Price v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on December 10, 2013. (mll)

N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
ARCHIE PRICE
vs.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 4:12-cv-04119

CAROLYN COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Archie Price (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his applications for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Titles II and
XVI of the Act. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any
and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment,
and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1.

Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his disability applications on July 13, 2010. (Tr. 17, 125-132).

Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to reading disability, major depressive disorder, anxiety, panic
disorder, and personality disorder. (Tr. 161). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of November 26, 2009.
(Tr. 162). These applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 59-65, 7078).

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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ____” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

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Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on his applications, and this hearing
request was granted. (Tr. 79-80). An administrative hearing was held on July 12, 2011. (Tr. 31-54).
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff was present and was represented by attorney Greg Giles. Id.
Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Evelyn Hartman testified at this hearing. Id. On the date of
this hearing, Plaintiff was forty-three (43) years old, which is defined as a “younger person” under
20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c) (2008) (SSI) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (2008) (DIB). (Tr. 35). Plaintiff
also testified at this hearing that he had completed the eighth grade. Id.
On August 19, 2011, subsequent to the hearing, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision on
Plaintiff’s applications. (Tr. 17-27). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured
status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2014. (Tr. 19, Finding 1). The ALJ determined
Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since November 26, 2009, his
alleged onset date. (Tr. 19, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: affective disorder, bipolar disorder, substance addiction disorder, anxiety related
disorder, and reading disorder. (Tr. 19, Finding 3). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff’s impairments
did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix
1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 20-21, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 21-25, Finding 5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints and found his claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the
ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the following:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant
has the residual functional capacity to perform a fall range of work at all exertional
levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: he is limited to simple routine
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tasks with no more than occasional contact with the general public and requires no
reading of written instructions, or preparation of written reports.
Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 25, Finding 6). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff was unable to perform his PRW. Id. The ALJ, however, also determined there
was other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could perform. (Tr.
25-26, Finding 10). The ALJ based his determination upon the testimony of the VE. Id. Specifically,
the VE testified that given all Plaintiff’s vocational factors, a hypothetical individual would be able
to perform the requirements of a representative occupation such as a kitchen helper with
approximately 2,160 such jobs in state of Arkansas and 84,700 such jobs in the nation and garment
bagger with approximately 2,850 such jobs in state of Arkansas and 311,500 such jobs in the nation.
Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined
by the Act since November 26, 2009. (Tr. 26, Finding 11).
On September 9, 2011, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s
unfavorable decision. (Tr. 12). On September 17, 2012, the Appeals Council declined to review this
disability determination. (Tr. 1-3). On October 4, 2012, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No.
1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on October 16, 2012. ECF No. 5. Both
Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 9, 12. This case is now ready for decision.
2.

Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than

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a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year
and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel, 160
F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines a
“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her
disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the
familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged
in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly
limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the
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claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the
regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience);
(4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his or her past
relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3.

Discussion:
In his appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by

substantial evidence in the record and should be reversed and remanded. ECF No. 9 at 10-20.
Specifically, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s mental impairment and in the
findings of Dr. Oladele Adebogun and Carla Ward, M. S. Id. The Court has considered this
argument and agrees with Plaintiff’s claim. Because the ALJ erred in evaluating medical findings and
by failing to fully evaluate his Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 45, this Court
finds Plaintiff’s case must be reversed and remanded.
In social security cases, it is important for an ALJ to evaluate a claimant’s GAF score or scores
in determining whether that claimant is disabled due to a mental impairment. GAF scores range from
0 to 100. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR)
34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000). The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held GAF scores must be carefully
evaluated when determining a claimant’s RFC. See, e.g., Conklin v. Astrue, 360 F. App’x. 704, 707
(8th Cir. 2010) (reversing and remanding an ALJ’s disability determination in part because the ALJ
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failed to consider the claimant’s GAF scores of 35 and 40); Pates-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 94445 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole, in part due to the ALJ’s failure to discuss or consider numerous GAF scores
below 50).
Indeed, a GAF score at or below 40 should be carefully considered because such a low score
reflects “a major impairment in several areas such as work, family relations, judgment, or mood.”
Conklin, 360 F. App’x at 707 n.2 (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000)). A GAF score of 40 to 50 also
indicates a claimant suffers from severe symptoms. Specifically, a person with that GAF score suffers
from “[s]erious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR
any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep
a job).” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR)
34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000).
In the present action, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Adebogun as a part of a psychiatric
evaluation. (Tr. 228-230). As a part of that examination, Plaintiff was assessed as having a GAF
score of 45. (Tr. 229). This GAF score represents “serious symptoms.” In his opinion, the ALJ
referenced this GAF score and noted it represents “serious symptoms,” but the ALJ then entirely
discounted this low GAF score. (Tr. 23). Indeed, the ALJ stated he gave the opinions of Dr.
Adebogun “little weight” but he did not explain why he gave no weight to this low GAF score. Id.
This same GAF score was found by Dr. Betty Feir who performed a one-time Mental Diagnostic
Evaluation on September 16, 2010. (Tr. 239-244). However, the ALJ gave the opinions of Dr. Feir
“great weight” and found they were consistent with other evidence in the record. (Tr. 23).
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Accordingly, because the ALJ was required to evaluate this score and provide a reason for
discounting this low GAF score but did not do so, Plaintiff’s case must be reversed and remanded for
further development of the record on this issue. See Pates-Fires, 564 F.3d at 944-45.
4.

Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits

to Plaintiff, must be reversed and remanded. A judgment incorporating these findings will be entered
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.
ENTERED this 10th day of December 2013.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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