Harris v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Erin L. Setser on September 1, 2016. (rg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

CLETHIA ANN HARRIS

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL NO. 15-5220

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Clethia Ann Harris, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(Commissioner) denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
(DIB) under the provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review,
the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to
support the Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Procedural Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her current application for DIB on November 1, 2012,

alleging an inability to work since October 12, 2012, due to degenerative bone loss in the spine,
ruptured discs, bone spurs, arthritis in the spine and bulging discs. (Doc. 12, pp. 69, 144). An
administrative video hearing was held on November 22, 2013, at which Plaintiff appeared with
counsel and testified. (Doc. 12, pp. 45-64).
By written decision dated February 28, 2014, the ALJ found that during the relevant
time period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Doc.
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12, p. 34). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: a
disorder of the back, neck, and bilateral knees; and obesity. However, after reviewing all of the
evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the
level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found in Appendix I,
Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Doc. 12, p. 37). The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (RFC) to:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except the claimant
can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, crouch and crawl but
never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She is able to frequently rotate, flex
and extend her neck. In addition, the claimant can occasionally operate foot
controls with her right lower extremity and frequently operate foot controls with
her left lower extremity. She is limited to the performance of jobs that would
allow her to use a hand-held device for ambulation.
(Doc. 12, p. 38). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could
perform her past relevant work as a bookkeeper. (Doc. 12, p. 41).
Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, which
after reviewing additional medical evidence submitted by Plaintiff, denied that request on July
31, 2015. (Doc. 12, p. 4). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (Doc. 1). This case is
before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 7). Both parties have filed
appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (Docs. 9, 11).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments
are presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.
II.

Applicable Law:
This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th
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Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable
mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must
be affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314
F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that
supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial
evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the
Court would have decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th
Cir. 2001). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the
decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the
burden of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted
at least one year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity.
Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § §
423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which
are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A Plaintiff must show that her disability, not simply her
impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.
The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in
substantial gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical
and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet

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or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from
doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the
national economy given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Only
if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and
work experience in light of her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683
F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Higgins v. Apfel, 222 F.3d
504, 505 (8th Cir. 2000); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
III.

Discussion:
Of particular concern to the undersigned is the ALJ’s RFC determination. RFC is the

most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It is
assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id.

This includes medical records,

observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of her
limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v.
Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as
pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity
is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s
determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that
addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642,
646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically a claimant’s
limitations and to determine how those limitations affect h[er] RFC.” Id.
In the present case, the ALJ determined Plaintiff is able to perform sedentary work with
limitations. In making this determination, the ALJ pointed out that no treating physician
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opined as to Plaintiff’s abilities, and that two non-examining medical consultants opined that
Plaintiff was able to perform light work with limitations. While the ALJ did reduce Plaintiff’s
RFC to sedentary work, a review of the record reveals that the non-examining medical
consultants did not have the evidence regarding Plaintiff’s bilateral knee impairments before
them when they opined as to Plaintiff’s capabilities. A review of the record reveals that
Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Mark W. Powell in July of 2013. (Doc. 12, pp.426-431). The Court
notes that at that time, Dr. Powell recommended that Plaintiff “use a walker and toe-touch
weight bear only on the left lower extremity due to the osteochondral lesion in her right knee.”
(Doc. 12, p. 429). The record further reveals that Plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing
in November of 2013, that Dr. Powell had completed the forms for her to receive a handicap
license plate because she was unable to walk one hundred feet without having to stop and rest;
that she had to use a cane to get around at all times; and that even with the use of a brace on
each knee her knees would buckle. (Doc. 12, p. 53). The record is void of a medical opinion
by either an examining or non-examining medical professional regarding Plaintiff’s bilateral
knee impairments which at times have required the use of a walker during the time period in
question. After reviewing the record, the Court finds remand necessary for the ALJ to more
fully and fairly develop the record with respect to Plaintiff’s physical RFC.
On remand, the ALJ is directed to address interrogatories to a medical professional
requesting that said physician review Plaintiff's medical records; complete a RFC assessment
regarding Plaintiff's capabilities during the time period in question; and give the objective basis
for the opinion so that an informed decision can be made regarding Plaintiff's ability to perform
basic work activities on a sustained basis. The ALJ may also order a consultative examination,
in which, the consultative examiner should be asked to review the medical evidence of record,
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perform examinations and appropriate testing needed to properly diagnosis Plaintiff's
condition(s), and complete a medical assessment of Plaintiff's abilities to perform work related
activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.917.
With this evidence, the ALJ should then re-evaluate Plaintiff's RFC and specifically
list in a hypothetical to a vocational expert any limitations that are indicated in the RFC
assessments and supported by the evidence.
IV.

Conclusion:
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by

substantial evidence, and therefore, the denial of benefits to the Plaintiff should be reversed
and this matter should be remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
DATED this 1st day of September, 2016.

/s/ Erin L. Setser
HON. ERIN L. SETSER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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