Hamilton v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on October 13, 2016. (rg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HARRISON DIVISION
ZENA MARCIA HAMILTON
vs.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 3:15-cv-03103

CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Zena Marcia Hamilton (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her
applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the
Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 7.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues
this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1.

Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her disability application on January 31, 2014. (Tr. 9, 143-144).

In her application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to lumbar degenerative arthritis, left knee
osteoarthritis, right knee patellofemoral syndrome, right shoulder osteoarthritis, left shoulder strain,
degenerative cervical spine, hip strains, and hand osteoarthritis. (Tr. 218). Plaintiff alleges an onset

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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___.” The
transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

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date of February 1, 2012. (Tr. 218). This application was denied initially and again upon
reconsideration. (Tr. 9). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her denied
application, and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 85).
Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on March 17, 2015. (Tr. 23-54). Plaintiff was
present and was represented by counsel, Frederick Spencer, at this hearing. Id. Plaintiff and
Vocational Expert (“VE”) Jim Spragins testified at this hearing. Id. At this hearing, Plaintiff
testified she was fifty-five (55) years old and graduated from high school. (Tr. 25-26).
After this hearing, on August 12, 2015, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying
Plaintiff’s DIB application. (Tr. 9-17). In this decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured
status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2016. (Tr. 11, Finding 1). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since February 1,
2012, her alleged onset date. (Tr. 11, Finding 2).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the severe impairment of osteoarthritis. (Tr. 11, Finding
3). However, the ALJ also determined Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the
requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No.
4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 13, Finding 4).
In his decision, the ALJ indicated he evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and
determined her Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 13-17, Finding 5). First, the ALJ
indicated he evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found her claimed limitations were not
entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC for light work, except
she is able to frequently climb, balance, crawl, kneel, stoop, and crouch; and frequently finger and
handle bilaterally. (Tr. 13).
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The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and found Plaintiff capable of
performing her PRW as an administrative office clerk. (Tr. 17, Finding 6). Based upon this finding,
the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined by the Act from February 1,
2012, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 17, Finding 7).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 4-5). On September 17, 2015, the Appeals Council denied this request for review.
(Tr. 1-3). Plaintiff then filed the present appeal on October 14, 2015. ECF No. 1. The Parties
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on November 3, 2015. ECF No. 7. This case is now ready
for decision.
2.

Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s
decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that
would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case
differently. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the
record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions
represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel,

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221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
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3.

Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in: (1) failing to properly determine her

severe impairments, (2) the RFC determination, and (3) failing to give credibility to his allegations
of pain. ECF No. 13 at 8-17. Upon review of this claim, the Court agrees with Plaintiff and finds
the ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Accordingly, the Court will only
address this argument for reversal.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are
as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;
(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are

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Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 r equire the analysis
of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of
your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board,
etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of
these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not
require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

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not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. Instead of
complying with Polaski and considering the Polaski factors, the ALJ only focused on Plaintiff’s
medical records and the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians.3 (Tr. 14-16). First, the ALJ
summarized Plaintiff’s medical records. Id. The ALJ only provided a conclusory reason for
discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the
reasons explained in this decision.

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The ALJ also did not even specifically reference the Polaski factors which, although not required, is the
preferred practice. See Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007).

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(Tr. 14).
The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints for the sole reason that they were not
consistent with his medical records. The ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations
based upon the medical evidence alone was improper. The ALJ made no specific findings regarding
the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s claimed subjective complaints and the record evidence. The
ALJ must make a specific credibility determination, articulate the reasons for discrediting the
Plaintiff’s testimony, and address any inconsistencies between the testimony and the record. The
ALJ failed to perform this analysis.
As a result, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
without a sufficient basis was improper under Polaski. See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding a
claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be discounted “solely because the objective medical
evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]”). Accordingly, because the ALJ
provided no valid reason for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, this case must be reversed
and remanded.
4.

Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits

to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 13th day of October2016.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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