Keebler v. Bridges et al
Filing
7
OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by Honorable Timothy L. Brooks on August 17, 2016. (src)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
PLAINTIFF
ROYCE DEE KEEBLER
v.
CASE NO.: 5:16-CV-05200
JUDGE PAUL BRIDGES;
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
JAY SEXTON; PUBLIC
DEFENDER NATHAN SMITH;
PSYCHOLOGIST
DANA HARTSFEW
DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights action filed Plaintiff Royce Dee Keebler under the provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds prose and in forma pauperis. He is incarcerated in
the Benton County Detention Center (BCDC) .
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) modified the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
to require the Court to screen complaints for dismissal under§ 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court
must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (a) are frivolous or
malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted ; or (c) seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I. BACKGROUND
According to the allegations of the Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff has been incarcerated
on state criminal charges since October 24, 2015. He states he has a total of seven
criminal charges filed against him including one that has been pending since November 2,
2014 . He names as Defendants those associated with his criminal case, Judge Bridges,
Prosecuting Attorney Jay Sexton , and Public Defender Nathan Smith, and the psychologist,
Dana Hartsfew who performed a mental evaluation to determine if Plaintiff is capable of
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assisting in his defense. With respect to Dana Hartsfew, Plaintiff alleges she has her own
practice on the square in Fayetteville.
Plaintiff contends his constitutional rights have been violated in the following ways:
(1) certain questions during his mental evaluation were designed to get him to incriminate
himself; (2) although he has been appointed an attorney, Plaintiff alleges that Nathan Smith
has been of no assistance at all ; (3) he has been denied Due Process; (4) he has been
denied a speedy trial ; (5) he has been denied the right to appear in person at court instead
of by video; (6) he has not been allowed to obtain "witnesses in [his] favor;" (7) he has not
been given the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him; (8) his bond is excessive ;
(9) he has not been provided any information about his case; (10) he is being unlawfully
detained; and (11) Judge Bridges has unlawfully entered not guilty pleas on Plaintiff's behalf
thus acting as both the Judge and Plaintiff's attorney.
As relief, the Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages.
II. DISCUSSION
Under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen a case prior to service of process
being issued . A claim is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact."
Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319 , 325 (1989) . A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face ." Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) . However, the
Court bears in mind that when "evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted
sufficient facts to state a claim , we hold 'a prose complaint, however inartfully pleaded, .
. . to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."' Jackson v. Nixon,
747 F.3d 537 , 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)) .
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal. First, Judge Paul Bridges is immune from
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suit. Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) ("Judicial immunity is an immunity from
suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.") ; see also Duty v. City of
Springdale, 42 F.3d 460 , 462 (8th Cir. 1994).
"Judges performing judicial functions
enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability." Robinson v. Freeze , 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th
Cir. 1994). "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in
error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349 , 356-57 (1978).
Judicial immunity is overcome in two situations :
(1) if the challenged act is
nonjudicial; and (2) if the action , although judicial in nature, was taken in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction . Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. It is clear from the allegations of the
complaint that neither situation applies here.
Second , Prosecuting Attorney Jay Sexton is immune from suit. The United States
Supreme Court, in Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409 , 427 (1976) , established the absolute
immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "in initiating
a prosecution and in presenting the State's case."
This immunity extends to all acts
that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."
Id. at
430; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons , 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (finding that a prosecutor
acting as an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is entitled to absolute
immunity while a prosecutor acting in an investigatory or administrative capacity is only
entitled to qualified immunity) ; Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir.1996)
(holding that county prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity from suit) .
Third , Public Defender Nathan Smith is not subject to suit under§ 1983. A§ 1983
complaint must allege that each defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived plaintiff
of "rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United
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States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999). Nathan Smith
does not act under color of state law while representing Plaintiff in his criminal proceeding .
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 , 318 (1981) (public defender does not act under color
of state law when performing traditional functions as counsel) .
Finally, Dana Hartsfew, a psychologist, does not act under color of state law merely
because she performed Plaintiff's mental evaluation . Private individuals, not employed by
a detention center or a state agency, do not act under color of law unless they are so
connected with the state that their conduct may be fairly attributed to the state itself. Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922 , 936 (1983) . In this case , Plaintiff has alleged only that
Dana Hartsfew conducted his mental evaluation . There is no allegation that she was
employed by Benton County or that she acted pursuant to a contract with Benton County.
See, e.g. , West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (physician acting pursuant to a contract
with the state to provide medical services acted under color of state law) ; Greffey v.
State of Ala. Dept. of Corr., 996 F. Supp. 1368, 1379 (N .D. Ala . 1998) (psychologist
employed by the State acts under color of law) . In fact, Plaintiff indicates Dana Hartsfew
was in private practice. See, e.g. , Black v. Delano Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 2015 WL 4923224, *4
(E.D. Cal. Aug . 18, 2015) (finding defendants are not employees of the state and plaintiff
"does not allege that there is any contractual , or otherwise 'deeply intertwined,'
relationship between the hospitals and the prison .
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to
allege that Defendants acted under color of state law.") .
There is no allegation that Benton County had any control , or responsibility, for Dana
Hartsfew's actions. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 , 1004 (1982) (no state action
when determinations "ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties
according to professional standards that are not established by the State") ; cf Jensen v.
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Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 575 (9th Cir. 2000) (relationship between county and private
psychiatric group providing mental evaluations was so "deeply intertwined" that
psychiatrist who signed commitment order acted under color of state law for § 1983
purposes) . Here, there are no allegations suggesting any basis on which Dana Hartsfew
can be held to be a state actor. Therefore , she did not act under color of law. See, e.g. ,
Pino v. Higgs , 75 F.3d 1461 , 1466-67 (10th Cir. 1996) (private emergency room physician
not acting under color of state law for purposes of§ 1983 when he examined, detained,
and certified plaintiff for transport under state commitment statute); Dixon v. Baptist S.
Med. Hosp. , 2010 WL 431186, *7 (M .D. Ala . Feb . 1, 2010) ("The vast majority of federal
courts agree that treatment by a non-contract private physician , nurse or hospital upon
referral or on an emergency basis does not satisfy the requirements of state action").
Ill. CONCLUSION
The Complaint as against Judge Paul Bridges , Prosecuting Attorney Jay Sexton , and
Public Defender Nathan Smith fails to state cognizable claims under § 1983, is frivolous ,
or is against parties immune from suit. Therefore, these claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (IFP action , or any part of it, may be
dismissed at any time due to frivolousness , for failure to state a claim , or because the
claims are against a party immune from suit) . The Complaint as against Dana Hartsfew is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE .
IT IS SO ORDERED on this
;t!
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day of August, 20 6
- OOKS
TES DISTRICT JUDGE
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