Jackson v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Erin L. Setser on September 22, 2014. (tg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

CHRISTINA JACKSON

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL NO. 13-5213

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Christina L. Jackson, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(Commissioner) denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
(DIB) under the provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review,
the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to
support the Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Procedural Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her current application for DIB on November 18, 2009,

alleging an inability to work since May 16, 2009, due to narcolepsy, fibromyalgia,
temporomandibular joint disorder (TMJ), interstitial cystitis, post traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), depression and anxiety. (Tr. 138, 169). An administrative video hearing was held on
June 12, 2012, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 29-46).
By written decision dated July 13, 2012, the ALJ found that during the relevant time
period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 14).

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Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: status post left lower
extremity fracture; hypertension; and cognitive and mood disorders. However, after reviewing
all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or
equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found in
Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 18). The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (RFC) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). The individual can
occasionally lift 20 pounds, 10 pounds frequently; sit/stand/walk six hours in an
eight-hour workday; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb
ramps/stairs but not ladders, ropes or scaffolds. Must avoid hazards to include
unprotected heights and moving machinery. The individual can understand,
remember and carry out simple, routine repetitive tasks; respond to usual work
situations and work changes, and respond to supervision that is simple, direct and
concrete.
(Tr. 19). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work
as a production line assembler, and a sewing machine operator. (Tr. 22).
Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, which
denied that request on August 13, 2013. (Tr. 1-6). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (Doc.
1). This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 6). Both
parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (Docs. 10, 12).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments
are presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.
II.

Applicable Law:
This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.

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2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind
would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must be
affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d
964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the
Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists
in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have
decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other
words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ
must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one
year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v.
Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3),
1382(3)(c). A Plaintiff must show that her disability, not simply her impairment, has lasted for
at least twelve consecutive months.
The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial
gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or
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mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal
an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past
relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national
economy given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Only if the final
stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience
in light of her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42
(8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
III.

Discussion:
Plaintiff argues the following issues on appeal: 1) the ALJ erred in failing to consider

all of Plaintiff’s impairments in combination; 2) the ALJ erred in his analysis and credibility
findings in regard to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain; 3) the ALJ erred in finding that
Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform less than a full range of light work; and 4) the ALJ erred
in failing to fully and fairly develop the record.
A.

Combination of Impairments:

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider all of the claimant’s impairments
in combination.
The ALJ stated that in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, he considered “all of the claimant’s
impairments, including impairments that are not severe.” (Tr. 13). In determining Plaintiff’s
severe impairments, the ALJ went into great detail with respect to the impairments that were
found to be non-severe, and gave the reason for this finding. (Tr. 14-18). The ALJ further found
that the Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 18). Such language demonstrates the ALJ
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considered the combined effect of Plaintiff’s impairments. Hajek v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 89, 92 (8th
Cir. 1994).
B.

Subjective Complaints and Credibility Analysis:

The ALJ was required to consider all the evidence relating to Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints including evidence presented by third parties that relates to: (1) Plaintiff’s daily
activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of her pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating
factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of her medication; and (5) functional
restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). While an ALJ may
not discount a claimant’s subjective complaints solely because the medical evidence fails to
support them, an ALJ may discount those complaints where inconsistencies appear in the record
as a whole. Id. As the Eighth Circuit has observed, “Our touchstone is that [a claimant’s]
credibility is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide.” Edwards, 314 F.3d at 966.
After reviewing the administrative record, and the Defendant’s well-stated reasons set
forth in her brief, it is clear that the ALJ properly considered and evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints, including the Polaski factors.

In reviewing the evidence, Plaintiff alleges

impairments stemming from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2005. Plaintiff reported
experiencing anxiety and panic symptoms when driving after this accident. The evidence further
revealed that Plaintiff reported TMJ problems that resulted in surgery in December of 2008. The
record indicated that despite these symptoms, Plaintiff was able to drive fifty miles each way to
and from work until she was laid off in May of 2009. On May 20, 2009, Plaintiff reported to Dr.
Ester Arejola Salvador, of Ozark Guidance, Inc., that the Provigil helped a lot with her energy
problems. At that time, Plaintiff reported that she had also lost her job, but reported that she had
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been doing a good job and that she was let go because of the economy. (Tr. 438). Despite
Plaintiff’s fear of driving, the record revealed that on May 24, 2009, Plaintiff, who was driving,
was in a motorcycle accident that resulted in injuries that required surgical intervention to her
left lower extremity. The medical evidence revealed that Plaintiff was noted to have full
extension and a normal gait, and that she could pursue normal activities by August 25, 2009.
(Tr. 284). The record revealed that Plaintiff continued to undergo therapy mainly regarding her
marital discord, as well as sporadic maintenance check-ups regarding her TMJ.
With regard to Plaintiff’s alleged migraines, the medical evidence revealed that Plaintiff
did sporadically report experiencing headaches during the relevant time period, and was
prescribed medication as needed to treat her headaches. Based on the record as a whole, the
Court finds substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s headaches
were not disabling.
With regard to activities of daily living, the record revealed that in June of 2009, Plaintiff
reported that she was receiving unemployment benefits. (Tr. 442). The Court notes “[a]
claimant may admit an ability to work by applying for unemployment compensation benefits
because such an applicant must hold h[er]self out as available, willing and able to work.”
Jernigan v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir.1991). During the relevant time period,
Plaintiff also indicated that she was able to take care of her personal needs; perform household
chores; handle finances and pay bills; shop for groceries; volunteer at her granddaughter’s school
twice a week; watch television; visit with her daughter; and babysit. (Tr. 178, 231, 446, 461).

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Therefore, although it is clear that Plaintiff suffers with some degree of pain, she has not
established that she is unable to engage in any gainful activity. See Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433,
436 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that mere fact that working may cause pain or discomfort does not
mandate a finding of disability). Neither the medical evidence nor the reports concerning her
daily activities support Plaintiff’s contention of total disability. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints were not totally credible.
C.

The ALJ’s RFC Determination:

RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of
her limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v.
Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain
are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a
medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s
determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that
addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642,
646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically a claimant’s
limitations and to determine how those limitations affect his RFC.” Id.
In the present case, the ALJ considered the medical assessments of examining and nonexamining agency medical consultants, Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and her medical records
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when he determined Plaintiff could perform light work with limitations. In making the RFC
determination, the ALJ noted that the medical finding supported malingering and symptom
exaggeration, and that he took this finding into account when weighing the medical evidence.
(Tr. 20, 543, 627). After reviewing the entire evidence of record, the Court finds substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC finding.
D.

Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert:

After thoroughly reviewing the hearing transcript along with the entire evidence of
record, the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the vocational expert fully set forth
the impairments which the ALJ accepted as true and which were supported by the record as a
whole. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court finds that the
vocational expert's opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that
Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude her from performing work as a production line
assembler, and a sewing machine operator. Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296 (8th Cir.
1996)(testimony from vocational expert based on properly phrased hypothetical question
constitutes substantial evidence).
E.

Fully and Fairly Develop the Record:

While an ALJ is required to develop the record fully and fairly, see Freeman v. Apfel,
208 F.3d 687, 692 (8th Cir.2000) (ALJ must order consultative examination only when it is
necessary for an informed decision), the record before the ALJ contained the evidence required
to make a full and informed decision regarding Plaintiff’s capabilities during the relevant time
period. See Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1071-72 (8th Cir.2004) (ALJ must develop

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record fully and fairly to ensure it includes evidence from treating physician, or at least
examining physician, addressing impairments at issue).
IV.

Conclusion:
Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision
should be affirmed. The undersigned further finds that the Plaintiff’s Complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2014.

/s/ Erin L. Setser
HON. ERIN L. SETSER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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