P.A.M Transport, Inc. v. Faurecia Automotive Seating, Inc. et al

Filing 24

ORDER granting 7 Motion to Dismiss Case or, in the Alternative, Transfer Venue. CASE DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. Signed by Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren on October 26, 2011. (src)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

P.A.M. TRANSPORT, INC.

PLAINTIFF

v.

Case No. 11-5130

FAURECIA AUTOMOTIVE SEATING, INC.;
FAURECIA USA HOLDINGS, INC.;
FAURECIA INTERIOR SYSTEMS, USA, INC.;
and FAURECIA RIVERSIDE, LLC

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
Now

on

the

consideration

26th

day

defendants’

of

October,

Motion

to

2011,

comes

on

for

Dismiss

or,

in

the

Alternative, Transfer Venue (doc. #7) and the response and reply
thereto.

The Court, being well and sufficiently advised, finds

and orders as follows:
1.

The

plaintiff,

“P.A.M.”),

filed

defendants

Faurecia

Holdings,

Inc.,

this

P.A.M.

action

on

Automotive

Faurecia

Transport,
May

27,

Seating,

Interior

Inc.

(hereinafter

2011

against

the

Faurecia

USA

Inc.,

Systems,

USA,

Inc.,

and

Faurecia Riverside, LLC.
The complaint is brought under both federal question and
diversity jurisdiction and asserts claims for breach of contract,
action on account, and failure to pay interstate transportation
charges.

1

2.
lacks

The instant motion to dismiss asserts that the Court
personal

Alternatively,

jurisdiction

the

motion

seeks

against
to

dismiss

the
or

defendants.
transfer

this

matter for improper venue pursuant to a forum selection clause.1
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
3.

“When personal jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff

has the burden to show that jurisdiction exists.”

Burlington

Industries Inc. v. Maples Industries, 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th
Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).

“[T]he burden does not shift to

the party challenging jurisdiction."

Gould v. P.T. Krakatau

Steel, 957 F.2d 573, 575 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 506 U.S. 908
(1992), citing Newhard, Cook & Co. v. Inspired Life Centers,
Inc., 895 F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1990).
P.A.M., as the plaintiff asserting it, has the burden of
making a prima facie showing of this Court’s jurisdiction over
the defendants.

See First National Bank of Lewisville, Arkansas

v. First National Bank of Clinton, Kentucky, 258 F.3d 727, 729
(8th Cir. 2001); Falkirk Min. Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906
F.2d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 1990).
To ascertain whether jurisdiction exists, one must determine
"(1) whether a forum’s long-arm statute permits the assertion of
jurisdiction and (2) whether assertion of personal jurisdiction
1

Pursuant to the parties’ Notice of Stipulation (document #21) which was filed on October 7, 2011, the following
defendants have been dismissed from this action: Faurecia USA Holdings, Inc., Faurecia Interior Systems USA, Inc.,
and Faurecia Riverside, LLC. The instant motion will, therefore, be analyzed with respect to the only remaining
defendant, Faurecia Automotive Seating, Inc.

2

violates federal due process.”

Graphics Controls Corp. v. Utah

Med. Prods., Inc., 149 F.3d 1382, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998)(footnote
omitted).
Arkansas’ long-arm statute permits the assertion of
jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-4-101(B) (Supp. 1995); see also Kilcrease v.
Butler, 293 Ark. 454, 455, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987).

Therefore, the

sole inquiry this Court need make is whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is consistent with the due process clause2.
See 3D Systems, Inc. V. Aarotech Laboratories, Inc., 160 F.3d
1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Epps v. Stewart Information
Services Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2003).
“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty
interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum
with which he has no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’”
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72
(1985)(quotation omitted).

Due process requires sufficient

“minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state so
that “maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.”

World-Wide Volkswagon

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).

2

Courts are to apply the “minimum contacts” standard developed in International Shoe and its progeny. Hilderbrand
v. Steck Mfg. Co., Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1355 (Fed.Cir. Feb. 7, 2002).

3

To satisfy its burden, a plaintiff asserting jurisdiction
must establish either specific jurisdiction or general
jurisdiction.

Merck & Co., Inc. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 179

F.Supp.2d 368, 371 (D.Del. 2002); Mason v. Mooney Aircraft Corp.,
2003 WL 21244160 (W.D. Missouri)(Slip Opinion)(May 8,
2003)(explaining differences in two concepts).
(a)

General Personal Jurisdiction -- General jurisdiction

arises when the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts
with the state, irrespective of whether defendant’s connections
are related to the particular cause of action.

Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
(b)

Specific Personal Jurisdiction – Specific personal

jurisdiction is distinguished from general personal jurisdiction
in that specific jurisdiction usually refers to a “situation in
which the cause of action arises directly from the defendant’s
contacts with the forum State.”

Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import

Trading Co., 84 F.3d 424 (C.A. Fed. 1996).
4.

It appears to the Court that PAM is asserting

jurisdiction under both general and specific jurisdiction
theories.

Accordingly, the Court will analyze the contentions

together and make distinctions when and where appropriate.
5.

Due process focuses on the fundamental fairness of

exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, and
therefore, "it is essential in each case that there be some act
4

by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."

Hanson v.

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
The United States Supreme Court has held that to maintain
general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, the facts must
establish “substantial” or “continuous and systematic general
business contacts” with the forum state.
at 416.

Helicopteros, 466 U.S.

Such affiliations are construed in light of the Due

Process Clause which permits the Court to exercise jurisdiction
only if doing so would not “offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

That is, a defendant must

“reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in the remote
forum.

World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297

(1980).

While lack of physical presence in a state cannot alone

defeat jurisdiction, “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated”
contacts do not count in the minimum contacts calculus.
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).

Burger

If a party is

amenable to general jurisdiction, then it can be said that it has
such numerous contacts with the forum that it may be haled into
court in that forum even for a suit not arising out of its forum
contacts.

See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.

5

A showing of contacts alone, however, is not enough; a
foreign defendant may still defeat jurisdiction by marshaling a
compelling case that its exercise would be unreasonable or
contrary to concepts of fair play and substantial justice.
Corp., 84 F.3d at 429.

Viam

“The test of unreasonableness is a

multi-factored balancing test that weighs any burdens on the
defendant, against various countervailing considerations,
including the plaintiff’s interest in a convenient forum and the
forum state’s interest in resolving conflicts flowing from instate events.”
U.S. at 477.

Id., citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
For these reasons, a “plaintiff must show

significantly more than mere minimum contacts to establish
general jurisdiction.”

Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Medical

Surgical Prod., Ltd., 64 F.Supp.2d 448, 450 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
Once a defendant’s contacts with the forum have been
established, the Court considers the following factors in
deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction:
(1)

the nature and quality of defendant’s contacts
with the forum state;

(2)

the quantity of such contacts;

(3)

the relation of the cause of action to the
contacts;

(4)

the interest of the forum state in providing a
forum for its residents; and
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(5)

the convenience of the parties.

Epps, 327 F.3d at 648, citing Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Maple Industries, Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996)(addt’l
citations omitted).

In applying these factors, the central

inquiry is the “relationship among the defendant, the forum and
the litigation.”

Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture, Inc., 708

F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th

Cir. 1983)(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433

U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
Finally, even where a jurisdictional threshold can be
established, “personal jurisdiction may be defeated if its
exercise would be unreasonable” and in making this determination,
the Court considers factors such as
(a) the burden on the defendant; (b) the
interest of the forum state; © the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; (d)
the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and (e) the shared interest of
the several states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policy.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-14; Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel
Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 374 (8th Cir. 1990).
6.

The plaintiff’s complaint asserts that Faurecia

Automotive Seating, Inc.

(hereinafter “Faurecia”) is in breach

of contract for failure to pay certain charges related to
interstate transportation services which P.A.M. provided to
Faurecia.

The complaint states that “Faurecia conducts business

7

in Arkansas and is subject to personal jurisdiction in Arkansas.”
(a)

In response, Faurecia contends that it lacks

sufficient contacts with the State of Arkansas to be subjected to
personal jurisdiction in this Court.

In support of this

contention, Faurecia argues3:
* that it was “not involved in business in Arkansas;”
*

that the relationship between the parties originated via

a third-party logistics firm out of Ohio; and,
*

that although PAM provided interstate transportation

services transporting Faurecia materials to and from various
Faurecia facilities, Faurecia had no Arkansas facilities.
(b)

PAM counters by asserting -- through affidavit

testimony:
* that Faurecia and PAM negotiated extensively through
electronic mail and other communications concerning the terms of
a Master Transportation Service Agreement;
* that Faurecia was regularly engaged in communications with
Hopkins, who is PAM’s Vice President of Sales and Marketing and
located in PAM’s corporate headquarters in Tontitown, Arkansas,
about the interstate transportation services provided by PAM;
* that PAM hauled at least 60 of the unpaid shipments
identified in its Complaint from Mexico to Sterling Heights,

3

The defendants’ statements concerning their lack of contacts with the State of Arkansas are made solely in their
briefing and are not supported by affidavit testimony.

8

Michigan, or from Sterling Heights, Michigan, to Mexico and all
shipments traveled extensively in the State of Arkansas; and,
* that at least 73 of the unpaid shipments upon which PAM
makes claim for detention charges also traveled this same route
and extensively in the State of Arkansas.
The foregoing assertions appear to focus on the contention
that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Faurecia.
©

PAM further argues that Faurecia has contacts with

the State of Arkansas sufficient to support general personal
jurisdiction because:
* Faurecia is the sixth largest auto parts supplier in the
world; and is the 9th largest automotive supplier in North
America;
* Faurecia’s North America sales exceeded $3.4 billion in
2010; and,
* Faurecia’s own web site proclaims “Every Car Has A Bit of
Faurecia.”
7.

The Court will first discuss the argument asserting

general personal jurisdiction.

Although PAM argues that general

personal jurisdiction is satisfied because auto parts
manufactured by Faurecia are ultimately included in cars sold
extensively in the State of Arkansas, this “stream of commerce”
argument is not an adequate basis for the exercise of general
jurisdiction and the Court rejects it.
9

As established by

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, “[s]uch a
connection does not establish the ‘continuous and systematic’
affiliation necessary” for general jurisdiction.

Accordingly,

the Court rejects this contention.
8.

The Court now turns to an analysis of PAM's arguments

asserting specific personal jurisdiction.
(a)

PAM argues that specific personal jurisdiction is

present due to the contract negotiations between the parties.
This contention is not persuasive.

Applicable case law

indicates that “‘[m]erely entering into a contract with a forum
resident does not provide the requisite contacts between a
(nonresident) defendant and the forum state.’” Scullin Steel Co.
v. National Ry. Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309, 313 (C.A. Mo.
1982)(citing Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603
F.2d 1301, 1303)).

And, “[c]ontact by phone or mail is

insufficient to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction under
the due process clause.”

Porter v. Berall, 293 F.3d 1073, 1076

(8th Cir. 2002).
(b)

PAM further argues that, since it hauled the

shipments of Faurecia’s products extensively through the State of
Arkansas, those activities provide sufficient contacts with the
State to support jurisdiction.

However, the case law again

counsels otherwise -- holding that “[t]he unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant
10

cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.”
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

“The critical

relationship is that ‘among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.’”

Scullin Steel, 676 F.2d at 313 (quoting Shaffer v.

Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
The Court, therefore, concludes that the arguments advanced
by PAM in support of either general or specific jurisdiction are
unavailing and that it does not, in fact, have jurisdiction of
Faurecia in this matter.
VENUE
9.

Faurecia also argues that the plaintiff’s complaint

should be dismissed or transferred for improper venue pursuant to
FRCP 12(b)(3) and/or 12(b)(6) based on a forum selection clause.
Because the Court has concluded that personal jurisdiction
is lacking, it will not address this argument but, rather, leave
it for a court with proper jurisdiction.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
or, in the Alternative, Transfer Venue (doc. #7) is hereby
GRANTED and that this case is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jimm Larry Hendren
JIMM LARRY HENDREN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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