Williams v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on January 27, 2016. (mll)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
MERRY C. WILLIAMS
vs.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 4:15-cv-04007

CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Merry C. Williams (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her applications for a
period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues
this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1.

Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her disability applications on May 14, 2012. (Tr. 46, 333-342).

Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to depression, high blood pressure, pain and swelling in her legs,
and total knee replacement surgery on her left knee. (Tr. 356). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of
February 25, 2012. Id. These applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration.

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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ____” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

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(Tr. 46).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her applications, and this hearing
request was granted. (Tr. 284). Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on August 21, 2013. (Tr.
237-262). Plaintiff was present at this hearing and was represented by Greg Giles. Id. Plaintiff and
Vocational Expert (“VE”) Jerold Hildre testified at this hearing. Id. During this hearing, Plaintiff
testified she was forty-six (46) years old, which is defined as “younger person” under 20 C.F.R. §
416.963(c) (2008) (SSI) and under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (2008) (DIB). (Tr. 242). Plaintiff also
testified she had completed high school. (Tr. 243).
On September 20, 2013, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s
disability applications. (Tr. 46-59). In this decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Act through September 30, 2013. (Tr. 48, Finding 1). The ALJ also found
Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since February 25, 2012, her
alleged onset date. (Tr. 48, Finding 2).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: hypertension, morbid
obesity, affective disorder, anxiety disorder not otherwise specified, and degenerative joint disease
(DJD) in both knees status-post left arthroplasty. (Tr. 49, Finding 3). The ALJ determined
Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listings of
Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 49, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her RFC.
(Tr. 50-57, Finding 5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found her
claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained
the RFC to perform to perform sedentary work but can only occasionally balance, kneel, stoop,
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crouch, or climb ramps or stairs, with no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; must avoid
concentrated exposure to hazardous moving machinery and unprotected heights; and limited to
simple and routine tasks. (Tr. 50, Finding 5).
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and determined she did not
retain the capacity to perform any of her PRW. (Tr. 57, Finding 6). The ALJ then determined
whether Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the
national economy. (Tr. 57, Finding 10). The VE testified at the administrative hearing regarding
this issue. Id. Based upon that testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to
perform the following work: (1) order clerk (139,000 such jobs in the nation and 500 such jobs in
Arkansas); (2) assembler (106,000 such jobs in the nation and 600 such jobs in Arkansas); and (3)
lens inserter (100,000 such jobs in the nation and 500 such jobs in Arkansas). Id. Because Plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform this other work, the ALJ determined she was not disabled from
February 25, 2012 through the date of his decision. (Tr. 58, Finding 11).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 42). On November 18, 2014, the Appeals Council declined to review this unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 1-4). On January 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The Parties
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on January 16, 2015. ECF No. 5. Both Parties have filed
appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 10, 11. This case is now ready for decision.
2.

Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
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a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
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whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3.

Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff raises the following arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ erred

in finding her impairments did not meet the requirements of the Listings; (2) the ALJ erred in
assessing her severe impairments (3) the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of her treating
physician; and (4) the ALJ erred by failing to present a proper hypothetical to the VE. ECF No. 10
at 12-21. Because the Court finds the ALJ erred in failing to properly consider the opinions of
Plaintiff’s treating physician, the Court will only consider Plaintiff’s third argument for reversal.
Plaintiff’s treating physician is Dr. Jeff DeHaan, and he has been treating Plaintiff for her
knee pain since 2009. (Tr. 428-431, 475-478, 529-530, 586-596, 634-636). Plaintiff was first seen
by Dr. DeHaan on December 23, 2009 with complaints of left knee pain. (Tr. 586). In January of
2010 Plaintiff underwent a partial medial menisectomy. (Tr. 586-587). Plaintiff continued to have
knee problems and ultimately underwent a total knee replacement in 2011. (Tr. 589, 607-609).
Plaintiff continued to experience knee pain and limited motion throughout 2011 and into 2013. (Tr.
589-594).
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On February 25, 2013, Dr. DeHaan prepared an RFC Report on Plaintiff. (Tr. 634-636). In
the report he indicated Plaintiff could only lift less than 10 lbs. either occasionally or frequently;
could walk less than two hours with normal breaks and sit about four hours; would require breaks
each hour for 10- 15 minutes; can never crouch, kneel, crawl or climb ladders; and would miss more
than three days of work each month because of her impairments. Id.
In his opinion, the ALJ stated he did not give Dr. DeHaan’s findings significant weight. (Tr.
54). The ALJ provided the following reasons for discounting those findings:
While Dr. DeHaan’s opinion has been considered in the determination of the
claimant’s residual functional capacity, such as not been given significant weight, as
his opinion is not accompanied by narrative treatment notes or objective findings on
which he bases his opinion. His opinion is also inconsistent with other evidence of
record.
Id.
Notably, the ALJ did not state what was inconsistent with Dr. DeHaan’s findings and the
record contains his complete and lengthy medical record setting forth his more than three year
treatment of Plaintiff. As such, the Court finds the ALJ has stated no “good reasons” for discounting
Dr. DeHaan’s findings. Because Dr. DeHaan is a long-time treating source, the ALJ’s failure to
provide “good reasons” for discounting his findings was improper. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)
(2012). See also Tiley v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 675, 680 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding “[t]he regulations
require the ALJ to ‘always give good reasons’ for the weight afforded to the treating physician’s
opinion”). Thus, this case must be reversed and remanded for further consideration of Dr. DeHaan’s
findings.
4.

Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
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to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 27th day of January 2016.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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