Simmons v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on August 26, 2011. (tg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
SHIRLEY ANN SIMMONS
vs.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 6:10-cv-06059

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE
Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Shirley Ann Simmons (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application
for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and a period of disability under Title II of the Act. The
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings
in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting
all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this
memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB on April 2, 2008. (Tr. 106). Plaintiff
alleged she was disabled due to several different impairments, back pain, headaches, swelling of her
legs and feet, and an inability to sit or stand for long. (Tr. 136). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of
January 18, 2008.

(Tr. 136).

These applications were denied initially and again upon

reconsideration. (Tr. 64-66, 72). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her

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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ____” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

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application, and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 74-75).
Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on November 19, 2009 in Hot Springs, Arkansas.
(Tr. 27-63). Plaintiff was present and was represented by attorney Sherri Mcdonough, at this
hearing. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Dale Thomas testified at this hearing. Id. At
the time of this hearing, Plaintiff was forty-five (45) years old, which is defined as a “younger
person” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c), and had a ninth grade education. (Tr. 33).
On January 7, 2010, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s application
for DIB. (Tr. 15-22). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Act through June 30, 2013. (Tr. 17, Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff
had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since January 18, 2008, her alleged onset
date. (Tr. 17, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and obesity. (Tr. 17, Finding 3). The ALJ also
determined Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the
Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 17,
Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ indicated he evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and
determined her RFC. (Tr. 18-21, Finding 5). First, the ALJ stated he evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints and found her claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ
determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work. Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 21, Finding 6). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff’s PRW included work as a cashier, home health aid, and certified nursing
assistant. (Tr. 21). Based upon her RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff would be unable to perform

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this PRW. Id.
The ALJ did, however, find Plaintiff retained the ability to perform other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 21, Finding 10). The ALJ based this finding upon
the testimony of the VE. Id. Specifically, the VE testified in response to a question from the ALJ
that a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s limitations retained the ability to perform work as a
production work patcher with approximately 1,500 such jobs regionally and 106,000 in the national
economy, and creditor authorizer call-out operator with approximately 200 such jobs regionally and
48,000 in the national economy. Id. The ALJ then determined Plaintiff had not been under a
disability, as defined by the Act, from January 18, 2008 through the date of his decision. (Tr. 22,
Finding 11).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s unfavorable decision.
(Tr. 10). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.968. The Appeals Council declined to review this unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 1-3). On August 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The Parties
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on August 20, 2010. ECF No. 5. Both Parties have filed
appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 7,8. This case is now ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the

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Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
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or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 7 at 9-19. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred
(1) by failing to find Plaintiff’s impairments met or equaled a Listing, (2) in evaluating her RFC; (3)
in evaluating her subjective complaints; and (4) by failing to give proper weight to the opinions of
treating physicians. In response, the Defendant argues the ALJ did not err in any of his findings.
ECF No. 8. Because this Court finds the ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints,
this Court will only address this issue Plaintiff raised.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are
as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;
(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of

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Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two
additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other
symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your
back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny,
the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979,
983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

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medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not perform a proper Polaski analysis. Instead of
evaluating the Polaski factors and noting inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
and the evidence in the record, the ALJ merely focused upon Plaintiff’s medical records and noted
that her subjective complaints were not supported by her medical records. (Tr. 20). The ALJ also
stated the following:
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After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they
are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.
(Tr. 20). By discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints merely because they were not supported
by the medical evidence, the ALJ failed to comply with the requirements of Polaski. Thus, this case
must be reversed and remanded.3
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2011.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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This Court reverses and remands this case only for the purpose of allowing the ALJ to fully consider the
Polaski factors and supply valid reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. This Order should not be
interpreted as requiring that Plaintiff be awarded disability benefits.

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