Crihfield v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on July 19, 2013. (tg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
SAMANTHA MARIE CRIHFIELD
Civil No. 5:12-cv-05072
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Samantha Marie Crihfield (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of
the Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application
for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and a period of disability under Title XVI of the Act. The
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings
in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting
all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this
memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI on August 27, 2008. (Tr. 10, 126-128).
Plaintiff alleged she was disabled due to side effects from brain cancer, learning and memory
problems. (Tr. 147). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of May 27, 1996. (Tr. 147). This application
was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 46-48, 52-56). Thereafter, Plaintiff
The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ____” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”
requested an administrative hearing on his application and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 6667).
Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on March 19, 2010. (Tr. 24-43). Plaintiff was
present and was represented by counsel, Evelyn Brooks, at this hearing. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational
Expert (“VE”) John Massey testified at this hearing. Id. At the time of this hearing, Plaintiff was
twenty-one (21) years old, which is defined as a “younger person” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c),
and had a high school education. (Tr. 30).
On June 4, 2010, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s application for
SSI. (Tr. 10-18). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial
Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since August 27, 2008, her application date. (Tr. 12, Finding 1). The ALJ
also determined Plaintiff had the severe impairment of borderline intellectual functioning and mood
disorder. (Tr. 12, Finding 2). The ALJ then determined Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or
medically equal the requirements of any of the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P
of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 12, Finding 3).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her RFC.
(Tr. 14-17). First, the ALJ indicated he evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found her
claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained
the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but had non-exertional limitations
restricting her to work where interpersonal contact was incidental to work performed, complexity
of tasks was learned by rote with few variables, little judgment was required, and the supervision was
simple, direct, and concrete. (Tr. 14, Finding 4).
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 16, Finding 5). The ALJ
found Plaintiff had no PRW. Id. The ALJ also determined whether Plaintiff retained the capacity
to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 17-18, Finding
9). The VE testified at the administrative hearing regarding this issue. Id. Specifically, the VE
testified that considering her age, education, work experience, and RFC, Plaintiff retained the
capacity to perform occupations such as packager with 31,975 such jobs nationally and 475 such jobs
in Arkansas, assembler with 85,400 such jobs nationally and 1,500 such jobs in Arkansas, and
production work helper with 173,532 such jobs nationally and 5,930 such jobs in Arkansas. Id.
Because Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform this other work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had
not been under a disability as defined by the Act from his onset date or from August 27, 2008
through the date of his decision. (Tr. 18, Finding 10).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s unfavorable decision.
(Tr. 123). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.968. The Appeals Council declined to review this unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 1-3). On April 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The Parties
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on April 24, 2012. ECF No. 5. Both Parties have filed
appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 15, 16. This case is now ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 15, Pg. 10-16. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the ALJ
erred (1) in failing to consider Plaintiff’s impairments in combination, (2) in the RFC determination
of Plaintiff, (3) in the credibility determination of Plaintiff, and (4) by failing to fully develop the
record. Id. In response, the Defendant argues the ALJ did not err in any of his findings. ECF No.
16. Because this Court finds the ALJ erred in the credibility determination of Plaintiff, this Court
will only address this issue.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz
v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily
activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating
factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional
Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two
additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other
symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your
back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny,
the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979,
983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not perform a proper Polaski analysis. While the ALJ
indicated the factors from 20 C.F.R. 416.929 had been considered (Tr. 15), a review of the ALJ’s
opinion shows that instead of evaluating these factors and noting inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints and the evidence in the record, the ALJ merely reviewed the medical records
and recognized the proper legal standard for assessing credibility.3 In his opinion, the ALJ only
made the following perfunctory statement regarding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they
are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.
Other than mentioning that Plaintiff gave conflicting information about her work history, the
ALJ made no specific findings regarding the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s claimed subjective
complaints and the record evidence. The ALJ must make a specific credibility determination,
articulate the reasons for discrediting the Plaintiff’s testimony, and address any inconsistencies
between the testimony and the record. The ALJ failed to perform this analysis. This lack of analysis
is insufficient under Polaski, and this case should be reversed and remanded for further consideration
consistent with Polaski. Upon remand, the ALJ may still find Plaintiff not disabled, however a
proper and complete analysis pursuant to Polaski should be performed.4
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
The ALJ also did not even specifically reference the Polaski factors which, although not required, is the
preferred practice. See Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007).
This Court remands this case only for the purpose of fully considering the Polaski factors and supplying
valid reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, if any. This Memorandum Opinion should not be
interpreted as requiring Plaintiff be awarded disability benefits upon remand.
ENTERED this 19th day of July 2013.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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