Harvin v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on February 11, 2014. (mll)

N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
LISA K. HARVIN
vs.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 4:12-cv-04143

CAROLYN COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lisa Harvin (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her applications for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Titles II and
XVI of the Act. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any
and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment,
and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 7.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1.

Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on January 20, 2010 and SSI on June 4,

2010. (Tr. 14, 130-137). Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to back and mental problems. (Tr. 171).
Plaintiff alleges an onset date of August 1, 2009. (Tr. 171). These applications were denied initially
and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 14).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her applications, and this hearing

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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ____” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

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request was granted. (Tr. 85). An administrative hearing was held on November 2, 2011. (Tr. 2762). At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff was present and was represented by attorney Greg Giles.
Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Donald Anderson, testified at this hearing. Id. On the
date of this hearing, Plaintiff was forty-eight (48) years old, which is defined as a “younger person”
under 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c) (2008) (SSI) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (2008) (DIB). (Tr. 30).
Plaintiff also testified at this hearing she had graduated from high school. Id.
On December 30, 2011, subsequent to the hearing, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision
on Plaintiff’s applications. (Tr. 14-22). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured
status requirements of the Act through March 31, 2011. (Tr. 16, Finding 1). The ALJ also
determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since August 1, 2009,
her alleged onset date. (Tr. 16, Finding 2).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff had severe impairments including degenerative disc disease,
mood disorder, panic disorder, and dependent personality traits. (Tr. 16, Finding 3). The ALJ also
determined Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the
Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 16,
Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 17-20, Finding 5). First, the ALJ indicated he evaluated
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found her claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id.
Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC for light work with minimal public contact
and limited to simple instructions and tasks. (Tr. 17, Finding 5).
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 20, Finding 6). The ALJ

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determined Plaintiff was unable to perform her PRW. Id. The ALJ, however, also determined there
was other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could perform. (Tr.
21, Finding 10). The ALJ based his determination upon the testimony of the VE. Id. Specifically,
the VE testified that given all Plaintiff’s vocational factors, a hypothetical individual would be able
to perform the requirements of a representative occupation such as a light silver wrapper with
approximately 900 such jobs in Arkansas and 60,000 such jobs in the nation, sorter with
approximately 1,400 such jobs in Arkansas and 100,000 such jobs in the nation, and table worker with
approximately 3,000 such jobs in Arkansas and 98,000 such jobs in the nation. Id. Based upon this
finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined by the Act since
August 1, 2009. (Tr. 22, Finding 11).
On January 27, 2012, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s
unfavorable decision. (Tr. 8-9). On November 16, 2012, the Appeals Council declined to review this
disability determination. (Tr. 1-3). On December 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF
No. 1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on December 20, 2012. ECF No. 7.
Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 16, 20. This case is now ready for decision.
2.

Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
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Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year
and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel, 160
F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines a
“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her
disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the
familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged
in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly
limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the
claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the
regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience);
(4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his or her past
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relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3.

Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by

substantial evidence in the record and should be reversed and remanded. ECF No. 16, Pgs. 10-20.
Specifically, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred (1) in failing to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s mental
impairments, (2) in failing to find Plaintiff met a Listing (3) in failing to consider Plaintiffs lack of
funds when discrediting treatment, and (4) in his RFC determination. Id. In response, the Defendant
argues the ALJ did not err in any of his findings. ECF No. 20. Because this Court finds the ALJ
erred in his RFC determination and by failing to fully evaluate Plaintiff’s Global Assessment of
Functioning (“GAF”) scores, this Court finds Plaintiff’s case must be reversed and remanded.
Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is required
to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). This RFC determination must
be based on medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. See
Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004). The ALJ should consider “‘all the evidence
in the record’ in determining the RFC, including ‘the medical records, observations of treating
physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of his limitations.’” Stormo v. Barnhart,
377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019 (8th Cir. 2002)).
In social security cases where a mental impairment is alleged, it is important for an ALJ to
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evaluate a claimant’s Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score in determining whether that
claimant is disabled due to the claimed mental impairment. GAF scores range from 0 to 100. Am.
Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 34 (4th ed.,
text rev. 2000). The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that GAF scores (especially those at or below
40) must be carefully evaluated when determining a claimant’s RFC. See, e.g., Conklin v. Astrue, 360
F. App’x. 704, 707 (8th Cir. 2010) (reversing and remanding an ALJ’s disability determination in part
because the ALJ failed to consider the claimant’s GAF scores of 35 and 40); Pates-Fires v. Astrue,
564 F.3d 935, 944-45 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole, in part due to the ALJ’s failure to discuss or consider
numerous GAF scores below 50).
Indeed, a GAF score at or below 40 should be carefully considered because such a low score
reflects “a major impairment in several areas such as work, family relations, judgment, or mood.”
Conklin, 360 F. App’x at 707 n.2 Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000)). A GAF score of 40 to 50 also indicates a
claimant suffers from severe symptoms. Specifically, a person with that GAF score suffers from
“[s]erious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any
serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a
job).” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR)
34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000).
In the present action, Plaintiff was seen at Southwest Arkansas Counseling and Mental Health
Center on February 23, 2009. (Tr. 242). As a part of that examination, Plaintiff was assessed as
having a GAF score of 50. Id. This same GAF score was assessed throughout 2009 and into 2010.
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(Tr. 260, 261, 263, 264-265). On August 9, 2010, Plaintiff was seen for a Mental Diagnostic
Evaluation by Dr. Julia Wood. (Tr. 340-346). As part of that evaluation, Plaintiff was assessed as
having a current GAF score of 30-40. (Tr. 345). This GAF score represent “serious symptoms.”
Other than mentioning Plaintiff’s GAF score of 50 from a June 29, 20110 visit to Southwest
Arkansas Counseling and Mental Health Center, the ALJ failed to discuss or even mention Plaintiff’s
GAF scores in his opinion. The ALJ made no mention of Plaintiff’s GAF score of 30-40 based upon
the Mental Diagnostic Evaluation by Dr. Julia Wood.2 It was the ALJ’s responsibility to evaluate
Plaintiff’s GAF scores and make a finding regarding its reliability as a part of the underlying
administrative proceeding. See Conklin, 360 F. App’x at 707. Indeed, it is especially important that
the ALJ address low GAF scores where, as in this case, Plaintiff has been diagnosed with mood
disorder, panic disorder, and dependant personalty traits.
Accordingly, because the ALJ was required to evaluate these scores and provide a reason for
discounting the low GAF scores but did not do so, Plaintiff’s case must be reversed and remanded
for further development of the record on this issue. See Pates-Fires, 564 F.3d at 944-45.
4.

Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits

to Plaintiff, must be reversed and remanded. A judgment incorporating these findings will be entered
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.
ENTERED this 11th day of February 2014.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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The ALJ did reference Plaintiff’s GAF score from December 10, 2010 at Southwest Arkansas Counseling
and Mental Health Center (Tr. 19), however he incorrectly stated this to be 60 when in fact the score was 50.

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