to third party NuStream, which in turn
would pass the requests to the PRDE, which would then pass the requests to Plaintiff. Here we see
two, if not three, levels of separation between Defendant’s contacts with Plaintiff, and such
attenuated contacts are not of the nature and quality that the Court considers sufficient under the Due
Process Clause. Furthermore, even if direct, one-on-one emails between the parties existed, a review
of the relevant Eighth Circuit case law reveals that, in general, if a defendant’s connection to the
forum state is established merely through emails, calls, or faxes sent back and forth, such contacts
alone do not satisfy Due Process. See, e.g., Viasystems, 646 F.3d at 594 (scattered emails, phone
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calls, and wire transfers do not constitute deliberate and substantial connection with forum state);
Digi-Tel, 89 F.3d at 523 (numerous letters, faxes, and phone calls to forum state not enough to create
jurisdiction); Porter v. Berall, 293 F.3d 1073, 1076 (“Contact by phone or mail is insufficient to
justify exercise of personal jurisdiction under the due process clause.”).
The second example Plaintiff provides of direct, or purposeful, contact between Defendant
and Plaintiff is Defendant’s communications with Plaintiff’s employee Abellas1 in Puerto Rico.
Defendant’s employees are alleged to have communicated directly and extensively with Abellas,
through face-to-face meetings, phone calls, and emails over a two-year period and during the course
of Defendant’s alleged scheme to copy Plaintiff’s proprietary software. Plaintiff’s argument in a
nutshell is as follows: each time Defendant (in Puerto Rico) contacted Abellas (in Puerto Rico) with
a question, problem, or work request related to the PRDE’s data warehouse (built and maintained
in Puerto Rico at the Puerto Rican government’s direction), each such contact was also directed to
Plaintiff in Arkansas, where the question, problem, or work request ultimately would be addressed.
After careful consideration, the Court concludes that Defendant’s contacts with Abellas in
Puerto Rico are insufficient to constitute purposeful availment of the laws of Arkansas. “The
purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely
as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party
or a third person. Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts proximately result from actions
by the defendant himself that create a substantial connection with the forum State.” Stanton v. St.
Jude Med., Inc., 340 F.3d 690, 693-94 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
1

Abellas resides permanently in Puerto Rico. She “serv[ed] as a conduit between
[Plaintiff’s] headquarters in Arkansas and the Puerto Rican government, as well as any third-party
vendors with whom the Puerto Rican government request[ed] [Plaintiff] to work.” (Doc. 19-2).
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Here, the Court finds that, in keeping with the requirements of the Due Process Clause and the
holding of the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice” would be offended if this Court exerted personal jurisdiction over
Defendant, particularly if the only substantial contacts between Defendant and the forum state were
ones made solely by or through third parties, or through an employee of Plaintiff’s who resides in
and conducts business on behalf of Plaintiff exclusively in Defendant’s state of residence. 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945). The Court therefore finds that, due to the nature and quality of the contacts
between the parties, Defendant could not have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in
Arkansas, and thus, the first Land-O-Nod factor weighs in favor of Defendant.
2. Quantity of Contacts
Because the nature and quality of the contacts between Defendant and Arkansas are
insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction, the numerosity of such contacts is immaterial to the
Court’s analysis. Even if the Court were to assume that dozens of emails related to the SEAS
software and the PRDE’s back-up data warehouse project passed between the parties, Plaintiff has
failed to establish a prima facie case that these contacts were direct or exclusive in nature—as
between Plaintiff’s representatives in Arkansas and Defendant’s representatives in Puerto Rico—
or that such contacts were “uniquely or expressly aimed” at Arkansas. Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796.
Instead, it appears to the Court that the contacts identified by Plaintiff are composed of group emails
that include not only Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s employees, but also employees of the PRDE and/or
NuStream. Such emails, however numerous, do not establish minimum contacts between Defendant
and Arkansas. Moreover, any contacts, however numerous, between Defendant and Abellas,
Plaintiff’s Puerto Rico-based employee, are by their nature insufficient to create a substantial
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connection between Defendant and Arkansas, for reasons discussed above. Therefore, the second
Land-O-Nod factor weighs in favor of Defendant.
3. Relation of the Cause of Action to the Contacts
The third factor focuses on a defendant’s contacts with the forum state with respect to the
particular cause or causes of action asserted. Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816,
819 (8th Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for both copyright infringement and
unfair competition. However, there is no relationship between Arkansas and these causes of action.
Any violation of law committed by Defendant had to have occurred after Plaintiff’s data files left
Arkansas and arrived electronically in Puerto Rico. Defendant had no contact with Plaintiff’s server
in Arkansas. Any work requests made by Defendant were not aimed at Arkansas, but rather were
aimed at Puerto Rico through the PRDE’s representatives or NuStream’s representatives.
For purposes of proving a claim of illegal copying, a plaintiff must establish that it owns a
valid copyright in a work, that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work, and that a
substantial similarity exists between the original work and the defendant’s copy. Hartman v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987). If the forum state is only implicated as the
place where a copyrighted work was stored prior to copying, such a detail appears to be irrelevant
to proving an infringement claim. Plaintiff could have transmitted its data files to the PRDE from
any state, or even from a foreign country, and this information would not have altered the fact that
the alleged copying occurred exclusively in Puerto Rico. Accordingly, the Court finds that the third
Land-O-Nod factor weighs in favor of Defendant.
4. Interest of Forum and Convenience of Parties
Before the Court considers the final two Land-O-Nod factors, it is important to recognize that
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they cannot outweigh the first three factors. See Land-O-Nod, 708 F.2d at 1340 (“For instance, the
last two factors are said to be of secondary importance and not determinative.”). Even if the Court
were to assume that the fourth factor, which concerns the interest of the forum in litigating this
matter, weighed in favor of Plaintiff, the fifth factor, which concerns the convenience of the parties,
must weigh in favor of Defendant. The Court finds that litigating this case in Arkansas would be
inconvenient not only to Defendants and their Puerto Rico-based witnesses, but also potentially to
Plaintiff, whose witnesses are likely to include Abellas of Puerto Rico, certain employees of the
PRDE, and certain employees of the Puerto Rican company NuStream. The Court therefore
concludes that though the fourth Land-O-Nod factor may weigh in favor of Plaintiff, the fifth LandO-Nod factor does not. Arkansas’ “interest in providing its residents with a forum cannot make up
for the absence of minimum contacts.” Digi-Tel, 89 F.3d at 525.
B. Calder Effects Test
In addition to the five-part Land-O-Nod test, the Court must also weigh whether the brunt
of the injury allegedly incurred by Plaintiff was most strongly felt in the forum state, pursuant to the
Calder “effects” test. Under certain circumstances, personal jurisdiction can be exerted over a
tortfeasor that intentionally directs its tortious acts to the forum state. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
“‘Damage to intellectual property rights (infringement of a patent, trademark, or copyright)
by definition takes place where the owner suffers the damage.’” Dakota, 946 F.2d at 1388 (quoting
Acrison, Inc. v. Control & Metering, Ltd., 730 F.Supp. 1445, 1448 (N.D. Ill. 1990)). The Court
agrees that injuries suffered by Plaintiff would be felt most readily in Arkansas, the state of
Plaintiff’s incorporation and residence. However, it is not the case that personal jurisdiction over
a defendant will be presumed merely because an intentional tort has been alleged. The Eighth
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Circuit has “construe[d] the Calder effects test narrowly, and [held] that, absent additional contacts,
mere effects in the forum state are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.” Johnson, 614 F.3d
at 796-797. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff could establish Defendant’s knowledge as to Plaintiff’s
ownership of copyright-protected software and as to Plaintiff’s residence in Arkansas, these facts
alone would be insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to the Calder
test. Something more than mere effects is needed.
Cases decided throughout this Circuit uniformly hold that in order for a defendant’s tortious
conduct to confer personal jurisdiction in an intellectual property holder’s state of residence, there
must be a prima facie showing that the defendant’s intentional acts were “performed for the very
purpose of having their consequences felt in the forum state.” Dakota, 946 F.2d at 1391 (internal
citation omitted). See, e.g., Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796 (no personal jurisdiction where defendant’s
allegedly defamatory comments not expressly aimed at forum, and no other evidence of minimum
contacts existed); Express Scripts, Inc. v. Care Continuum Alliance, Inc., 2011 WL 2199967, *4
(E.D. Mo. June 7, 2011) (no personal jurisdiction where defendant did not knowingly target
trademark infringement at forum, and defendant had no other contacts with forum); Hicklin Eng’g,
Inc. v. Aidco, Inc., 959 F.2d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 1992) (no personal jurisdiction where defendant had
knowledge that plaintiff would be affected by intentional tort, but otherwise had no other connection
with forum); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1387 (8th Cir. 1993) (no
jurisdiction where “focal point” of the tortious injury occurred in outside forum, even though court
agreed that effects of harm ultimately were felt in forum).
Even a close examination of Calder reveals that the Supreme Court’s finding of personal
jurisdiction in that case depended on something more than the defendants’ knowledge that the
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plaintiff would feel the brunt of the injury in her state of residence. 465 U.S. at 1484-85. Other
contacts between the defendants and the forum state were found in Calder, including the fact that
the defendants made frequent trips to the forum for business, made direct phone calls to residents
of the forum in furtherance of the tort, and published the defamatory article about the plaintiff in the
forum, a state where the defendants’ publication had its highest circulation. Id. All of these facts
combined evidenced the Calder defendants’ purposeful availment of the forum and justified the
court’s exertion of personal jurisdiction over them.
In considering the case at bar, the Court observes that there are rarely bright line rules
accompanying jurisdictional questions. These types of legal inquiries require a court to weigh and
balance a number of factors and make a decision based on the totality of the circumstances. Kulko
v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (“ . . . the facts of each case must be weighed
to determine whether the requisite affiliating circumstances are present . . . We recognize that this
determination is one in which few answers will be written in black and white. The greys are
dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable.”) (internal quotation omitted).
Here, personal jurisdiction over Defendant is not justified by the facts of this case. Defendant
clearly lacks any traditional business contacts in Arkansas, such as offices, agents, representatives,
employees, or property holdings. Defendant has never sent any representatives to Arkansas.
Defendant secured the opportunity to access and allegedly copy Plaintiff’s intellectual property from
files transmitted to Puerto Rico, not Arkansas. Defendant committed all alleged violations of law
in Puerto Rico, not Arkansas. Finally, though Defendant exchanged some emails with Plaintiff in
Arkansas, all face-to-face contacts between Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s representatives occurred in
Puerto Rico. In sum, given the complete absence of any substantial connection between Defendant
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and the forum, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant solely because the
effects of the Plaintiff’s alleged injury are most strongly felt in Arkansas.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons described above, the Court has determined that it lacks personal jurisdiction
over Defendant. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction (Doc. 13) and does not address Defendant’s alternative bases for dismissal, including
improper venue and failure to join a necessary party. This case is hereby dismissed without
prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of February, 2013.

/s/P. K. Holmes, III
P.K. HOLMES, III
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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