Willis v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Erin L. Setser on November 10, 2015. (rg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HARRISON DIVISION

KEVIN R. WILLIS

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL NO. 14-3077

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Kevin R. Willis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(Commissioner) denying his claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
(DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under the provisions of Titles II and
XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether
there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's
decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Procedural Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his current applications for DIB and SSI on January 25,

2012, alleging an inability to work since December 27, 2010, due to back problems, numbness
in the left leg and arm, bipolar disorder, depression, vision problems in the left eye, anxiety,
and a learning disability. (Tr. 135, 143, 167). An administrative video hearing was held on
April 25, 2013, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 29-64).

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By written decision dated July 26, 2013, the ALJ found that during the relevant time
period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 12).
Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: disorder of the
back, back pain, a left leg condition, a vision problem in the left eye, and a mood disorder.
However, after reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s
impairments did not meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing
of Impairments found in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 12-13). The ALJ found
Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except
he is able to use a foot control on the left frequently, but must avoid moderate
exposure to moving machinery and heights. He is able to perform no work
requiring frequent depth perception or frequent peripheral acuity on the left.
The claimant is able to perform work where interpersonal contact is incidental
to work performed, complexity of tasks is learned and performed by rote, with
few variables, requiring little judgment, and supervision required is simple,
direct, and concrete.
(Tr. 14). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform
work as a housekeeper, and an inspector-one. (Tr. 22).
Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, which
denied that request on June 20, 2014. (Tr. 1-4). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (Doc.
1). This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 6). Both
parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (Docs. 11, 12).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments
are presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.
II.

Applicable Law:
This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th
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Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable
mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must
be affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314
F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that
supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial
evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the
Court would have decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th
Cir. 2001). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the
decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the
burden of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted
at least one year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity.
Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § §
423(d)(1)(A), 1382c (a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which
are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(C). A Plaintiff must show that his disability, not simply his
impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.
The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in
substantial gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical
and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet

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or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from
doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the
national economy given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920. Only if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age,
education, and work experience in light of his residual functional capacity. See McCoy v.
Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
IV.

Discussion:
Plaintiff argues the following issues on appeal: 1) the ALJ erred in determining

Plaintiff’s RFC; and 2) the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s credibility.
A.

Subjective Complaints and Credibility Analysis:

The ALJ was required to consider all the evidence relating to Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints including evidence presented by third parties that relates to: (1) Plaintiff’s daily
activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of his pain; (3) precipitating and
aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of his medication; and (5)
functional restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). While
an ALJ may not discount a claimant’s subjective complaints solely because the medical
evidence fails to support them, an ALJ may discount those complaints where inconsistencies
appear in the record as a whole. Id. As the Eighth Circuit has observed, “Our touchstone is
that [a claimant’s] credibility is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide.” Edwards, 314 F.3d
at 966.
After reviewing the administrative record, it is clear that the ALJ properly considered
and evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including the Polaski factors. A review of the
record reveals that Plaintiff reported the ability to manage money and shop independently in

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February of 2012. (Tr. 328). At that time, Plaintiff reported that his mother sometimes
reminded him to take his medication, but that he generally managed his activities of daily
living. In March of 2012, Plaintiff reported that he had lived alone in a duplex for one year,
and that he had his children every other weekend. (Tr. 333). Plaintiff further reported the
ability to perform household chores, to shop on his own, to watch television, and to listen to
music. (Tr. 334). The medical evidence further revealed that Plaintiff denied back or muscle
pain, anxiety, or depression when he was seen for dental pain in the emergency room on
January 10, 2013. (Tr. 393-398).
While Plaintiff alleged an inability to seek treatment due to a lack of finances, the
record is void of any indication that Plaintiff had been denied treatment due to the lack of
funds. Murphy v. Sullivan, 953 F.3d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that lack of evidence
that plaintiff sought low-cost medical treatment from her doctor, clinics, or hospitals does not
support plaintiff’s contention of financial hardship). The record further revealed that Plaintiff
was able to come up with the funds to purchase cigarettes during the relevant time period.
With regard to letters from Plaintiff’s mother and friends, the ALJ properly considered
this evidence but found it unpersuasive. This determination was within the ALJ's province.
See Siemers v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 299, 302 (8th Cir. 1995); Ownbey v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 342, 345
(8th Cir. 1993).
Therefore, although it is clear that Plaintiff suffers with some degree of limitation, he
has not established that he is unable to engage in any gainful activity. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints were not totally credible.

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B.

RFC Assessment:

RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes
medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own
descriptions of his limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005);
Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from
symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual
functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001).
Therefore, an ALJ’s determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical
evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart,
353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically a
claimant’s limitations and to determine how those limitations affect his RFC.” Id.
In finding Plaintiff able to perform light work with limitations, the ALJ considered
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the medical records of his treating and examining physicians,
and the evaluations of the non-examining medical examiners. The Court notes that in
determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ discussed the medical opinions of examining and nonexamining medical professionals, including the opinions of Drs. Robert L. Hudson, Nancy A.
Bunting, Jon Etienne Mourot, Kevin Santulli, Bill F. Payne, and David L. Hicks, and set forth
the reasons for the weight given to the opinions. Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1065
(8th Cir. 2012) (“It is the ALJ’s function to resolve conflicts among the opinions of various
treating and examining physicians”)(citations omitted); Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010 at 1012
(the ALJ may reject the conclusions of any medical expert, whether hired by the claimant or
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the government, if they are inconsistent with the record as a whole). After reviewing the entire
transcript, the Court finds substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC determination for
the time period in question.
C.

Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert:

After thoroughly reviewing the hearing transcript along with the entire evidence of
record, the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the vocational expert fully set
forth the impairments which the ALJ accepted as true and which were supported by the record
as a whole. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court finds
that the vocational expert's testimony constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's
conclusion that Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude him from performing work as a
housekeeper, and an inspector-one.

Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296 (8th Cir.

1996)(testimony from vocational expert based on properly phrased hypothetical question
constitutes substantial evidence).
IV.

Conclusion:
Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision
should be affirmed. The undersigned further finds that the Plaintiff’s Complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 10th day of November, 2015.
/s/ Erin L. Setser
HON. ERIN L. SETSER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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