Rasberry v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
JUDGMENT: granting 14 Motion for Attorney Fees in the amount of $3979.80; fees must be awarded to Plaintiff, not to Plaintiffs attorney; if Plaintiff has executed a valid assignment to Plaintiffs attorney of all rights in an attorneys fee award and Plaintiff owes no outstanding debt to the federal government, the attorneys fee may be awarded directly to Plaintiffs attorney. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on August 22, 2012. (cnn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
ROBIN LYNN RASBERRY
Civil No. 4:11-cv-04062
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE
Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Pending now before this Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). ECF No. 14. Defendant has responded to this Motion and has no
objections to the requested fees. ECF No. 17. The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a
magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial,
ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.
Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this Order.
Robin Lynn Raspberry (“Plaintiff”) appealed to this Court from the Secretary of the Social
Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her request for disability benefits. ECF No. 1. On June
8, 2012, Plaintiff’s case was reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
ECF Nos. 12-13.
On August 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed the present Motion requesting an award of attorney’s fees
under the EAJA. ECF No. 14. With this Motion, Plaintiff requests an award of attorney’s fees of
$3,715.80, representing 22.52 hours at an hourly rate of $165.00. Id. Defendant responded to this
Motion on August 10, 2012, and Defendant does not object to the amount Plaintiff requested. ECF
Pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), a court must award attorney's fees to a
prevailing social security claimant unless the Secretary’s position in denying benefits was substantially
justified. The Secretary has the burden of proving that the denial of benefits was substantially
justified. See Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986) (“The Secretary bears the burden
of proving that its position in the administrative and judicial proceedings below was substantially
justified”). An EAJA application also must be made within thirty days of a final judgment in an
action, See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), or within thirty days after the sixty day time for appeal has
expired. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 298 (1993).
An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though, at the conclusion of
the case, the plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and to collect a fee pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was
specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S.
789, 796 (2002) (citing Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 186 (1985)). The United States Supreme Court
stated that Congress harmonized an award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA and under 42 U.S.C. §
406(b)(1) as follows:
Fee awards may be made under both prescriptions [EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)],
but the claimant’s attorney must “refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the smaller
fee.”. . .“Thus, an EAJA award offsets an award under Section 406(b), so that the
[amount of total past-due benefits the claimant actually receives] will be increased by
the . . . EAJA award up to the point the claimant receives 100 percent of the past-due
Id. Furthermore, awarding fees under both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift
to the United States the prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable
government action. See id.; Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 986 (8th Cir. 1984).
The statutory ceiling for an EAJA fee award is $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(A). A court is only authorized to exceed this statutory rate if “the court determines that
an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys
for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” Id. A court may determine that there has been an
increase in the cost of living, and may thereby increase the attorney’s rate per hour, based upon the
United States Department of Labor’s Consumer Price Index (“CPI”). See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919
F.2d 503, 504 (8th Cir. 1990). See also General Order 39 (“Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access
to Justice Act”).
In the present action, Plaintiff’s case was remanded to the SSA. ECF Nos. 12-13. Defendant
does not contest Plaintiff’s claim that she is the prevailing party and does not oppose her application
for fees under the EAJA. ECF No. 17. The Court construes the lack of opposition to this application
as an admission that the government’s decision to deny benefits was not “substantially justified” and
that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.
Plaintiff requests a total award of $3,715.80, representing 22.52 hours of attorney work during
2011 and 2012 at an enhanced hourly rate of $165.00 for both years. ECF No. 14. This hourly rate
of $165.00 is authorized by the EAJA as long as the CPI-South index justifies the enhanced rate. See
General Order 39. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Johnson, 919 F.2d at 504. In the present
action, Plaintiff’s requested rate of $165.00 per hour is authorized by CPI-South index. Thus, this
hourly rate is authorized by the EAJA, and this Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to $165.00 per attorney
hour for the hours worked in 2011 and 2012.
Further, this Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s request for 22.52 hours of attorney work during
2011 and 2012. Plaintiff has submitted an itemized bill in support of that request. ECF No. 14-1. In
his response, Defendant states Plaintiff has improperly calculated her fee request, and Defendant does
not object to the total fees requested. ECF No. 17. In fact, Defendant claims that upon recalculating
Plaintiff’s fee request, Plaintiff is actually entitled to $3,979.80. Id. Therefore, this Court finds
Plaintiff is entitled to $3,979.80 pursuant to the EAJA and is awarded that amount.
Defendant claims the fees awarded should be paid directly to Plaintiff pursuant to Ratliff. ECF
No. 17. Ratliff requires that attorney’s fees be awarded to the “prevailing party” or the litigant. See
Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521, 2528 (2010). Thus, these fees must be awarded to Plaintiff, not to
Plaintiff’s attorney. However, if Plaintiff has executed a valid assignment to Plaintiff’s attorney of all
rights in an attorney’s fee award and Plaintiff owes no outstanding debt to the federal government, the
attorney’s fee may be awarded directly to Plaintiff’s attorney.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court awards Plaintiff $3,979.80 in attorney’s fees pursuant to
the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
ENTERED this 22nd day of August 2012.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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