Earp v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Erin L. Setser on May 5, 2014. (tg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
SHANDY EARP
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL NO. 13-5054
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
Social Security Administration
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Shandy Earp, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial
review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner)
denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB) under the
provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the
Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.
Procedural Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her current application for DIB on December 30, 2010,
alleging an inability to work since December 20, 2010, due to a herniated disc, fibromyalgia,
osteoarthritis, carpal tunnel, spinal stenosis, a bipolar disorder, and depression. (Tr. 15, 116,
162). An administrative hearing was held on March 19, 2012, at which Plaintiff appeared with
counsel and testified. (Tr. 29-64).
By written decision dated June 8, 2012, the ALJ found that during the relevant time
period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 12).
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Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc
disease; fibromyalgia; osteoarthritis; and bipolar disorder. However, after reviewing all of the
evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the
level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found in Appendix I,
Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 13). The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to:
perform less than a full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b).
Specifically, the claimant is able to lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10
pounds frequently; stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday with
normal breaks; sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks; and
push and pull in accordance with his (sic) ability to lift and carry. The claimant
is able to occasionally stoop and climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. She is able
to frequently balance, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs. The
claimant is able to occasionally interact with the public and co-workers. Further,
she is able to perform simple, repetitive, and routine tasks. The claimant is able
to perform work with only occasional changes in the work setting and only
occasional judgement required on the job. Finally, the claimant’s supervision
must be simple, direct, and concrete.
(Tr. 14). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work
as a production assembler, a fishing stringer assembler, and a gasket inspector. (Tr. 20).
Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, which
after reviewing additional evidence submitted by Plaintiff, denied that request on February 19,
2013. (Tr. 1-6). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (Doc. 1). This case is before the
undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 6). Both parties have filed appeal
briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (Docs.14, 17).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments
are presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.
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II.
Applicable Law:
This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.
2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind
would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must be
affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d
964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the
Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists
in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have
decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other
words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ
must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one
year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v.
Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3),
1382(3)(c). A Plaintiff must show that her disability, not simply her impairment, has lasted for
at least twelve consecutive months.
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The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial
gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or
mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal
an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national
economy given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Only if the final
stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience
in light of her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42
(8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
III.
Discussion:
Plaintiff argues the following issues on appeal: 1) the ALJ erred in determining
Plaintiff’s severe impairments; 2) the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s RFC; 3) the ALJ erred
in determining Plaintiff’s credibility; and 4) the ALJ failed to include all of Plaintiff’s
impairments in the hypothetical questions.
A.
Plaintiff’s Impairments:
At Step Two of the sequential analysis, the ALJ is required to determine whether a
claimant's impairments are severe. See 20 C .F.R. § 404.1520(c). To be severe, an impairment
only needs to have more than a minimal impact on a claimant's ability to perform work-related
activities. See Social Security Ruling 96-3p. The Step Two requirement is only a threshold test
so the claimant's burden is minimal and does not require a showing that the impairment is
disabling in nature. See Brown v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1987). The claimant,
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however, has the burden of proof of showing she suffers from a medically-severe impairment
at Step Two. See Mittlestedt v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir.2000).
The ALJ clearly considered all of Plaintiff’s impairments, including the impairments that
were found to be non-severe. See Swartz v. Barnhart, 188 F. App'x 361, 368 (6th Cir.2006)
(where ALJ finds at least one “severe” impairment and proceeds to assess claimant's RFC based
on all alleged impairments, any error in failing to identify particular impairment as “severe” at
step two is harmless); Elmore v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1085487 *12 (E.D. Mo. March 5, 2012); see
also 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2) (in assessing RFC, ALJ must consider “all of [a claimant's]
medically determinable impairments ..., including ... impairments that are not ‘severe’ ”); §
416.923 (ALJ must “consider the combined effect of all [the claimant's] impairments without
regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient
severity”). The Court finds the ALJ did not commit reversible error in setting forth Plaintiff’s
severe impairments.
B.
The ALJ’s RFC Determination:
RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of
her limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v.
Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain
are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a
medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s
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determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that
addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642,
646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically a claimant’s
limitations and to determine how those limitations affect his RFC.” Id.
In the present case, the ALJ considered the medical assessments of examining and nonexamining agency medical consultants, Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and her medical records
when he determined Plaintiff could perform light work with limitations. The Court finds, based
upon the well-stated reasons outlined in the Defendant’s brief, that Plaintiff’s argument is
without merit, and there was sufficient evidence for the ALJ to make an informed decision.
Plaintiff's capacity to perform light work with limitations is also supported by the fact that the
medical evidence does not indicate that Plaintiff's examining physicians placed restrictions on
her activities that would preclude performing the RFC determined. See Hutton v. Apfel, 175
F.3d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 1999) (lack of physician-imposed restrictions militates against a finding
of total disability). Accordingly, the Court finds there is substantial evidence of record to
support the ALJ’s RFC findings.
C.
Subjective Complaints and Credibility Analysis:
The ALJ was required to consider all the evidence relating to Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints including evidence presented by third parties that relates to: (1) Plaintiff's daily
activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of her pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating
factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of her medication; and (5) functional
restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). While an ALJ may
not discount a claimant's subjective complaints solely because the medical evidence fails to
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support them, an ALJ may discount those complaints where inconsistencies appear in the record
as a whole. Id. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit observed, “Our
touchstone is that [a claimant's] credibility is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide.” Edwards
v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003).
After reviewing the administrative record, it is clear that the ALJ properly considered and
evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including the Polaski factors. A review of the record
revealed that Plaintiff completed a Function Report on January 8, 2011, wherein she indicated
that she was able to help take care of her two children which included preparing meals, doing
their laundry, helping them with homework, and being “their taxi service.” (Tr. 182-190).
Plaintiff also indicated that she was able to feed her cats and dog, and bathe and brush her dog;
to take care of her personal needs; to prepare meals; to slowly do house chores; to drive; to shop
for groceries and supplies for the family; to pay bills and handle money; to read; to spend time
with her parents and to attend her daughters sports events weather permitting; and to attend
church weekly.
The ALJ also noted that the medical evidence revealed that Plaintiff reported her pain
medication helped to relieve her pain. Therefore, although it is clear that Plaintiff suffers with
some degree of pain, she has not established that she is unable to engage in any gainful activity.
See Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that mere fact that working may
cause pain or discomfort does not mandate a finding of disability); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d
1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that, although plaintiff did have degenerative disease of the
lumbar spine, the evidence did not support a finding of disabled). Neither the medical evidence
nor the reports concerning her daily activities support Plaintiff’s contention of total disability.
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Accordingly, the Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not totally credible.
D.
Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert:
After thoroughly reviewing the hearing transcript along with the entire evidence of
record, the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the vocational expert fully set forth
the impairments which the ALJ accepted as true and which were supported by the record as a
whole. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court finds that
the vocational expert's opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion
that during the relevant time period Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude her from performing
work as a production assembler, a fishing stringer assembler, and a gasket inspector. Pickney
v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1996)(testimony from vocational expert based on properly
phrased hypothetical question constitutes substantial evidence).
IV.
Conclusion:
Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial
evidence supporting the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision
should be affirmed. The undersigned further finds that the Plaintiff’s Complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 5th day of May, 2014.
/s/ Erin L. Setser
HON. ERIN L. SETSER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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