Miller v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Erin L. Setser on May 22, 2014. (rg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

ROY GLEAN MILLER

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL NO. 13-5105

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Roy Glean Miller, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(Commissioner) denying his claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
(DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under the provisions of Titles II and XVI
of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there
is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's decision. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Procedural Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his current applications for DIB and SSI on December 15,

2010, alleging an inability to work since December 1, 2009, due to back problems, chest
problems, and left foot problems. (Tr. 116, 139). An administrative hearing was held on April
10, 2012, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 27-57).
By written decision dated April 25, 2012, the ALJ found that during the relevant time
period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 17).

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Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: a fracture of the L5
vertebra, osteoarthritis of the left ankle, recurrent bronchitis, and asthma. However, after
reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not
meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found
in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 17). The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the
residual functional capacity (RFC) to:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except
that she (sic) can occasionally climb, balance, kneel, stoop, crouch and crawl.
She (sic) can frequently finger and handle. The claimant must avoid concentrated
exposure to pulmonary irritants such as dust, gases and chemicals.
(Tr. 18). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work
as a clerical worker, a machine tender, and an assembler. (Tr. 22).
Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, which
denied that request on April 2, 2013. (Tr. 1-6). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (Doc.
1). This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 8). Both
parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (Docs.14, 15, 16).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments
are presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.
II.

Applicable Law:
This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.
2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind
would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must be

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affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d
964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the
Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists
in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have
decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other
words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ
must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one
year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v.
Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3),
1382(3)(c). A Plaintiff must show that his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for
at least twelve consecutive months.
The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial
gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or
mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal
an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past
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relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national
economy given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Only
if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work
experience in light of his residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138,
1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
III.

Discussion:
Plaintiff argues the following issues on appeal: 1 ) the ALJ failed to give proper weight

to Plaintiff’s treating physician when determining Plaintiff’s RFC; 2) the ALJ erred in his
analysis and credibility findings in regard to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; and 3) the ALJ
failed to ask the vocational expert whether there was a conflict between the vocational expert
testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).
A.

The ALJ’s RFC Determination:

RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of
his limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v.
Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain
are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a
medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s
determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that
addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642,
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646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically a claimant’s
limitations and to determine how those limitations affect his RFC.” Id.
Generally, a treating physician's opinion is given more weight than other sources in a
disability proceeding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). When the treating physician's opinion is
supported by proper medical testing, and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in
the record, the ALJ must give the opinion controlling weight. Id. “However, [a]n ALJ may
discount or even disregard the opinion of a treating physician where other medical assessments
are supported by better or more thorough medical evidence, or where a treating physician renders
inconsistent opinions that undermine the credibility of such opinions.” Wildman v. Astrue, 596
F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). Ultimately, the
ALJ must “give good reasons” to explain the weight given the treating physician's opinion. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
After reviewing the entire record, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s argument is without
merit, and that there was sufficient evidence for the ALJ to make an informed decision. The
Court notes that in determining Plaintiff could perform sedentary work with limitations, the ALJ
specifically discussed the relevant medical records, and the medical opinions of treating and nonexamining medical professionals, and set forth the reasons for the weight given to the opinions.
Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1065 (8th Cir. 2012) (“It is the ALJ’s function to resolve
conflicts among the opinions of various treating and examining physicians”)(citations omitted).
With regard to the assessment completed by Dr. Wm. Frank Webb on March 28, 2012 (Tr. 317),
the ALJ specifically addressed this report and pointed out that the assessment was inconsistent
with Dr. Webb’s treatment notes, as well as the assessment itself wherein Dr. Webb opined
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Plaintiff’s pain was a “mild” factor in Plaintiff’s life. Davidson v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 987, 990-91
(8th Cir. 2007) (finding ALJ correctly discounted a physician’s assessment report when his
treatment notes contradicted the report). Based on the record as a whole, the Court finds
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC determination for the relevant time period.
B.

Subjective Complaints and Credibility Analysis:

We now address the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's subjective complaints. The ALJ was
required to consider all the evidence relating to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints including
evidence presented by third parties that relates to: (1) Plaintiff's daily activities; (2) the duration,
frequency, and intensity of his pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of his medication; and (5) functional restrictions. See Polaski v.
Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). While an ALJ may not discount a claimant's
subjective complaints solely because the medical evidence fails to support them, an ALJ may
discount those complaints where inconsistencies appear in the record as a whole. Id. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit observed, “Our touchstone is that [a
claimant's] credibility is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide.” Edwards v. Barnhart, 314
F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003).
After reviewing the administrative record, it is clear that the ALJ properly considered and
evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including the Polaski factors. A review of the record
revealed that during the relevant time period, Plaintiff was able to help do house work and yard
work; to take care of his dog which included feeding, bathing, and walking; to take care of his
personal hygiene; to prepare simple meals; to shop for groceries; and to visit with his family and
attend church. (Tr. 165-172). The record further revealed that during the relevant time period
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Plaintiff sought treatment after falling off a ladder, falling off of a skateboard, and moving
furniture around in his house. (Tr. 227, 246, 307). These activities do not support Plaintiff’s
alleged limitations due to his impairments. In March of 2011, Plaintiff also reported that he was
able to perform all activities of daily living without assistance. (Tr. 264).
The Court would also note that while Plaintiff alleged an inability to seek treatment due
to a lack of finances, the record is void of any indication that Plaintiff had been denied treatment
due to the lack of funds. Murphy v. Sullivan, 953 F.3d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that
lack of evidence that plaintiff sought low-cost medical treatment from her doctor, clinics, or
hospitals does not support plaintiff’s contention of financial hardship). The record further
revealed that Plaintiff was able to come up with the funds to support his smoking habit
throughout the relevant time period.
Therefore, although it is clear that Plaintiff suffers with some degree of pain, he has not
established that he is unable to engage in any gainful activity. See Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433,
436 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that mere fact that working may cause pain or discomfort does not
mandate a finding of disability). Accordingly, the Court concludes that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not totally credible.
C.

Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert:

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to ask the vocational expert whether there was a
conflict between the vocational expert testimony and the DOT. However, a review of the hearing
transcript clearly indicates that the ALJ asked the vocational expert to explain any inconsistency
with the DOT and her testimony. (Tr. 53).

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After thoroughly reviewing the hearing transcript along with the entire evidence of
record, the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the vocational expert fully set forth
the impairments which the ALJ accepted as true and which were supported by the record as a
whole. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court finds that
the vocational expert's opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion
that during the relevant time period Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude him from performing
work as clerical worker, a machine tender, and an assembler. Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294,
296 (8th Cir. 1996)(testimony from vocational expert based on properly phrased hypothetical
question constitutes substantial evidence).
IV.

Conclusion:
Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision
should be affirmed. The undersigned further finds that the Plaintiff’s Complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 22nd day of May, 2014.

/s/ Erin L. Setser
HON. ERIN L. SETSER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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