Prince (Fitch) v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Erin L. Setser on January 15, 2016. (rg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

TRICIA Z. PRINCE (FITCH)

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL NO. 14-5348

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Tricia Z. Prince, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(Commissioner) denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
(DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under the provisions of Titles II and
XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether
there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's
decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Procedural Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her current applications for DIB and SSI on September 20,

2010, alleging an inability to work since March 15, 2009, due to degenerative disc disease of
the spine. (Tr. 180, 187, 218). An administrative hearing was held on June 12, 2012, at which
Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 62-75).
By written decision dated July 2, 2012, the ALJ found that during the relevant time
period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 24).
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Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: chronic back pain
and obesity. However, after reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in
the Listing of Impairments found in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 24). The
ALJ found Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a)
except the claimant can occasionally lift/carry 10 pounds; she can frequently
carry less than 10 pounds; she can occasionally sit for 6 hours in a workday;
she can stand for 2 hours at a time; and she can occasionally perform postural
activities such as crawling, kneeling, and crouching.
(Tr. 24). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform
work as a small product assembler and a small production machine operator. (Tr. 27).
Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, which
denied that request on August 19, 2013. 1 (Tr. 11). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action.
(Doc. 1). This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 6).
Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (Docs. 10, 13).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments
are presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.
II.

Applicable Law:
This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th
Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable

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The Court notes that on October 8, 2014, the Appeals Council granted Plaintiff an extension of time to file a civil action.
(Tr. 1).

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mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must
be affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314
F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that
supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial
evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the
Court would have decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th
Cir. 2001). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the
decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the
burden of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted
at least one year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity.
Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c (a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that
results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”

42 U.S.C. §§

423(d)(3), 1382(3)(C). A Plaintiff must show that her disability, not simply her impairment,
has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.
The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in
substantial gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical
and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet
or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from

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doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the
national economy given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920. Only if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age,
education, and work experience in light of her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v.
Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
III.

Discussion:
Plaintiff argues the following issues on appeal: 1) the ALJ failed to fully and fairly

develop the record; 2) the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility; 3) the ALJ erred in
determining Plaintiff’s RFC; and 4) the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff could perform other
work.
A.

Fully and Fairly Develop the Record:

While an ALJ is required to develop the record fully and fairly, see Freeman v. Apfel,
208 F.3d 687, 692 (8th Cir.2000) (ALJ must order consultative examination only when it is
necessary for an informed decision), the record before the ALJ contained the evidence required
to make a full and informed decision regarding Plaintiff’s capabilities during the relevant time
period. See Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1071-72 (8th Cir.2004) (ALJ must develop
record fully and fairly to ensure it includes evidence from treating physician, or at least
examining physician, addressing impairments at issue).
B.

Subjective Complaints and Credibility Analysis:

The ALJ was required to consider all the evidence relating to Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints including evidence presented by third parties that relates to: (1) Plaintiff’s daily
activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of her pain; (3) precipitating and

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aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of her medication; and (5)
functional restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). While
an ALJ may not discount a claimant’s subjective complaints solely because the medical
evidence fails to support them, an ALJ may discount those complaints where inconsistencies
appear in the record as a whole. Id. As the Eighth Circuit has observed, “Our touchstone is
that [a claimant’s] credibility is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide.” Edwards, 314 F.3d
at 966.
After reviewing the administrative record, it is clear that the ALJ properly considered
and evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including the Polaski factors. A review of the
record reveals that on November 11, 2011, Plaintiff completed a Function Report wherein she
indicated that she was able to do a few chores around the house slowly; to feed and water her
animals; to take care of her personal hygiene, although she noted a few limitations; to prepare
a simple meal; to drive, noting that she does not have her own vehicle; to shop for groceries
and household items; to handle money; to watch television and work in a puzzle book; to attend
church weekly; and to visit with her neighbor two to three times per week. (Tr. 247-254). The
record also reveals that on July 28, 2010, Plaintiff sought treatment for a cut on her finger after
cleaning grass from a lawn mower blade. (Tr. 283). Based on the record as a whole, the Court
finds substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s daily activities
are not consistent with the inability to perform substantial gainful activity.
With respect to Plaintiff’s alleged physical impairments and pain, the ALJ noted that
medical records during the relevant time period reveal that Plaintiff’s impairments were treated
conservatively. See Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 1992) (course of
conservative treatment contradicted claims of disabling pain).
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The Court would also note that while Plaintiff alleged an inability to seek treatment
due to a lack of finances, the record is void of any indication that Plaintiff had been denied
treatment due to the lack of funds. Murphy v. Sullivan, 953 F.3d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding that lack of evidence that plaintiff sought low-cost medical treatment from her doctor,
clinics, or hospitals does not support plaintiff’s contention of financial hardship). The record
further revealed that Plaintiff was able to come up with the funds to support her cigarette
smoking habit during the relevant time period.
Therefore, although it is clear that Plaintiff suffers with some degree of limitation, she
has not established that she is unable to engage in any gainful activity. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints were not totally credible.
C.

RFC Assessment:

RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes
medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own
descriptions of her limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005);
Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from
symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual
functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001).
Therefore, an ALJ’s determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical
evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart,

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353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically a
claimant’s limitations and to determine how those limitations affect h[er] RFC.” Id.
In finding Plaintiff able to perform sedentary work with limitations, the ALJ considered
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the medical records of her treating and examining physicians,
and the evaluations of the examining and non-examining medical examiners. Plaintiff's
capacity to perform this level of work is supported by the fact that Plaintiff's examining
physicians placed no restrictions on her activities that would preclude her performing the RFC
determined during the relevant time period. See Hutton v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 651, 655 (8th Cir.
1999) (lack of physician-imposed restrictions militates against a finding of total disability.
After reviewing the entire transcript, the Court finds substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s
RFC determination for the time period in question.
D.

Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert:

After thoroughly reviewing the hearing transcript along with the entire evidence of
record, the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the vocational expert fully set
forth the impairments which the ALJ accepted as true and which were supported by the record
as a whole. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court finds
that the vocational expert's opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's
conclusion that Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude her from performing work as a small
product assembler and a small production machine operator. Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294,
296 (8th Cir. 1996)(testimony from vocational expert based on properly phrased hypothetical
question constitutes substantial evidence).

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IV.

Conclusion:
Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision
should be affirmed. The undersigned further finds that the Plaintiff’s Complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 15th day of January, 2016.
/s/ Erin L. Setser
HON. ERIN L. SETSER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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