Stancil v. Robinson et al

Filing 13

ORDER denying 5 Motion to Dismiss Case. Signed by Honorable Susan O. Hickey on August 16, 2016. (mll)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

TRACY STANCIL

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CASE NO. 4:15-CV-4116

KENNETH ROBINSON,
ANGELA KEY,
DAKOTA SHIPLEY,
JOANNE SHIPLEY and
JOHN DOES 1-3

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

Before the Court is Separate Defendants Dakota Shipley and Joanne Shipley’s Motion to
Dismiss and Alternatively Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff has filed a
response. (ECF No. 7). The Court finds this matter ripe for consideration.
On December 15, 2015, this case was removed to this Court from the Circuit Court of
Miller County, Arkansas.

(ECF No. 1).

collision that occurred on August 4, 2014.

Plaintiff’s Complaint arises from an automobile
Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant’s acts of

negligence proximately caused her injuries. Specific to the Separate Defendants who filed this
Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dakota Shipley was the driver of a vehicle
that was involved in the collision. Plaintiff further alleges that this vehicle was owned by
Defendant Joanne Shipley and that, “as a result of the relationship of Defendant Dakota Shipley
and Defendant Joanna Shipley, all actions of Defendant Dakota Shipley are…imputed to
Defendant Joanne Shipley.” (ECF No. 4, ¶ 25). Defendant Joanne Shipley was a passenger in
the vehicle at the time of the accident and had allegedly given Defendant Dakota Shipley
permission to operate the vehicle.

The form of Separate Defendants’ pleadings requires some clarification. Rather than file
a standalone motion to dismiss, Separate Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and an answer
within the same document.

The Motion to Dismiss and Answer (ECF No. 5) states that

Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed due to “insufficiency of process, insufficiency of
service of process, and…failure to state facts upon which relief can be granted.” (ECF No. 5, ¶
1). The Motion to Dismiss and Answer goes on to state that the claims against Separate
Defendant Joanne Shipley should be dismissed because “there is no specific relationship pled in
Plaintiff’s Complaint that would impute any actions of Separate Defendant Dakota Shipley, to
Separate Defendant Joanne Shipley.” (ECF No. 5, ¶ 2). The brief (ECF No. 6) in support of the
motion addresses only the claims against Separate Defendant Joanne Shipley and the
“relationship” issue. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis will be limited to this issue.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court should grant a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require a complaint to state “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court
assumes that all the facts in the complaint are true. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993). The Court is free, however, to
ignore “sweeping legal conclusions” and “unwarranted inferences.” Wiles v. Capitol Indem.
Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002). The Court may consider the complaint’s legal
sufficiency, but not the weight of the evidence supporting it. Id.
The Court should not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

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U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plaintiff must “nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
DISCUSSION
In support of her Motion to Dismiss, Separate Defendant Joanne Shipley states that
Dakota Shipley was an adult at the time of the collision and that “there is no theory of negligent
entrustment or any other legal theory pled in Plaintiff's Complaint against Joanne Shipley that
would create a relationship for Dakota Shipley's conduct to be imputed to her.” (ECF No. 6, p.
1). Separate Defendant’s brief does not elaborate on these statements or support these assertions
with citations to legal authority. In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff states that the
Complaint “affirmatively stated the need for [Separate Defendant Joanne Shipley] to be included
in the Complaint. Separate Defendant Joanne Shipley was the registered owner of the vehicle in
question at the time of the incident; she has legal liability for the bodily injury to the person of
the Plaintiff.” Plaintiff does not elaborate further or cite to any legal authority.
Upon consideration, the Court finds that the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
Plaintiff’s Complaint strains the requirements of Rule 8, and Plaintiff’s response does little to
clarify the issue. Nonetheless, the facts pled in the Complaint are sufficient to draw the inference
that Separate Defendant Joanne Shipley is liable for the misconduct alleged in the Complaint.
Specifically, Plaintiff appears to be proceeding on a claim of negligent entrustment.

In

Arkansas, the elements of negligent entrustment are “1) the entrustee was incompetent,
inexperienced, or reckless; 2) the entrustor knew or had reason to know of the entrustee’s
conditions or proclivities; 3) there was an entrustment of the chattel; 4) the entrustment created

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an appreciable risk of the harm to the plaintiff and a relational duty on the part of the defendant;
and 5) the harm to the plaintiff was proximately legally caused by the negligence of the
defendant.” Balentine v. Sparkman, 327 Ark. 180, 184–85 (Ark. 1997). While these elements
are not pled with particularity in the Complaint, Plaintiff has indicated that Separate Defendant
Joanne Shipley entrusted Separate Defendant Dakota Shipley to drive her vehicle and that this
entrustment proximately caused injury to Plaintiff. At this stage in the proceedings, these
allegations are sufficient to survive dismissal.
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Joanne Shipley’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5)
should be and hereby is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 16th day of August, 2016.

/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
United States District Judge

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