McCutcheon v. Parker et al

Filing 51

ORDER ADOPTING 46 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN ITS ENTIRETY. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 31 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; see Order for specifics. Signed by Honorable Timothy L. Brooks on March 11, 2025. (tmc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HARRISON DIVISION
GENE EDWARD MCCUTCHEON
V.

PLAINTIFF

CASE NO. 3:23-CV-3041

JAIL ADMINISTRATOR HETTIE PARKER,
Searcy County Detention Center (SCDC);
JAILER/DISPATCHER JIM HENRY, SCDC;
and JAILER ANTONIO MARTINEZ

DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff Gene Edward McCutcheon, who
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis on claims arising from his incarceration in the
Searcy County Detention Center (“SCDC”) from March 28, 2023, to March 23, 2024. Mr.
McCutcheon contends that Defendants Hettie Parker, Jim Henry, and Antonio Martinez
should be held individually liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: (1) denying Mr. McCutcheon
certain heart medications, which caused him to suffer chest pains; (2) denying him access
for two weeks to his “latitude communicator,” a medical device that reads his pacemaker
and sends the results to his cardiologist; (3) failing to transport Mr. McCutcheon to an
appointment with his cardiologist on June 12, 2023; and (4) refusing to provide him with
medical care and treatment for a large hernia that grew in size during his incarceration
and at times caused him severe pain.
On January 22, 2025, the Honorable Mark E. Ford, United States Magistrate Judge
for the Western District of Arkansas, considered Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 31) and filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 46). In
Magistrate Judge Ford’s opinion, Defendants Henry and Martinez are entitled to qualified
immunity on Mr. McCutcheon’s second, third, and fourth claims above but must stand trial
1

on his first claim for the denial of heart medication. Magistrate Judge Ford further
recommends that Defendant Parker stand trial for all claims asserted against her in her
individual capacity and that the official capacity claim against Searcy County also proceed
to trial.
On February 10, 2025, Defendants collectively filed Objections to the R&R (Doc.
50), which prompted this Court to review the entire record de novo. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). There are four objections. First, Defendants contend they are all entitled to
summary judgment on all pending claims because there is insufficient proof that Mr.
McCutcheon suffered more than a de minimis physical injury. Second, Defendants
maintain there are no genuine, material disputes of fact as to whether they were
deliberately indifferent to Mr. McCutcheon’s needs regarding the administration of heart
medication. Third, Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity on all claims
the R&R does not dismiss. And fourth, they assert there is insufficient proof to permit Mr.
McCutcheon’s official capacity claim to proceed to trial.
In evaluating the objections below, the Court is mindful of the legal standard it must
apply on summary judgment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
I. OBJECTION ONE: NO PROOF OF PHYSICAL INJURY
Defendants’ first argument is that all claims should be dismissed because “there is
no verifying medical evidence” to show Mr. McCutcheon suffered anything more than de
minimis physical injury, which is not recoverable under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”). The Court disagrees. The R&R’s discussion of the “Physical Injury
Requirement” cogently explains why Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment

2

on this basis. See Doc. 46, pp. 26–27. In brief, there is a genuine, material dispute of fact
as to whether the severity of Mr. McCutcheon’s chest pain and related cardiac symptoms
caused more than de minimis injury and whether pain caused by Mr. McCutcheon’s
untreated hernia was more than de minimis. 1 The objection is therefore OVERRULED.
II. OBJECTION TWO: FAILURE TO ADMINISTER HEART MEDICATION
Next, Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations about
McCutcheon’s heart medication claim. Defendants claim they faithfully administered
“seven different heart medications” to Mr. McCutcheon during the course of the year he
spent at the SCDC, which, to them, proves they were not deliberately indifferent to his
serious heart condition. (Doc. 50, p. 5 (emphasis added)). Unfortunately for Defendants,
Mr. McCutcheon’s jail medical records prove no such thing.
As the R&R noted, the medical records Defendants provided the Court are a mess.
They are incomplete, disorganized, and prove next to nothing about what medications
Mr. McCutcheon was administered. For starters, the records do not show that any
medications were provided daily. At most, they show that medications were ordered in
Mr. McCutcheon’s name from Allcare Pharmacy on various dates. A careful read of the
records actually supports Mr. McCutcheon’s claim that SCDC personnel allowed him to
run out of two heart medications—Entresto and Amiodarone—on at least one occasion,
even though Defendants at that point were aware that if Mr. McCutcheon missed his
medications, he could suffer serious consequences, including a stroke, a heart attack, or
even death.

1 Though Defendants describe the hernia as a “pre-existing condition,” a genuine dispute

of material fact exists as to whether the condition dramatically worsened during the year
Mr. McCutcheon spent at the SCDC due to Defendants’ deliberate indifference.
3

Mr. McCutcheon’s written requests to jail medical staff for help with his medical
conditions are not presented in any particular order, and they most often contain no
written response—either from the jail nurse or any of the jailers. As the R&R notes, the
Court received “no records indicating the dates on which McCutcheon was seen by
[Nurse] Elkin, or with any type of chart or record of Elkin’s diagnosis or orders”; and though
“[a] couple of McCutcheon’s requests have handwritten notes made on them, . . . the
notes are unsigned.” Id. at p. 6.
The Court is well persuaded that genuine, material disputes of fact exist as to
whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Mr. McCutcheon’s needs regarding
the administration or misadministration of medication for his heart condition. This
objection is therefore OVERRULED.
III. OBJECTION THREE: ENTITLEMENT TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendants’ next objection is to the denial of qualified immunity. In their view, the
medical records, though “difficult to read,” prove Defendants were not deliberately
indifferent to Mr. McCutcheon’s serious medical needs. (Doc. 50, p. 7). Once again,
Defendants are wrong. If anything, the medical records support Mr. McCutcheon’s claims
of deliberate indifference and point to a systemic failure to train jail officers on how to
appropriately treat inmates with serious medical conditions in accordance with their
constitutional rights. If Mr. McCutcheon’s medical records are any indication of the
SCDC’s practices, the jail does not systematically or routinely:
•
maintain daily logs documenting the medications and dosages that jail staff
administer to inmates;
•

record the dates that inmates are evaluated by jail medical staff;

•

record the diagnoses and medical orders made by jail medical staff;
4

•

respond in writing to prisoners’ medical requests;

•

maintain a system to assure that inmates’ medications are refilled on time;

•

maintain a system for scheduling inmates’ outside doctor’s appointments;

•
record important information about outside medical appointments, including
date, time, provider’s name, and clinic or hospital; and
•
maintain medical records from outside medical appointments, including
diagnoses and orders.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether Defendants violated Mr. McCutcheon’s clearly established
constitutional rights. First, it is undisputed that Mr. McCutcheon had a constitutional right
to adequate medical care, and this clearly established right extended to access to
prescribed medications. See, e.g., Phillips v. Jasper Cnty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 795–96 (8th
Cir. 2006) (“[T]he knowing failure to administer prescribed medicine can itself constitute
deliberate indifference.”). Mr. McCutcheon’s medical records do not prove he was
administered life-sustaining heart medications daily, routinely, or otherwise; in fact, the
records do not even show which medication he received on a given day—or a given week.
Second, it is clearly established that an inmate has the right to treatment for serious and
painful conditions and that “[d]elay in the provision of treatment or in providing
examinations can violate inmates’ rights when the inmates’ ailments are medically serious
or painful in nature.” Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1055 (8th Cir. 1989). A
jury must therefore decide whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Mr.
McCutcheon’s serious cardiac needs and to his worsening hernia, and whether such
indifference caused Mr. McCutcheon to suffer needless pain and suffering. This objection
is OVERRULED.

5

IV. OBJECTION FOUR: LEGAL BASIS FOR OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIM
Defendants’ final objection is that the SCDC’s medical policies are in no way
objectionable and certainly do not constitute a widespread pattern or custom of
unconstitutional conduct. Once again, Defendants point to the seven different
medications Mr. McCutcheon received at one time or another—as though the number of
medications alone somehow absolves them of a claim of deliberate indifference. They
point to the fact that he was seen by an in-house nurse practitioner once a week—though
the medical records do not establish this. And they note that he was taken to the hospital
for a cardiac emergency on at least one occasion and not simply ignored. But the fact
that Mr. McCutcheon survived a year at the SCDC does not immunize the jail from
possible official capacity liability. As Magistrate Judge Ford correctly observed:
Searcy County’s act in contracting with [Nurse] Elkin to provide medical care
at the facility does not relieve the County of its constitutional obligation to
provide medical care. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988)
(“Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the [county] of its
constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its
custody, and it does not deprive the [county’s] prisoners of the means to
vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights”). While the record contains no
evidence about the training Defendants received, and their failure to follow
their own policies does not necessarily equate to a constitutional violation,
given the lack of records regarding the administration of medication to
McCutcheon and his medical care or treatment, a jury could reasonably
conclude that the Defendants were inadequately trained in the provision of
medical care and that this lack of training resulted in the violation of
McCutcheon’s constitutional rights. Searcy County’s failure to implement a
policy to make sure inmates with serious medical needs are promptly
treated may also establish a failure to provide adequate medical care. See,
e.g., Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006)
(denying summary judgment regarding County’s failure to implement
policies for responding to medically unstable patients, for prompt
assessment if treatment is refused, and for transfer of medically unstable
patient).
Id. at pp. 25–26. Accordingly, this objection is also OVERRULED.

6

_________________________________
The Court agrees with the R&R’s thorough and well-reasoned analysis in all
respects. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the R&R (Doc. 46) is ADOPTED IN ITS
ENTIRETY. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31) is GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART as follows: (1) the Court preserves for trial Mr. McCutcheon’s
claim that Defendants Henry and Martinez were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs regarding medication distribution; but all other claims against Henry and
Martinez are DISMISSED due to qualified immunity; (2) all claims against Defendant
Parker are preserved for trial; and (3) Mr. McCutcheon’s official capacity claim is
preserved for trial.
A case management order will issue shortly setting pretrial deadlines and a trial
date.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 11th day of March, 2025.

_____________________________
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7