Payne-Lamb v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Erin L. Setser on April 17, 2014. (adw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
JAYME ELIZABETH PAYNE-LAMB
v.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL NO. 13-5011
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
Social Security Administration
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying
her claim for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under the provisions of Title XVI of
the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there
is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's decision. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.
Procedural Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her current application for SSI on October 27, 2010, alleging
an inability to work due to post-traumatic stress disorder, left knee problems, bipolar disorder,
anxiety, and a back injury. (Tr. 97, 128). An administrative hearing was held on October 18,
2011, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 51-73).
By written decision dated November 4, 2011, the ALJ found that during the relevant time
period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 12).
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Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: disorder of the knee,
status post arthroscopic surgery, a dysthymic disorder, and an anxiety disorder. However, after
reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not
meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found
in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 12). The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the
residual functional capacity (RFC) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) in that she is able to
occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds and frequently lift and carry 10 pounds.
She is able to sit for six hours and stand and walk for six hours during an eighthour day. She can frequently climb, crawl, kneel, stoop, crouch and balance.
Nonexertionally, the claimant is able to perform work in which interpersonal
contact is incidental to the work performed; complexity of tasks is learned and
performed by rote with few variables and use of little judgment; and the
supervision required is simple, direct and concrete.
(Tr. 14). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work
as a compression molding machine tender, a riveting machine tender, a bindery machine tender,
a motel maid, and a production and assembler worker. (Tr. 17-18).
Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, which
denied that request on November 21, 2012. (Tr. 1-6). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action.
(Doc. 1). This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 4).
Both parties have filed appeal briefs and Plaintiff filed a Reply, and the case is now ready for
decision. (Docs. 9,10,11).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments
are presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.
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II.
Applicable Law:
This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.
2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind
would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must be
affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d
964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the
Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists
in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have
decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other
words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ
must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one
year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v.
Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3),
1382(3)(c). A Plaintiff must show that her disability, not simply her impairment, has lasted for
at least twelve consecutive months.
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The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial
gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or
mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal
an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national
economy given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Only if the final
stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience
in light of her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42
(8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
III.
Discussion:
Plaintiff argues the following issues on appeal: 1) the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s
complaints of disabling pain; and 2) the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record.
A.
Fully and Fairly Develop the Record:
While an ALJ is required to develop the record fully and fairly, see Freeman v. Apfel,
208 F.3d 687, 692 (8th Cir.2000) (ALJ must order consultative examination only when it is
necessary for an informed decision), the record before the ALJ contained the evidence required
to make a full and informed decision regarding Plaintiff’s capabilities during the relevant time
period. See Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1071-72 (8th Cir.2004) (ALJ must develop
record fully and fairly to ensure it includes evidence from treating physician, or at least
examining physician, addressing impairments at issue).
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B.
Subjective Complaints and Credibility Analysis:
The ALJ was required to consider all the evidence relating to Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints including evidence presented by third parties that relates to: (1) Plaintiff’s daily
activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of her pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating
factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of her medication; and (5) functional
restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). While an ALJ may
not discount a claimant’s subjective complaints solely because the medical evidence fails to
support them, an ALJ may discount those complaints where inconsistencies appear in the record
as a whole. Id. As the Eighth Circuit has observed, “Our touchstone is that [a claimant’s]
credibility is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide.” Edwards, 314 F.3d at 966.
After reviewing the administrative record, and the Defendant’s well-stated reasons set
forth in her brief, it is clear that the ALJ properly considered and evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints, including the Polaski factors. In making a credibility finding, the ALJ noted that in
February of 2011, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Patricia Walz that she did not need assistance with
activities of daily living, but indicated that over the previous year housework had become more
difficult. (Tr. 216). Plaintiff reported to Dr. Walz that she passed the time by playing with her
children, watching television, and getting on the internet.
With regard to her alleged back impairment, the record revealed that Plaintiff was hit by
a vehicle while she was walking in a parking lot on April 15, 2011. Emergency room notes
indicated that Plaintiff had normal range of motion but did exhibit tenderness. Plaintiff was
diagnosed with a cervical strain and prescribed medication. (Tr. 249-263). The record revealed
that Plaintiff sought treatment for back pain again on July 18, 2011. (Tr. 425-428). At that time,
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Plaintiff was noted to have a non-tender back with normal range of motion and alignment, but
with bilateral lumber tenderness spasm. Plaintiff was noted to have a normal range of motion
in her extremities and her motor strength was within normal limits. Plaintiff was diagnosed with
lumbosacral strain. The record revealed that Plaintiff received chiropractic care beginning on
July 29, 2011, and was noted to be experiencing slow but good progress at her last visit on
August 23, 2011. (Tr. 449-458). The August 23, 2011, notation indicated that Plaintiff was to
continue with two more weeks of treatment. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s counsel submitted
all of the chiropractic treatment notes to the ALJ after the administrative hearing in October of
2011, and there is no indication that Plaintiff continued with chiropractic treatment after August
23, 2011, despite the recommendation that she continue treatment for at least two more weeks.
The Court would also note that while Plaintiff alleged an inability to seek treatment due
to a lack of finances, the record is void of any indication that Plaintiff had been denied treatment
due to the lack of funds. Murphy v. Sullivan, 953 F.3d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that
lack of evidence that plaintiff sought low-cost medical treatment from her doctor, clinics, or
hospitals does not support plaintiff’s contention of financial hardship). The record further
revealed that Plaintiff was able to come up with the funds to support her smoking habit
throughout the relevant time period.
Therefore, although it is clear that Plaintiff suffers with some degree of pain, she has not
established that she is unable to engage in any gainful activity. See Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433,
436 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that mere fact that working may cause pain or discomfort does not
mandate a finding of disability). Accordingly, the Court concludes that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not totally credible.
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C.
The ALJ’s RFC Determination:
RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of
her limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v.
Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain
are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a
medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s
determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that
addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642,
646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically a claimant’s
limitations and to determine how those limitations affect his RFC.” Id.
In the present case, the ALJ considered the medical assessments of examining and nonexamining agency medical consultants, Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and her medical records
when he determined Plaintiff could perform light work with limitations. The Court finds, based
upon the well-stated reasons outlined in the Defendant’s brief, that Plaintiff’s argument is
without merit, and there was sufficient evidence for the ALJ to make an informed decision.
Plaintiff's capacity to perform light work with limitations is also supported by the fact that the
medical evidence does not indicate that Plaintiff's examining physicians placed restrictions on
her activities that would preclude performing the RFC determined. See Hutton v. Apfel, 175
F.3d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 1999) (lack of physician-imposed restrictions militates against a finding
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of total disability). Accordingly, the Court finds there is substantial evidence of record to
support the ALJ’s RFC findings.
D.
Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert:
After thoroughly reviewing the hearing transcript along with the entire evidence of
record, the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the vocational expert fully set forth
the impairments which the ALJ accepted as true and which were supported by the record as a
whole. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court finds that the
vocational expert's opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that
Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude her from performing work as a compression molding
machine tender, a riveting machine tender, a bindery machine tender, a motel maid, and a
production and assembler worker. Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1996)(testimony
from vocational expert based on properly phrased hypothetical question constitutes substantial
evidence).
IV.
Conclusion:
Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial
evidence supporting the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision
should be affirmed. The undersigned further finds that the Plaintiff’s Complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 17th day of April, 2014.
/s/ Erin L. Setser
HON. ERIN L. SETSER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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