Blanchard v. McDonald et al
Filing
17
OPINION AND ORDER denying 16 Motion for Reconsideration ; see order for specifics. Signed by Honorable Timothy L. Brooks on September 27, 2016. (rg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
CRAIG ALLEN BLANCHARD, MBA
v.
PLAINTIFF
Case No. 16-CV-05189
ROBERT A. MCDONALD, Secretary
Department of Veteran's Affairs, Agency
DEFENDANT
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Craig Allen Blanchard , proceeding prose , has filed a letter (Doc. 16) that
can be construed as either a notice of appeal or a motion for reconsideration of this
Court's screening order (Doc. 12), which dismissed Mr. Blanchard's claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ('Title VII "), but allowed his claims to proceed under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("the Rehabilitation Act"). For the following reasons , the
letter will be treated as a motion for reconsideration and is DENIED.
Federal Courts of Appeals only have jurisdiction to hear a "final decisionO" of
district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Interlocutory orders, such as this Court's screening
order, "may not be appealed unless it includes the grant or denial of an injunction,
§ 1292(a)(1 ); or the district court has certified a controlling issue of law under§ 1292(b );
or the court has directed entry of a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ; or the order is appealable as a final order under the
judicially created collateral order doctrine." Borntrager v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas
Pension Fund, 425 F.3d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir. 2005).
There has not been a final decision in this case , as Mr. Blanchard 's claims under
the Rehabilitation Act have not been dismissed and are proceeding . Moreover, an
injunction has not been granted or denied, nor has the Court certified a controlling issue
of law, or directed entry of a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b ). Likewise , the
order is not appealable as a final order under the judicially created collateral order
doctrine. Thus, since Mr. Blanchard cannot appeal the order dismissing his Title VII
claims at this time, this Court will treat his letter as a motion for reconsideration.
A motion for reconsideration in this context would be governed by Rule 59(e) or
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . "Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited
function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence. " Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist. , 540 F.3d 752 , 761 (8th Cir.
2008) (quoting United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930 , 933 (8th
Cir.2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). Rule 60(b) provides that a party
may be relieved from an order of the Court under certain enumerated circumstances,
including the existence of "mistake , inadvertence , surprise , or excusable neglect" or
"any other reason that justifies relief." Fed . R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (6). Furthermore ,
Rule 60(b) "provides for extraordinary relief which may be granted only upon an
adequate showing of exceptional circumstances ." United States v. Young , 806 F.2d
805 , 806 (8th Cir. 1986).
Mr. Blanchard only raises one legal argument as to why th is Court should
reconsider its previous order dismissing his Title VII claims. This argument is that 42
U.S.C.A. § 1981 a provides him with a legal mechanism to assert a separate Title VII
claim for disability discrimination, based on his claim that he was passed over for two
separate jobs because he is a paraplegic. However, 42 U.S.C .A. § 1981 a does not
create an independent cause of action , but merely provides a possibility of recovery of
both compensatory and punitive damages fo r a plaintiff who successfully proves
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intentional violations of Title VII , the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, or section
501 of the Rehabilitation Act. In other words, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 a does not create a
path for one to sue under Title VII; it only provides a way to recover damages once one
has proven intentional discrimination under Title Vil , the ADA, or the Rehabilitation Act.
It appears that Mr. Blanchard is under the impression that this Court's previous order
foreclosed his ability to recover under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a. This is not the case. Mr.
Blanchard 's claims under the Rehabilitation Act were not dismissed and are proceeding,
and if he prevails at summary judgment or trial, he will be eligible to recover
compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 a. Since there are no
new facts that have been brought to the Court's attention, and Mr. Blanchard's sole
legal argument is without merit, his motion for reconsideration (Doc. 16) is DENIED.
The Court will set a case management hearing soon after the Defendant answers
or otherwise responds to the
Complaint.~
IT IS SO ORDERED on this
t 1d ay of September
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