Hughes v. Infante et al
Filing
38
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 29 Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Honorable P. K. Holmes III on July 9, 2019. (lgd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
EULAS LINWOOD HUGHES
v.
PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 5:18-CV-05090
NURSE FRAN INFANTE, NURSE
SHAWNA STEPHENS, DR. SAEZ, and
NURSE HEATHER TRIMMER
DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Currently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 29, 30, 31.).
I. BACKGROUND
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges his federal constitutional rights have been
violated by the denial of medical care while incarcerated at the Benton County Detention Center
(BCDC) as a pretrial detainee. (ECF No. 11 at 4-5). He alleges he was shot four times in the back
on January 20, 2018. (Id. at 3-4). Plaintiff alleges bullets remain lodged in both his neck and
rotator cuff, but the areas were x-rayed and he was told nothing could be done. 1 (Id. at 5). Plaintiff
identifies Dr. Saez as the physician at the BCDC. Starting January 23, 2018, Plaintiff alleges Dr.
Saez could have given him pain medication for his injuries, but instead did not permit him to have
any pain medication “at all.” (Id. at 4).
Plaintiff proceeds against all Defendants in their official and personal capacity. (Id. at 4).
He seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 7).
It is not clear from Plaintiff’s Complaint if this determination was made by medical staff in the BCDC or
elsewhere.
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Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on December 12, 2018. (ECF Nos.
29, 30, 31). On December 13, 2018, the Court entered an Order directing Plaintiff to file a
Response to the Summary Judgment Motion. (ECF No. 32). Plaintiff filed his Response on
January 25, 2019. (ECF No. 35).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
"Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with
the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists.” National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165
F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).
The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." National Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). "A case founded on speculation or suspicion is
insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment." Id. (citing, Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
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III. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue summary judgment in their favor is appropriate because: (1) Defendants
were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs; (2) no policy or custom of
Southern Health Partners, Inc. caused Plaintiff to suffer any unconstitutional harm; (3) Plaintiff
cannot “meet proof with proof” to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. (ECF
No. 31).
Plaintiff provided a one-paragraph Response, stating as follows: “They say my injurys [sic]
are chronic but I’m not being treated as so. My pain is terriable [sic] everyday and they could
make this at least more bearable. My pain and suffering make my life not as worth living. The
quality of my life is pain every day.” (ECF No. 35 at 1) (errors in original).
The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment prohibits deliberate
indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs. Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th
Cir. 2012). To prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants acted
with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976).
The deliberate indifference standard includes “both an objective and a subjective
component: ‘The [Plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious
medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those
needs.’” Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132
F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)).
To show that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need, Plaintiff must show he
“has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or has an injury “that is so obvious
that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Schaub v.
VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
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For the subjective prong of deliberate indifference, “the prisoner must show more than
negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions
does not give rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Popoalii v. Correctional Med. Servs,
512 F.3d 488, 499 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal
recklessness, which demands more than negligent misconduct.” Id.
It is well settled that “[a] prisoner’s mere difference of opinion over matters of expert
medical judgment or a course of medical treatment fail[s] to rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.” Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 449 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). An
“inmate must clear a substantial evidentiary threshold to show the prison’s medical staff
deliberately disregarded the inmate’s needs by administering inadequate treatment.” Id. (internal
citations omitted). Despite this, issues of fact exist when there is a question of whether or not
medical staff exercised independent medical judgment, and whether the decisions made by medical
staff fell so far below the reasonable standard of care as to constitute deliberate indifference. See
Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1990).
There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s injuries meet the objective first prong of the deliberate
indifference standard. He was involved in an alleged altercation with police on January 20, 2018.
During this incident, he was shot four times. (ECF No. 30 at 1). Upon admission to Washington
Regional Medical Center on January 20, 2017, he presented with gunshot wounds in his left chest
cavity, left side of his back, right side of his chest, an open fracture of the right scapula, various
soft tissue injuries, and several systemic issues. (ECF No. 31-1 at 3). Bullet fragments were noted
to be present at the “at the lateral mass of the cervical spine” with “no fracture or injury to the
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spine.” Plaintiff was held overnight for observation and then released into police custody. 2 (ECF
No. 31-1 at 2).
Plaintiff fails, however, to meet the subjective second prong of the deliberate indifference
standard. His allegations that he received no pain medication “at all” are blatantly contradicted by
the record. Upon discharge from the hospital on January 22, 2018, Plaintiff was prescribed 15
doses (30 tablets) of Tramadol, an opioid pain medicine. (ECF No. 30 at 1; 31-1 at 5). He was
booked into BCDC that day and saw Defendant Saez on January 23, 2018. (ECF No. 31-1 at 78). Defendant Saez prescribed Tramadol twice a day, and on January 24, 2018, added 500
milligrams of Tylenol for additional pain control. (ECF No. 30 at 2; 31-1 at 8). On January 29,
2018, an injury on his flank exhibited odor, increased drainage, and increased pain. He was taken
to Washington Regional Medical Center that same day, where he was diagnosed with an infection
in one of his gunshot wounds. (ECF No. 30 at 2; 31-1 at 8, 13, 14-18). Upon discharge, he was
prescribed Bactrim (antibiotic) and Flexeril (muscle relaxant). The muscle relaxant was prescribed
to reduce muscle spasms, which contribute to pain. (ECF No. 30 at 2; 31-1 at 19; 31-2 at 2).
Plaintiff was started on these additional drugs at BCDC on January 30, 2018. (ECF No. 30 at 2;
31-1 at 20). During that medical encounter, he told the provider he had a history of alcohol and
prescription drug abuse. (ECF No. 30 at 3; 31-1 at 22). Plaintiff continued to receive Tramadol
through February 2, 2018. (ECF No. 30 at 3; 31-2 at 2).
Starting on February 5, 2018, Plaintiff received gabapentin, a medication for nerve pain,
instead of the opioid Tramadol. Given Plaintiff’s reported history of prescription drug abuse,
Defendant Saez did not believe it was medically prudent to continue Plaintiff on opioids after that
time. (ECF No. 30 at 3; 31-2 at 2). On February 6, 2018, Plaintiff was also started on Naproxen,
Based on the fact that Plaintiff was not scheduled for surgery, the Court will assume that it was the medical
providers at Washington Regional who determined that surgery was not appropriate to remove the bullet fragments.
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another pain medication. (Id.). From February 2018 through the date he filed his Complaint in
May 2018, Plaintiff continued to receive non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs and gabapentin for
pain, with several increases to the dosages in response to Plaintiff’s requests. (ECF No. 30 at 3-4;
31-1 at 24-43; 31-2 at 2-3). Plaintiff’s wounds were noted to be healed by Defendant Saez on
March 23, 2018. (ECF No. 31-2 at 2). Plaintiff received a CT scan of his shoulder on March 6,
2017, and no fractures or dislocations were seen. (ECF No. 30 at 4; 31-2 at 2). On June 8, 2017,
a CT scan of his neck indicated no spinal cord injury and no migration of the bullet fragment.
(ECF No. 30 at 4; 31-2 at 3).
Thus, the record indicates Plaintiff has received regular medical care, including an
immediate transport to Washington Regional Medical Center when one of his wounds became
infected. The bullet fragments in his neck are also monitored by CT scan on a regular basis to
ensure they have not migrated. Finally, the record indicates he has regularly received multiple
pain medications, and the dosages for those pain medications have been increased several times
upon his request. Plaintiff has provided no evidence to contradict the record. In particular,
Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that he should be receiving something other than the
multiple pain medications he is already prescribed or that surgery or other treatments to address
the bullet fragments have been recommended. While the Court is not unsympathetic to his
allegations of chronic pain, nothing in the record indicates the existence of any deliberate
indifference by Defendants to that pain. Plaintiff’s mere disagreement with the medical care
provided does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Nelson, 603 F.3d at 449 (“[a]
prisoner’s mere difference of opinion over matters of expert medical judgment or a course of
medical treatment fail[s] to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”) (internal citation
omitted)).
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In the absence of any evidence of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s pain, his official
capacity claim against Defendants necessarily fails. “To establish liability in an official-capacity
suit under section 1983, a plaintiff must show either that the official named in the suit took an
action pursuant to an unconstitutional governmental policy or custom . . .or that he or she possessed
final authority over the subject matter at issue and used that authority in an unconstitutional
manner.” Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 433 (8th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff did not allege that Southern
Health Partners, Inc. or BCDC had a policy or custom of denying medical care or pain medication
to inmates, and the summary judgment record provided no evidence that any such policy or custom
existed.
Accordingly, there is no question of material fact remaining, and Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 29) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of July 2019.
Judgment will be entered accordingly.
/s/P. K. Holmes, III
P. K. HOLMES, III
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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