Rayburn v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on July 20, 2015. (mll)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
SAMUEL DEWAYNE RAYBURN
vs.
PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 4:14-cv-04145
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Samuel Dewayne Rayburn (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of
the Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his application
for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 8.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues
this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1.
Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his disability application on June 27, 2011. (Tr. 11, 172-180). In
his application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to scoliosis and bipolar. (Tr. 203). Plaintiff
alleged an onset date of September 17, 2009. (Tr. 11, 203). This application was denied initially
and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 11).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on his denied application, and this
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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. __.” The transcript
pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”
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hearing request was granted. (Tr. 73-74). On June 3, 2013, the ALJ held an administrative hearing
to address Plaintiff’s application. (Tr. 35-58). Plaintiff was present at this hearing and was
represented by counsel, Matthew Golden. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Michael
Gartman testified at this hearing. Id. At the time of this hearing, Plaintiff was thirty-one (31) years
old, which is defined as a “younger person” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c), and had a high school
education. (Tr. 38).
After this hearing, on June 27, 2013, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying
Plaintiff’s application for DIB. (Tr. 11-21). In this decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured
status of the Act through March 31, 2012. (Tr. 13, Finding 1). The ALJ also found Plaintiff had not
engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) from his alleged onset date of September 17, 2009
through his date last insured of March 31, 2012. (Tr. 13, Finding 2).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: scoliosis, personality
disorder, affective and anxiety-related disorder, and polysubstance abuse. (Tr. 13, Finding 3).
However, the ALJ also determined Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the
requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No.
4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 13, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his RFC.
(Tr. 14-19, Finding 5). First, the ALJ indicated he evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and
found his claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff
retained the RFC for sedentary work except he can stand or walk for up to two hours a day, lift up
to 10 pounds, have incidental contact with others and no complex tasks. Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and found Plaintiff was unable
to perform his PRW. (Tr. 19, Finding 6). The ALJ then considered whether Plaintiff retained the
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capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 20-21,
Finding 10). The VE testified at the administrative hearing on this issue. Id. Based upon that
testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform the following occupations:
(1) final assembler work with 28,000 such jobs in the United States and 1,500 such jobs in Texas;
(2) polisher of eyeglass frames with 80,000 such jobs in the United States and 6,000 such jobs in
Texas; and (3) table worker with 100,000 such jobs in the United States and 9,000 such jobs in
Texas. Id. Because Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform this other work, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, from his onset of September 17, 2009
through the date last insured of March 31, 2012. (Tr. 21, Finding 11).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 5). On September 4, 2014, the Appeals Council denied this request for review. (Tr.
1-4). Plaintiff then filed the present appeal on November 4, 2014. ECF No. 1. The Parties
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on November 24, 2014. ECF No. 8. Both Parties have
filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 15, 16. This case is now ready for decision.
2.
Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
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Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
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the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3.
Discussion:
In his appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 15, Pg. 5-8. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred
in the credibility determination of Plaintiff. Id. In response, the Defendant argues the ALJ did not
err in any of his findings. ECF No. 16.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are
as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;
(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
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Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of
two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your
pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g.,
lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However,
under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional
factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of
these additional factors in this case.
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not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not perform a proper Polaski analysis. While the ALJ
indicated the factors from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 had been considered (Tr. 14), a review of the ALJ’s
opinion shows that instead of evaluating these factors and noting inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints and the evidence in the record, the ALJ merely reviewed the medical records
and recognized the proper legal standard for assessing credibility.3 In his opinion, the ALJ only
made the following cursory statement regarding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could not reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the
reasons explained in this decision.
(Tr. 19).
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The ALJ also did not even specifically reference the Polaski factors which, although not required, is the
preferred practice. See Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007).
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In briefing this matter, Defendant references several factors that could have been significant
and that do support the ALJ’s credibility determination. ECF No. 16 at 6-7. The only problem is
that the ALJ did not actually state those factors in his decision. This analysis and these factors only
appear in Defendant’s briefing in this matter. Such an attempt to bolster the ALJ’s credibility
determination after-the-fact is improper. Instead, the ALJ has the responsibility to state those factors
and inconsistencies in his opinion. See Baker, 159 F.3d at 1144.
The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints for the sole reason that they were not
consistent with his medical records. The ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations
based upon the medical evidence alone was improper. The ALJ made no specific findings regarding
the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s claimed subjective complaints and the record evidence. The
ALJ must make a specific credibility determination, articulate the reasons for discrediting the
Plaintiff’s testimony, and address any inconsistencies between the testimony and the record. The
ALJ failed to perform this analysis. This lack of analysis is insufficient under Polaski, and this case
should be reversed and remanded for further consideration consistent with Polaski.
4.
Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 20th day of July 2015.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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