Buchanan v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Erin L. Setser on February 11, 2013. (tg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

GORDON RAY BUCHANAN

v.

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL NO. 11-5258

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Gordon Ray Buchanan, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(Commissioner) denying his claim for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under the
provisions of Title XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the
Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Procedural Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his current application for SSI on September 8, 2009, alleging

an inability to work since January 1, 2000,1 due to his back, pain in his legs, and asthma. (Tr.
136-138, 155). An administrative hearing was held on March 31, 2011, at which Plaintiff
appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 22-53).

1

Plaintiff through his counsel amended the alleged onset date to January 1, 2009. (Tr. 11, 46). The Court notes that
Title XVI benefits are not payable for the period prior to the application. See Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1185
(8th Cir. 1989); 20 C.F.R.§§ 416.330, 416.335.

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By written decision dated April 21, 2011, the ALJ found that during the relevant time
period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 13).
Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative
disc disease, asthma, and osteoarthritis in the left hip. However, after reviewing all of the
evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the
level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found in Appendix I,
Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr.13 ). The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to:
medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except occasionally lift and/or
carry 50 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 25 pounds, stand and/or walk 6 hours
in a normal 8-hour workday, sit 6 hours in a normal 8-hour workday, must avoid
concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation.
(Tr. 13). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work
as a packing machine operator, a sawing machine operator, and a press operator. (Tr. 17).
Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, which
after reviewing additional evidence submitted, denied that request on September 6, 2011. (Tr.
1-5). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (Doc. 1). This case is before the undersigned
pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 5). Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the
case is now ready for decision. (Docs. 8,9).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments
are presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.

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II.

Applicable Law:
This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.
2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind
would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must be
affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d
964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the
Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists
in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have
decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other
words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ
must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one
year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v.
Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3),
1382(3)(c). A Plaintiff must show that his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for
at least twelve consecutive months.
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The Commissioner’s regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial
gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or
mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal
an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national
economy given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Only if the final
stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience
in light of his residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42
(8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
III.

Discussion:
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that the Plaintiff was not disabled

because: 1) the ALJ erred in failing to consider all of Plaintiff’s impairments in combination; 2)
the ALJ erred in the analysis and credibility findings in regard to Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints of pain; 3) the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform less
than a full range of medium work; and 4) the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record.
A.

Combination of Impairments:

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider all of the claimant’s impairments
in combination.
The ALJ stated that in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, he considered “all of the claimant’s
impairments, including impairments that are not severe.” (Tr. 12). The ALJ further found that
the Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
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equaled one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 13). Such language demonstrates the ALJ considered
the combined effect of Plaintiff’s impairments. Hajek v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1994).
B.

Subjective Complaints and Credibility Analysis:

The ALJ was required to consider all the evidence relating to Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints including evidence presented by third parties that relates to: (1) Plaintiff’s daily
activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of her pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating
factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of her medication; and (5) functional
restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). While an ALJ may not
discount a claimant’s subjective complaints solely because the medical evidence fails to support
them, an ALJ may discount those complaints where inconsistencies appear in the record as a
whole. Id. As the Eighth Circuit has observed, “Our touchstone is that [a claimant’s] credibility
is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide.” Edwards, 314 F.3d at 966.
After reviewing the administrative record, and the Defendant’s well-stated reasons set
forth in his brief, it is clear that the ALJ properly considered and evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints, including the Polaski factors. In performing the credibility analysis, the ALJ noted
that Plaintiff had received essentially routine and conservative treatment. See Gowell v. Apfel,
242 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding fact that physician prescribed conservative treatment
weighed against plaintiff’s subjective complaints).
With regard to an alleged mental impairment, the record failed to show Plaintiff sought
treatment from a mental health professional. See Gowell v. Apfel, 242 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir.
2001) (holding that lack of evidence of ongoing counseling or psychiatric treatment for
depression weighs against plaintiff’s claim of disability). It is also noteworthy that Plaintiff did
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not allege a mental impairment when he applied for benefits. See Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d
1033, 1039 (8th Cir. 2001) (failure to allege disabling mental impairment in application is
significant, even if evidence of depression is later developed).
The Court would also note that while Plaintiff alleged an inability to seek treatment due
to a lack of finances, the record is void of any indication that Plaintiff had been denied treatment
due to the lack of funds. Murphy v. Sullivan, 953 F.3d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that
lack of evidence that plaintiff sought low-cost medical treatment from her doctor, clinics, or
hospitals does not support plaintiff’s contention of financial hardship).
Based on the record as a whole, the Court finds there is substantial evidence to support
the ALJ’s credibility findings.
C.

The ALJ’s RFC Determination:

RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of
his limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v.
Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain
are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a
medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s
determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that
addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642,

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646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically a claimant’s
limitations and to determine how those limitations affect his RFC.” Id.
In the present case, the ALJ considered the medical assessments of examining agency
medical consultants, Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and his medical records when he
determined Plaintiff could perform medium work with limitations. The Court finds, based upon
the record as a whole and the well-stated reasons outlined in the Defendant’s brief, that
Plaintiff’s argument is without merit. Accordingly, the Court finds there is substantial evidence
of record to support the ALJ’s RFC findings.
D.

Fully and Fairly Develop the Record:

While an ALJ is required to develop the record fully and fairly, see Freeman v. Apfel,
208 F.3d 687, 692 (8th Cir.2000) (ALJ must order consultative examination only when it is
necessary for an informed decision), the record before the ALJ contained the evidence required
to make a full and informed decision regarding Plaintiff’s capabilities during the relevant time
period. See Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1071-72 (8th Cir.2004) (ALJ must develop
record fully and fairly to ensure it includes evidence from treating physician, or at least
examining physician, addressing impairments at issue).
E.

Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert:

After thoroughly reviewing the hearing transcript along with the entire evidence of
record, the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the vocational expert fully set forth
the impairments which the ALJ accepted as true and which were supported by the record as a
whole. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court finds that
the vocational expert's opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion
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that Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude him from performing work as a packing machine
operator, a sawing machine operator, and a press operator. Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296
(8th Cir. 1996)(testimony from vocational expert based on properly phrased hypothetical
question constitutes substantial evidence).
IV.

Conclusion:
Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision
should be affirmed. The undersigned further finds that the Plaintiff’s Complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this11th day of February, 2013.
/s/ Erin L. Setser
HON. ERIN L. SETSER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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