Shipp v. Murphy et al

Filing 27

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 18 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against Defendants Murphy and Arnold; his Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims against Defendants Murphy and Arnold; his Ei ghth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against Defendant Murphy; and his cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim against Defendant Murphy are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim and cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims against Defendant Arnold remain. Defendant Kevin Murphy terminated. Signed by Honorable Susan O. Hickey on May 23, 2018. (mll)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
CRAIG SHIPP

v.

PLAINTIFF

Case No. 4:18-cv-4017

KEVIN MURPHY; STEVE
ARNOLD; et al.

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants Kevin Murphy and Steve Arnold’s Motion to Dismiss.
(ECF No. 18). Plaintiff Craig Shipp filed a response. (ECF No. 20). The Court finds the matter
ripe for consideration.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 26, 2018, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, filed an amended complaint,
asserting Eighth Amendment cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims and Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment deliberate-indifference claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law
negligence claims against various Defendants. 1
At all times relevant to this suit, Plaintiff was serving a sentence in the Arkansas
Community Correction, Southwest Arkansas Community Correction Center in Texarkana,
Arkansas (“SWACCC”). Plaintiff is diabetic and alleges that he requires the use of orthotic shoes
to prevent sores and/or ulcers from forming on his feet as a result of his condition.
Plaintiff alleges that before being transferred to the SWACCC, his orthotic shoes were
taken from him at the Miller County Detention Center. Plaintiff alleges further that when he was

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not assert negligence claims against Defendants Murphy and Arnold. Thus,
Plaintiff’s negligence claims are not placed at issue in the instant motion and will not be discussed in this Order.

transferred to the SWACCC on February 1, 2016, he informed the intake personnel that he was
diabetic and required orthotic shoes for his medical condition. Plaintiff states that he was told he
needed approval for orthotic shoes. Plaintiff alleges that on the same day, he wrote a formal
complaint to Defendant Arnold, the warden of the SWACCC, stating that it was medically
necessary for him to receive orthotic shoes. Plaintiff did not receive orthotic shoes at that time.
Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to climb multiple flights of stairs because he was housed
on an upper level of the facility, and that climbing the stairs without orthotic shoes caused
additional stress on his feet. He alleges that he applied for elevator use, but the request was denied.
On February 12, 2016, Plaintiff alleges to have advised Defendant Arnold that he had begun to
suffer medical complications to his feet. Plaintiff alleges to have again advised Defendant Arnold
that he needed orthotic shoes. Plaintiff also alleges that this request was forwarded to Separate
Defendant Lenora Turner, the medical director at the SWACCC. (ECF No. 15, p. 6).
Plaintiff alleges that he saw medical staff on February 12, February 16, and February 23,
2016, and did not receive orthotic shoes during those visits. On February 23, 2016, medical staff
informed Plaintiff that he had a limb-threatening wound and needed expert debridement, 2 but
Plaintiff alleges that due to the “policies and procedures and custom or practice” implemented by
certain Defendants, including Defendants Murphy and Arnold, nearly a week passed before he
received the requested debridement.
At some unspecified time, Plaintiff alleges to have requested a transfer to a corrections
center in Malvern, Arkansas, which he states had a better medical department and facility to
manage his diabetic condition. Plaintiff alleges that this request was denied due to Defendants’

2

Debridement “is the process of removing dead (necrotic) tissue or foreign material from and around a wound to
expose healthy tissue.” 3 Richard H. Camer & Monique Laberge, The Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine 1447 (5th ed.
2015).

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policies, procedures, and protocol.
Plaintiff ultimately received his orthotic shoes more than three weeks after arriving at the
SWACCC. Plaintiff alleges that his foot was amputated because of the wounds and ulcers that
formed during the time he did not have orthotic shoes. Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ acts,
omissions, policies, and procedures violated his constitutional rights.
On March 28, 2018, Defendants Murphy and Arnold filed the instant motion, arguing that
Plaintiff’s claims against them should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
II. STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading must provide “a short and
plain statement of the claim that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The
purpose of this requirement is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The Court must accept as true all factual allegations set
forth in Plaintiff’s amended complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor.
See Ashley Cnty., Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009).
However, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”

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Id. (internal citations and alterations

omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In other words, “the pleading standard Rule 8
announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the complaint should be read as
a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible.”
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009). The issue in considering such
a motion is not whether Plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether Plaintiff is entitled to present
evidence in support of the claim. See Nusku v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). In reviewing
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is “not precluded in [its] review of the complaint
from taking notice of items in the public record” or considering documents that do not contradict
the complaint. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 269 n.1 (1986); Stahl v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 327
F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2003); Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1999).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants Murphy and Arnold argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted against either of them. Accordingly, Defendants
Murphy and Arnold move for dismissal of all claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law,
of a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. In order to state a claim under section 1983, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants Murphy
and Arnold acted under color of state law and that they violated a right secured by the Constitution.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will
not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under section 1983. Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).

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Plaintiff appears to assert three types of claims against Defendants Murphy and Arnold:
(1) deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) deliberate indifference under the
Eighth Amendment; and (3) cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The
Court will address each claim in turn.
A. Deliberate Indifference
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s amended complaint appears to assert
deliberate-indifference claims against Defendants Murphy and Arnold under both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff’s amended complaint states that his causes of action are based
upon Defendants’ denial of his Eighth Amendment constitutional rights. (ECF No. 15, p. 3). The
amended complaint later states that Defendants’ deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs constitutes a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Before the Court can proceed
to the substance of the instant motion, it must first address the distinction between these two claims,
academic as it may be.
1. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Murphy and Arnold were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Claims of deliberate indifference arise under the Fourteenth Amendment when the inmate
is a pre-trial detainee. Thornton v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064 (D. Minn.
2000) (citing Whitnack v. Douglas Cnty., 16 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 1994)). Conversely,
deliberate-indifference claims arise under the Eighth Amendment when the inmate has been
convicted and is serving a sentence. Id.
In this case, Plaintiff has pleaded that at all times relevant to this suit, he was serving a
sentence in the SWACCC. (ECF No. 15, p. 5). Plaintiff has not pleaded that he was a pre-trial

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detainee when Defendants Murphy and Arnold were allegedly deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs, which would provide a basis for bringing a deliberate-indifference claim
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. For this reason, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
state a plausible Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim upon which relief can be
granted.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-

indifference claims against Defendants Murphy and Arnold should be dismissed.
2. Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Murphy and Arnold were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Although he does not specify,
Plaintiff appears to assert these claims against Defendants Murphy and Arnold in both their
individual and official capacities. 3
The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment prohibits deliberate
indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs. Luckert v. Dodge Cnty., 684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th
Cir. 2012). The deliberate-indifference standard includes “both an objective and a subjective
component: ‘The [plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious
medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those
needs.’” Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (alterations in original).
To show that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need, Plaintiff must show he
“has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or has an injury “that is so obvious
that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Schaub v.
VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir. 2011). To satisfy the subjective prong of deliberate

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Murphy and Arnold were final decision-makers at the SWACCC “who caused an
unconstitutional policy and practice and/or custom of the facility to refuse diabetic inmates their orthotic shoes despite
the known risks of limb loss and developing wounds and ulcers.” (ECF No. 15, p. 6).

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indifference, “the prisoner must show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence, and
mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not give rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal recklessness, which demands more than
negligent misconduct.” Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 499 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Deliberate indifference may be manifested by “prison guards in intentionally denying or
delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (footnotes omitted). However, the “Constitution
does not require jailers to handle every medical complaint as quickly as each inmate might wish.”
Jenkins v. Cnty. of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009). The objective seriousness
of delay in treatment must be measured by reference to the effect of delay, which must be shown
by verifying medical evidence in the record. Laughlin v. Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir.
2005). But see Schaub, 638 F.3d at 919 (stating that submission of verifying medical evidence is
unnecessary where the need for medical attention would have been obvious to a layperson).
Defendants Murphy and Arnold argue that Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims
against them should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief should be granted. For ease of discussion, the Court will first address Plaintiff’s officialcapacity claims against Defendants Murphy and Arnold. Then the Court will separately address
Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims against the two.
a. Official-Capacity Claims
Under section 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his individual or official capacity or
both. Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998). Official-capacity claims are
“functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels

7

Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010).

Defendants Murphy and Arnold are

employees of the Arkansas Community Correction, an Arkansas state agency. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants Murphy and Arnold are treated as claims
against the State of Arkansas. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2010); Tiller v.
Nash, No. 4:14-cv-4095, 2015 WL 4647651, at *1-2 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 5, 2015) (treating officialcapacity claims against Arkansas Community Correction employees as claims against the State of
Arkansas).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars federal lawsuits brought
by individuals against states. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). “‘This
bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.’” Williams v. Missouri, 973 F.2d 599,
599-600 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986)). However, there
are certain well-established exceptions to the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. Burk v. Beene,
948 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1991). “A state may waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit
in federal court, and Congress may, by legislation, abrogate immunity without the state’s consent
in order to effectuate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
Defendants Murphy and Arnold do not argue that sovereign immunity applies to bar
Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against them. However, “‘sovereign immunity is a threshold
jurisdictional matter and a jurisdictional prerequisite’ and ‘may be raised sua sponte by the court.’”
Ernst v. Hinchliff, 129 F. Supp. 3d 695, 722 (D. Minn. 2015) (quoting Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp.
v. Malaterre, 663 F.3d 680, 686 (8th Cir. 2001)). With this in mind, the Court will address sua
sponte the issue of whether Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants Murphy and
Arnold are barred by sovereign immunity.

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“Congress did not abrogate constitutional sovereign immunity when enacting the law that
was to become section 1983.” Burk, 948 F.2d at 493. Likewise, there is nothing to suggest that
the State of Arkansas has waived its sovereign immunity or consented to this suit. Therefore, to
the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief from the State of Arkansas or the Arkansas Community
Correction as an arm of the State of Arkansas, his section 1983 claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against

Defendants Arnold and Murphy should be dismissed.
b. Individual Capacity Claim Against Defendant Arnold
Defendants Murphy and Arnold argue that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible deliberateindifference claim against Defendant Arnold. They argue that because Defendant Arnold, the
warden of the SWACCC, is not involved in treatment decisions and lacks medical expertise, he
can only be held liable for deliberate indifference for intentionally delaying or denying access to
medical care or intentionally interfering with medical treatment once prescribed. They argue
further that, although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Arnold was aware of his medical needs,
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Arnold failed to get him medical attention. Defendants
Murphy and Arnold point to Plaintiff’s allegations that after he advised Defendant Arnold on
February 12, 2016, that he was developing injuries to his feet, he saw medical personnel on the
same day. Defendants Murphy and Arnold also argue that Plaintiff’s amended complaint concedes
that Defendant Arnold forwarded his February 12, 2016, medical request to the appropriate
medical staff. Thus, Defendants Murphy and Arnold conclude that because Defendant Arnold
passed Plaintiff’s medical request to the medical staff, he did not delay or deny Plaintiff’s access
to treatment and cannot be liable for deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff responds that he has alleged that he repeatedly advised Defendant Arnold of his

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medical need for orthotic shoes and Defendant Arnold repeatedly failed to take action regarding
the medical requests. Plaintiff also argues that he did not allege that Defendant Arnold forwarded
Plaintiff’s medical request to the appropriate personnel on February 12, 2016. In support, Plaintiff
points to the answer filed in this case by separate medical personnel Defendants, who claim that
they did not receive Plaintiff’s medical complaints from Defendant Arnold. Plaintiff argues that
his allegations that Defendant Arnold intentionally failed to respond to his medical requests and
failed to forward the requests to medical staff form a plausible deliberate-indifference claim. 4
Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges in relevant part that:
On or about February 12, [Plaintiff] advised [Defendant Arnold] that he had already
developed an open wound on his left foot and charcot joint on his right foot, causing
his bones to break down. He again reiterated that he needed special orthotics. This
request was forwarded to Lenora Turner. Ms. Turner failed to respond in an
appropriate amount of time and failed to insure that [Plaintiff] was provided his
orthotics in a timely manner.
(ECF No. 15, p. 6). Plaintiff and Defendants Murphy and Arnold each point to this passage as
support for their respective arguments. Their point of contention is the allegation that Plaintiff’s
medical request “was forwarded” to SWACCC medical staff. Defendants Murphy and Arnold
contend that this language alleges that Defendant Arnold forwarded the medical request to medical
staff. Plaintiff argues that this is not the case and that he instead alleged that Defendant Arnold
failed to do so, although he does not clarify who he alleges forwarded the request to medical staff.
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court must take as true all of Plaintiff’s factual
allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. See Ashley Cnty., Ark., 552
F.3d at 665. In doing so, the Court will, for purposes of this Order, infer that Plaintiff alleged that
Defendant Arnold did not forward his medical request to medical staff. This allegation, taken in

4

Plaintiff also makes other arguments against dismissal of his claim, including that Defendant Arnold acted with
deliberate indifference by failing to adequately supervise the SWACCC medical staff. In light of the Court’s finding
below, it is not necessary for the Court to consider these arguments.

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conjunction with Plaintiff’s other allegations that he informed Defendant Arnold of his medical
needs on other occasions and that Defendant Arnold took no action regarding the medical requests,
asserts that Defendant Arnold denied or delayed Plaintiff’s access to medical treatment, which is
sufficient to state a plausible deliberate-indifference claim against Defendant Arnold in his
individual capacity. The Court’s role at this stage is not to determine if Plaintiff will ultimately
prevail on said claim, but merely whether he may present evidence in support of the claim. See
Nusku, 490 U.S. at 327. The Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on his deliberate-indifference
claim against Defendant Arnold in his individual capacity, and that the instant motion should be
denied as to this claim.
c. Individual Capacity Claim Against Defendant Murphy
Defendants Murphy and Arnold argue that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible deliberateindifference claim against Defendant Murphy. They argue that Plaintiff has not alleged that
Defendant Murphy was involved in the day-to-day operations of the facility, was involved in the
provision of medical care to inmates, or was personally present during or consulted about the
provision of Plaintiff’s medical care. Defendants Murphy and Arnold argue further that, although
Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Murphy created an unconstitutional policy at the SWACCC,
he failed to allege any specific facts regarding said policy or Defendant Murphy’s creation or
knowledge of the same. Accordingly, they conclude that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible
deliberate-indifference claim against Defendant Murphy.
Plaintiff argues in response that he alleged that Defendant Murphy, the chief deputy of the
SWACCC, should be maintaining supervision of policies and procedures regarding significant
healthcare issues. He argues further that Defendant Murphy disregarded this duty, which allowed
unconstitutional practices to occur. Plaintiff states that Defendant Murphy’s only argument for

11

dismissal—that he did not know of any unconstitutional policies or procedures at the SWACCC—
is insufficient to obtain dismissal.
As discussed above, liability under section 1983 requires “a causal link to, and direct
responsibility of, the deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of . . . supervisory
defendants, [the plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct
responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d
962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original). “[A] . . . general responsibility for supervising
the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement.” Id.
Upon consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
Defendant Murphy.

Excluding the section on parties and jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s amended

complaint mentions Defendant Murphy once, alleging that he instituted an unconstitutional policy
or custom at the SWACCC that caused a week to pass before Plaintiff received requested
debridement treatment. (ECF No. 15, p. 7). Plaintiff makes no other allegations regarding
Defendant Murphy. Plaintiff has not alleged any specific facts demonstrating that Defendant
Murphy created an unconstitutional policy or custom, 5 was involved in or decided the prescription
of Plaintiff’s medical treatment in any way, or that he was even aware of Plaintiff’s medical
condition. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible deliberate-indifference claim
against Defendant Murphy, and the Court finds that this claim should be dismissed.
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Murphy and Arnold’s deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Defendants Murphy and Arnold argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon

5

Furthermore, Plaintiff did not allege any facts regarding said policy or custom other than conclusory statements that
the policy existed and that it resulted in harm to him.

12

which relief may be granted, and accordingly, that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s cruel-andunusual-punishment claims against them.
The Eighth Amendment, which applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” on those
convicted of crimes. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). Deliberate indifference to a
prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983); Langford
v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 459-60 (8th Cir. 2010).
As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts supporting a plausible
deliberate-indifference claim against Defendant Murphy. It follows for the same reasons that
Plaintiff has failed to state a cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim against Defendant Murphy.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim
upon which relief may be granted as to Defendant Murphy, and that that said claim should be
dismissed.
The Court also found above that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a deliberate-indifference
claim against Defendant Arnold. For that reason, the Court finds that Plaintiff has also stated a
plausible cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim against Defendant Arnold. Plaintiff may proceed
on his cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim against Defendant Arnold in his individual capacity,
and the instant motion should be denied as to this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendants Murphy and Arnolds’ Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) should be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s
official-capacity claims against Defendants Murphy and Arnold; his Fourteenth Amendment

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deliberate-indifference claims against Defendants Murphy and Arnold; his Eighth Amendment
deliberate-indifference claim against Defendant Murphy; and his cruel-and-unusual-punishment
claim against Defendant Murphy are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim and cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims
against Defendant Arnold remain.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of May, 2018.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
United States District Judge

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