Munn v. Martin

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on September 24, 2012. (cap)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
WILLIE MUNN
V.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL NO. 4:11-cv-04084

SHERIFF DANNY MARTIN

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff, Willie Munn, pursuant to the provisions of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The parties have consented to the
jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including
conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment
proceedings. ECF No. 32.
Currently before the Court is Defendant, Sheriff Danny Martin’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 37); Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 38); and
Statement of Facts (ECF No. 39). Plaintiff filed a response titled Plaintiff’s Response to the
Defendant’s Answer to Interrogatories and Request for Productions of Documents and Objections
to Summary Judgment (ECF No. 44) (“Objections”). This matter is ripe for consideration.
I.

BACKGROUND
The events that are the subject of this lawsuit occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated in the

Nevada County Detention Center (“NCDC”) in Prescott, Arkansas. Plaintiff alleges his
constitutional rights were violated when Separate Defendant, Sheriff Danny Martin (“Sheriff
Martin”) denied him medical care, access to the courts, religious services, and humane living

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conditions. ECF No. 14, p. 7. As this case is before the Court on Sheriff Martin’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Court will assume the facts as alleged by Plaintiff, the non-moving party,
are true. Plaintiff does not indicate in his Amended Complaint whether he brings these claims
against Sheriff Martin in his individual or official capacity or in both capacities. ECF No. 14.
However, in his original Complaint, Plaintiff indicated he was suing Sheriff Martin in both his
official and individual capacities. ECF No. 1, p.2. Pro se pleadings should be liberally construed
and held to less stringent standards when facing a motion for summary judgment. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 2002).
Therefore, the Court will address Plaintiff’s claims as both official and individual capacity claims.
There are two separate dates of incarceration at issue in this case. According to the record,
Plaintiff was first arrested and booked into the NCDC on June 30, 2011, at approximately 11:00
p.m. Plaintiff was released the following day at approximately 3:06 p.m. ECF No. 38, Ex. A.
Plaintiff was incarcerated at the NCDC for approximately sixteen (16) hours during the first
incarceration at issue here. On August 14, 2011, at approximately 4:02 p.m., Plaintiff was again
booked into the NCDC. He was released to the Arkansas Department of Corrections on August
15, 2011 at approximately 2:04 p.m. ECF No. 38, Ex. A. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the NCDC
for approximately twenty-two (22) hours during the second incarceration at issue here. In total,
Plaintiff spent approximately thirty-eight (38) hours incarcerated at the NCDC over the course of
his two separate incarcerations.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims the NCDC: (1) did not have sheets; (2) did not
have sick call; (3) did not have a nurses station; (4) did not have fresh drinking water; (5) did not
have “incomes to contact officer under supervisor;” (6) did not have a separate space for eating
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away from the toilet and shower; (7) did not allow outside recreation; (8) did not have cleaning
supplies; (9) was “decading around the [toilet] and the wall;” (10) did not have a law library; (11)
did not have an escape route; (12) did not have tuberculosis lights or tuberculosis screening; and
(13) did not have chaplain call. Plaintiff also alleges he is disabled and the NCDC did not have
a cell to accommodate a disabled person. ECF No. 14, p. 4. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges he
requested the arresting officer to take him to the hospital but his request was denied. Plaintiff then
informed the arresting officer he needed his medication but the arresting officer “locked [Plaintiff]
in a holding cell and left.” Plaintiff also claims NCDC denied him a doctors appointment with Dr.
Glen Roundtree at Collom and Carney Urology in Texarkana. ECF No. 14, p. 5. Finally, Plaintiff
claims the NCDC double bunked; had outdated “staffing security, [and] nursing health safety;”
gave no access to the courts; imposed mail restrictions; and was under supervised. ECF No. 14,
pp. 5-6.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
The Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if the evidence could cause a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for either party, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-2 (1986), and a fact
is material if it affects the outcome of the case, id. at 248. The moving party has the burden of
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as
a matter of law, but the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the
pleadings and must set forth specific facts to raise a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 256; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The Court must view all evidence
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and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See McCleary v. ReliaStar Life
Ins. Co., 682 F.3d 1116, 1119 (8th Cir. 2012). However, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a
motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff claims Defendant violated his constitutional rights in both his official and

individual capacities. Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to state factual allegations against
Sheriff Martin and failed to name any individual that is responsible for the day-to-day operations
of the NCDC.
Under Section 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his individual capacity, or in his
official capacity, or in both. In Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir.1998), the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals (“Eighth Circuit”) discussed the distinction between individual and official
capacity suits. As explained by the Gorman case:
Claims against government actors in their individual capacities differ from those in their
official capacities as to the type of conduct that is actionable and as to the type of defense
that is available. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991).
Claims against individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the
entity for which they work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated
the plaintiff's rights, and the only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity
itself. Id. 502 U.S. at 24–27, 112 S.Ct. at 361–62 (1991). Personal capacity claims, on the
other hand, are those which allege personal liability for individual actions by officials in
the course of their duties; these claims do not require proof of any policy and qualified
immunity may be raised as a defense. Id. 502 U.S. at 25–27, 112 S.Ct. at 362.
Gorman, 152 F.3d at 914.
Plaintiff has not proffered any facts to support a claim that a custom or policy of Nevada

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County was the moving force behind his claimed constitutional rights violations. See Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 & n. 55, 694 (1978) (plaintiff seeking to impose
liability on local government body under Section 1983 must show official policy or widespread
custom or practice of unconstitutional conduct that caused a deprivation of constitutional rights).
Even construing Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, as he is proceeding pro se, the Court finds no facts
of a policy or custom of Nevada County causing the alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff may
not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings and must set forth specific facts to raise
a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986). Therefore, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims fail as a matter of law.
Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support any individual capacity claims
against Sheriff Martin. A claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based on a
respondeat superior theory of liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. “[A] supervisor is not
vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional activity.” White v.
Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir.
1997) (“general responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish
the personal involvement required to support liability”). In other words, Sheriff Martin cannot be
held liable merely because he supervises the individuals allegedly responsible for violating
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id.; see also Mark v. Nix, 983 F.2d 138, 139–40 (8th Cir. 1993)
(Section 1983 liability requires some personal involvement or responsibility). There are no
allegations or facts on the record that show Sheriff Martin was personally involved in any way in
the events complained of by Plaintiff. Plaintiff bases his claims against Sheriff Martin solely on
his position as Sheriff of Nevada County. This is insufficient to state a claim under section 1983.
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Therefore, Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Sheriff Martin fail as a matter of law.
Furthermore, Plaintiff did not name any individuals responsible for the conduct he complains of
in his Complaint.
Based on the foregoing I find the claims made in the Complaing and Amended Complaint
to be completely unfounded and frivolous. Accordingly, I recommend that Separate Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37) be GRANTED.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37) is

hereby GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Further, because the
claims asserted here are frivolous or fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted the
dismissal of this action constitutes a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The clerk is DIRECTED
to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of September 2012.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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