Huff v. Regis Corp/Regis Salon
Filing
15
OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Honorable Timothy L. Brooks on June 20, 2016. (jn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
PLAINTIFF
ROBERT DEON HUFF
v.
CASE NO. 5:16-CV-05083
REGIS CORPORATION d/b/a REGIS SALON
DEFENDANT
OPINION AND ORDER
Currently before the Court are Defendant Regis Corporation d/b/a Regis Salon's
("Regis") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) and Brief in support (Doc. 7). On May 31 , 2016,
Plaintiff Robert Deon Huff filed a Response (Doc. 13) in opposition to the Motion.
In
reviewing the Motion to Dismiss, the Court has also considered the pleadings; Mr. Huff's
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Charge of Discrimination , which
was attached to the Motion; 1 and the Exhibits attached to the Complaint.
For the
reasons stated herein , the Court now GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Robert Deon Huff is a former employee of Regis #321 at the Northwest Arkansas
Mall in Fayetteville , Arkansas . Mr. Huff worked at Regis as a stylist from some time in
1992 until January 13, 2015 , when Regis terminated him . On April 9, 2015, 86 days
after Regis terminated Mr. Huff, he filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC
against Reg is. The Charge alleged age discrimination , discrimination based on a
"[h]ostile work environment," and "harassment based on age and sexual orientation."
1
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court ordinarily does not consider matters
outside the pleadings . Fed . R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, the Court may also consider
public records. Faibisch v. Univ. of Minn. , 304 F.3d 797, 802-803 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding
that an EEOC Charge of Discrimination is a public record).
1
(Doc. 6-1 ). Mr. Huff filed his Charge in accordance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
("Title VII ") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").
Mr. Huff contends that he was fired due to his age and his status as a gay man .
Mr. Huff further maintains in his EEOC Charge:
Beginning in approximately March of 2013 , and continuing thereafter,
certain supervisors and employees of Regis who were superior to me
began to tease me about my age and sexual orientation . At times I was
referred to as the salon "Matriarch" or the "Residential Fairy of Regis. "
This occurred in approximately November, 2014. Over the course of time
from approximately March , 2013 , continually until and including January
13, I was subjected to ridicule by my co-workers and superiors at work,
such as being required to deliver a public apology (standing in the middle
of the salon in front of everyone present) for something I was accused of
doing which I did not do. It was a humiliating and inappropriate way to
handle that situation even if I had done what my superiors claimed that I
did. I was suspended without cause in November 2014. There were
multiple instances in which I was teased about my age and sexual
orientation on a regular basis from March 2013 up to the date I was
terminated on January 13, 2015 .
Id.
Mr. Huff's Complaint also appears to allege that customers were torn away from
him "[d]ue to [his] religion and sexual orientation ." (Doc. 3). Though he does not identify
the specific facts surrounding this incident or incidents, Mr. Huff claims that "[t]his
situation has caused defamation of character. " Id.
Regis responds that Mr. Huff was not fired for discriminatory reasons. Instead ,
Regis terminated Mr. Huff for failing to return to work on time after taking time off for
personal leave , and for his prior suspension due to "unprofessionalism and his actions
in front of a walk-in guest. " (Doc. 7, p. 1 ).
On September 23 , 2015, the EEOC dismissed Mr. Huff's discrimination charge
and sent him a "Right-to-Sue" letter. See Doc. 3-2 . On March 23 , 2016 , 182 days after
2
the EEOC issued Mr. Huff his Right-to-Sue letter, Mr. Huff filed the current Complaint
before the Court. On April 21 , 2016, Regis filed its Motion to Dismiss arguing first that
Mr. Huff's age, sexual orientation , and possible religious discrimination claims should be
dismissed because the claims are time-barred , and because Mr. Huff failed to state a
claim for each charge; and second , that Mr. Huff's defamation claim also should be
dismissed due to a time-bar and for failure to state a claim.
In his Response, Mr. Huff concedes that his discrimination claims are timebarred : "I understand about the time limits clearly. It was a misjudgment to turn the
EEOC Right to Sue letter in late." (Doc. 13). However, he argues that his claims should
not be dismissed because he feels he has evidence to prove his case on the merits,
and "[e]veryone in the United States has a right to be heard in front of a judge and even
a right to a fair trial. " Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b )(6) , the complaint must
present "a short and plain statement of the claim that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Fed . R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The intention of this is to "give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. " Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 ,
93 (2007) (quoting Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Even so , the
complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true , to 'state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face ."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged ." Id. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions'
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or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do .' Nor does a
complaint
suffice
if it tenders
'naked
assertion[s)'
devoid
of 'further factual
enhancement."' Id. In short, "the pleading standard that Rule 8 announces does not
require 'detailed factual allegations ,' but it demands more than an unadorned , the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation ." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Ill. DISCUSSION
A. Title VII and ADEA Claims
Regis first argues that any claims by Mr. Huff under Title VII or the ADEA are
time-barred , a point that Mr. Huff concedes in his Response. After the EEOC dismisses
a charge of discrimination , both Title VII and the ADEA allow a claimant to file suit
against the respondent within 90 days of notice or receipt, respectively, of the dismissal.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) ("If a charge filed with the Commission .. . is dismissed
by the Commission , ... the Commission ... shall so notify the person aggrieved
and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought
against the respondent named in the charge by the person claiming to be aggrieved");
29 U.S .C. § 626(e) ("If a charge filed with the Commission under this chapter is
dismissed . . . the Commission shall notify the person aggrieved . A civil action may be
brought under this section by a person . .. against the respondent named in the charge
within 90 days after the date of the receipt of such notice"). The Arkansas Civil Rights
Act ("ACRA") also requires a claimant to bring suit within 90 days of receipt of the
EEOC's dismissal or within one year after the alleged discrimination occurred . See
A.C.A. § 16-123-107(c)(3).
4
Here, the EEOC dismissed Mr. Huff's charges under both Title VII and the ADEA
on September 23, 2015 . Thus, the latest date Mr. Huff could have filed suit would have
been December 22 , 2015 , 90 days after he received notice of the dismissal.
Furthermore , the latest date Mr. Huff could have filed suit for any state law
discrimination claims under ACRA would have been January 13, 2016 , one year after
his notice of termination from Regis. Mr. Huff did not file this current lawsuit until March
23 , 2016 , 182 days after the EEOC's dismissal and 70 days after the ACRA deadline.
Mr. Huff's Title VII and ADEA claims and any possible ACRA claims are clearly timebarred.
In certain limited situations, the Court may for equitable reasons toll the 90-day
statute of limitations for commencement of a civil action after dismissal of an EEOC
charge. See Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown , 466 U.S . 147, 151 (1984). These
situations include ones where "(1) a claimant has received inadequate notice; (2) a
motion for appointment of counsel is pending ; (3) the court has led the plaintiff to
believe that he or she has done everything required of him or her; or (4) affirmative
misconduct on the part of a defendant lulled the plaintiff into inaction." Shempert v.
Harwick Chem. Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Baldwin Cty. Welcome
Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151 ). However, in this case the record does not show that any of these
situations have occurred , and Mr. Huff has failed to state any reason why the statute of
limitations should be tolled . "While Title VII is remedial legislation and its charge-filing
provisions are not to be read too literally or technically, '[p]rocedural requirements
established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be
disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants. "' Shempert, 151
5
F.3d at 797 (quoting Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 152). Because Mr. Huff's
discrimination claims are time-barred and not subject to tolling , the Court finds it
unnecessary to consider Defendant's alternative argument that Mr. Huff failed to state a
claim.
For the foregoing reasons, all of Mr. Huff's discrimination claims are dismissed
with prejudice .
B. Defamation Claim
Next, Regis argues that Mr. Huff's defamation claim should be dismissed
because it is time-barred , and because Mr. Huff failed to state a claim . Defamation may
refer to either slander (spoken defamation) or libel (written defamation). See Faulkner v.
Ark. Children 's Hosp. , 347 Ark. 941 , 955 (2002). Here, the Court will assume Mr. Huff is
making a slander claim because he never refers to any written publication in his
Complaint or supporting documents. In Arkansas, the statute of limitations for slander is
one year. AC .A. § 16-56-104(3). The statute of limitations for slander begins to run at
the time of publication of the alleged slander. Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 262
(1997) (assuming that the time of publication of slander is the time the slanderous
statements are made).
Mr. Huff's defamation claim is time-barred. The latest date Mr. Huff could have
brought suit is one year after Regis terminated his employment because the defamatory
statements he complains his employer and co-workers made about him occurred during
his employment at Regis. That date was January 13, 2016 . Mr. Huff filed his Complaint
on March 23 , 2016 , 70 days after the deadline.
6
Because Mr. Huff's defamation claim is time-barred , it is dismissed with
prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein , IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant
Regis Salon's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) is GRANTED .
contemporaneously with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this
~
Jb'
day of
7
Judgment will be entered
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