Hays v. Helder et al

Filing 15

OPINION AND ORDER adopting 13 Report and Recommendations; Motion to Dismiss 8 is GRANTED. Signed by Honorable Timothy L. Brooks on February 25, 2016. (rg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
GUY F. HAYS, JR.
V.

PLAINTIFF
CASE NO. 5:15-CV-05167

SHERIFF TIM HELDER and
CORPORAL MULVANEY

DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER

Currently before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) (Doc.
13) of the Honorable Erin L. Setser, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western
District of Arkansas, filed October 22, 2015, which recommends granting Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8). Also before the Court are Plaintiff Guy F. Hays, Jr.’s timely
Objections to the R & R (Doc.14). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court has
reviewed the record de novo as to all specified proposed findings and recommendations
to which Hays has raised objections. The Court has determined that the Objections
offer neither law nor fact sufficient to justify deviating from the findings and conclusions
announced in the R & R. Accordingly, the R & R is APPROVED and ADOPTED IN ITS
ENTIRETY. Below the Court will address Hays’s Objections, beginning with a brief
review of the facts alleged in the case.
According to the Complaint, Hays contends that Sheriff Tim Helder and Corporal
Mulvaney denied him adequate medical care and violated his religious rights as a fullblooded Cherokee Indian by not permitting him to access his medicine bag 1 while he
was incarcerated at Washington County Detention Center in January of 2013.
Defendants’ position in their Motion to Dismiss is that the facts surrounding Hays’s
1

Hays never explains the religious significance, if any, of this medicine bag and only
states that it contained “medication sent from the reservation.” (Doc. 1, p. 20).
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instant Complaint are the same as the facts alleged in an earlier-filed lawsuit brought by
Hays in 2013, which was eventually dismissed with prejudice as a result of settlement.
See Guy F. Hays, Jr. v. Nurse Rhonda Bradley, Dr. Howard, Cpl. Sharp, Jailer Mobbs,
Jailer Smith, and Nurse Vickery, Case No. 5:13-CV-05044, Doc. 34.
In the earlier-filed lawsuit, Hays claimed that two nurses, a doctor, and certain
officers at the Washington County Detention Center were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs, in violation of his constitutional rights.

Hays admits in the

Complaint in the case at bar that he filed this earlier lawsuit “dealing with the same facts
involved in this action” on March 15, 2013. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Further, Hays’s Complaint
identifies the earlier lawsuit by case number, notes that Magistrate Judge Setser was
assigned to the case, and asserts that Hays “won [the] case for $1,000.00.” Id. A
review of the docket entries in the earlier case 2 confirms that a Joint Motion to Dismiss
Due to Settlement was filed on February 25, 2015, and an Order granting the Joint
Motion was entered on March 3, 2015. The case was indeed dismissed with prejudice
due to settlement, but the settlement agreement was never filed of record.
Hays filed the instant lawsuit on July 20, 2015, less than five months after the
earlier case was dismissed.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss now argues that Hays

should be barred from proceeding with his current claims because he executed a valid
settlement and release agreement (“Release”) 3 in the earlier case, which covers all
2

The Court may take judicial notice of the public records of the earlier case without
converting Defendants’ Motion to a motion for summary judgment. See Porous Media
Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
3

The Court has reviewed and considered the Release that was executed by Hays as
part of the settlement in the earlier case. See Doc. 8-1. Details concerning the
settlement, including the dollar amount paid to Hays by the defendants in the earlier
case, are found in the Release, and this information was voluntarily disclosed by Hays
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claims in the earlier case arising from his 2013 incarceration at Washington County
Detention Center and “any potential claims” against Washington County and its
employees “which occurred prior to the date of [the Release].” (Doc. 8-1).
The Magistrate Judge in her R & R recommended granting Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. In response, Hays filed two objections, which the Court will now consider in
turn.
Hays begins his Objections by recounting his version of the facts, as set forth in
his Complaint. See Doc. 14, p. 1. He also claims that it “was proven” in his earlier
lawsuit that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights and “that there [sic]
medical staff was liable for my pain and suffering for their missdiagnosis [sic] of my
medical condition.” Id. He points out, however, that Defendant Helder and Defendant
Mulvaney “were with held [sic]” from the earlier lawsuit, and that is the reason why they
are named in the instant suit. Id. It appears, therefore, that Hays’s Objections assume
that the Release he signed in the earlier case does not bar him from asserting the
instant claims against these Defendants.
A thorough review of the Release executed on February 15, 2015, reveals that
Hays agreed to hold “Washington County, Arkansas, and all the past and present
in the Complaint now before the Court. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Release is
a document “necessarily embraced” by the Complaint and may properly be considered
on a Motion to Dismiss. The Eighth Circuit has held that a trial court reviewing a motion
to dismiss may consider those documents “whose contents are alleged in a complaint
and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the
pleading.” Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012)
(emphasis added). The Court observes that Hays has not challenged the authenticity of
the Release in these proceedings; and quite to the contrary, Hays has characterized the
settlement in the earlier case as a “win,” including in describing the settlement in his
Objections to the R & R. See, e.g., Doc. 14, p. 1 (“I did win my case . . . in Hays vs.
Bradley 13-5044.”).
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agents, servants, officials, and employees” harmless as to “any and all liability and
damages that have developed or might develop in the future arising out of or in any way
related to the arrest and incarceration of Guy F. Hays,” including “any known or
unknown Section 1983 claims, constitutional violation claims, negligence claims, and
other tort claims.” (Doc. 8-1, p. 1).
Releases such as the one executed by Hays in the earlier lawsuit are generally
“governed by basic principles of contract law.”

Sheng v. Starkey Labs., Inc., 53 F.3d

192, 194 (8th Cir. 1995). “It is the policy of the law to encourage settlement of litigation
and to uphold and enforce contracts of settlement if they are fairly arrived at and not in
contravention of law or public policy.” McCoy Farms, Inc. v. J & M McKee, 263 Ark. 20,
33 (1978). Furthermore, unless fraud or mutual mistake are alleged by either party to
the settlement, a court will ordinarily give full effect to the parties’ agreement. See
Bishop v. Bishop, 50 Ark. App. 164, 172 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998).
“Res judicata operates when (i) the court that previously adjudicated the claim
had jurisdiction to do so, (ii) the previous litigation resulted in a final judgment on the
merits, and (iii) the previous suit involved the same cause of action between the same
parties, or was based on the same nucleus of operative facts.” Larken, Inc. v. Wray,
189 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1999). And “[w]hen the parties to a previous lawsuit agree
to dismiss a claim with prejudice, such a dismissal constitutes a ‘final judgment on the
merits’ for purposes of res judicata.” Id. Considering the law as stated above, it is clear
that Hays’s Section 1983 claims arising from his arrest and incarceration in 2013, as realleged in the instant suit, are barred by res judicata. His first objection is overruled.

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Hays’s second objection relates to his claim of discrimination and/or denial of his
right to the free exercise of religion due to his jailors’ alleged refusal to let Hays have
access to his medicine bag.

For purposes of reviewing the record de novo and

evaluating Hays’s objections, the Court will assume for the sake of argument that Hays
is, indeed, of the Cherokee Indian faith. 4 Regardless, Hays’s medicine bag claim, to the
extent it arises under the First Amendment to the Constitution or the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, was brought pursuant to
Section 1983. This claim is therefore barred—as are all Hays’s Section 1983 claims
related to his 2013 arrest—due to res judicata, as the Release signed in the earlier case
states that “all the past and present agents, servants, officials, and employees“ of
Washington

County,

Arkansas—which

would

include

Defendants

Helder

and

Mulvaney—are to be held harmless for “any known or unknown Section 1983 claims”
made by Hays related to his 2013 arrest and incarceration. (Doc. 8-1, p. 1).
To the extent Hays has attempted to state a claim concerning a religious
deprivation that does not arise under Section 1983, such a claim is subject to dismissal
due to a lack of plausibility. As the Magistrate Judge noted in her R & R, Hays has
failed to allege that a policy or action implemented by Washington County or by these
individual Defendants placed a substantial burden on Hays’s ability to practice his
religion.

His assertion that he was discriminated against due to his religion is

conclusory, at best.

His second objection is therefore overruled, and his claim of

religious discrimination will be dismissed without prejudice due to failure to state a
4

Hays also notes in his second objection that Defendant Mulvaney breached “his duty
as problem solver to track down or find out [Hays’s] real heritage . . . .” (Doc. 14, p. 2).
This comment alludes to various attempts by Mulvaney and other jail personnel to
confirm with the Cherokee Nation that Hays is a registered member of the tribe.
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claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009) (finding that a claim is subject to
dismissal when it lacks facial plausibility and is only supported “by mere conclusory
statements”).
In light of the above reasoning, IT IS ORDERED that the R & R (Doc. 13) is
APPROVED and ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 8) is GRANTED. Hays’s claim regarding the denial of adequate medical
care is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and his claim regarding religious discrimination
in the denial of access to his medicine bag is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 25th day of February, 2016.

/s/ Timothy L. Brooks
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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