Myrick v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on February 14, 2012. (dmc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
MARTIN CASEY MYRICK
vs.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 6:10-cv-06087

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE
Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Martin Casey Myrick (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his
application for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”), Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and a
period of disability under Titles II and XVI of the Act. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction
of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial,
ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.1
Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final
judgment in this matter.
1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB and SSI on July 3, 2006. (Tr. 112-120).
Plaintiff alleged he was disabled due to bi-polar disorder, manic depression and a dislocated
shoulder. (Tr. 127). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of October 15, 2005. (Tr. 127). These
applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 70-76, 82-85). Thereafter,

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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ____” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

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Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on his applications, and this hearing request was
granted. (Tr. 86).
Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on November 20, 2008, in Hot Springs, Arkansas.
(Tr. 21-65). Plaintiff was present and was represented by counsel, Hans Pullen, at this hearing. Id.
Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Dr. Vance Sales, testified at this hearing. Id. At the time
of this hearing, Plaintiff was fifty (50) years old, which is defined as a “person closely approaching
advanced age” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d), had graduated high school and attended some college.
(Tr. 27).
On December 24, 2008, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s
application for DIB and SSI. (Tr. 9-20). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not
engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since October 15, 2005. (Tr. 18, Finding 2). The
ALJ determined Plaintiff had the severe impairment of closed anterior dislocation of the humerus
on the right; bipolar disorder I with psychotic features; and alcohol and cannabis abuse. (Tr. 15,
Finding 3). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the
requirements of any of the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No.
4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 15, Finding 3).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his RFC.
(Tr. 12-17, Findings 4,5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found his
claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained
the RFC to perform work-related activities except for work involving lifting more than 50 pounds
occasionally, 25 pounds frequently; standing/walking for 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday and able
to grasp, hold, and turn objects. Further, he is limited to performing work where interpersonal

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contact is incidental to work performed, complexity of tasks is learned and performed by rote, few
variables, and little judgment: supervision required is simple, direct and concrete. Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 19, Finding 6). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff was unable to perform his PRW as a title examiner for a title company. Id. The
ALJ did, however, find Plaintiff retained the ability to perform other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 19, Finding 11). The ALJ based this finding upon the
testimony of the VE. Id. Specifically, the VE testified in response to a question from the ALJ that
a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s limitations retained the ability to perform work as a cleaner
with 7,000 such jobs in Arkansas and 900,000 in the national economy, and as a hand packer with
7,400 such jobs in Arkansas and 700,000 in the national economy. Id. The ALJ then determined
Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, at anytime through the date of his
decision. (Tr. 19, Finding 12).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s unfavorable decision.
(Tr. 4-5). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.968. The Appeals Council declined to review this unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 1-3). On November 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The
Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on November 30, 2010. ECF No. 5. Both Parties
have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 8, 11. This case is now ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

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support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
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listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 8 at 11-20. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred
(1) by failing to find Plaintiff’s impairments met or equaled a Listing, (2) in determining his RFC
and (3) by failing to find a closed period of disability. In response, the Defendant argues the ALJ
did not err in any of his findings. ECF No. 11. Because this Court finds the ALJ improperly
evaluated Plaintiff’s RFC, this Court will only address this issue.
In social security cases where a mental impairment is alleged, it is important for an ALJ to
evaluate a claimant’s Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score in determining whether that
claimant is disabled due to the claimed mental impairment. GAF scores range from 0 to 100. Am.
Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 34 (4th ed.,
text rev. 2000). The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that GAF scores (especially those at or below
40) must be carefully evaluated when determining a claimant’s RFC. See, e.g., Conklin v. Astrue,
360 F. App’x. 704, 707 (8th Cir. 2010) (reversing and remanding an ALJ’s disability determination
in part because the ALJ failed to consider the claimant’s GAF scores of 35 and 40); Pates-Fires v.
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Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 944-45 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported
by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, in part due to the ALJ’s failure to discuss or
consider numerous GAF scores below 50).
Indeed, a GAF score at or below 40 should be carefully considered because such a low score
reflects “a major impairment in several areas such as work, family relations, judgment, or mood.”
Conklin, 360 F. App’x at 707 n.2 (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000)). A GAF score of 40 to 50 also
indicates a claimant suffers from severe symptoms. Specifically, a person with that GAF score
suffers from “[s]erious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent
shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no
friends, unable to keep a job).” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000).
In the present action, Plaintiff was assessed as having a GAF score of 45 while hospitalized
at the San Antonio State Hospital in June of 2006. (Tr. 187). This two week hospitalization was for
treatment of bi-polar disorder with severe psychotic features. (Tr. 186). The ALJ in his opinion
incorrectly stated Plaintiff was given a GAF score of 60. (Tr. 13). This GAF score was considered
to be the highest score Plaintiff had been assessed within the last 12 months. (Tr. 187).
A month following discharge from the San Antonio State Hospital, Plaintiff began treatment
at the Community Counseling Center for his bi-polar disorder and psychosis. (Tr. 240). Between
July 14, 2006 and September 22, 2008, Plaintiff was assessed a GAF score of 50 during 13 separate
visits. (Tr. 243, 246, 252, 260, 264, 268, 318, 322, 326, 330, 334, 336, 338). The ALJ’s opinion
only mentioned these GAF scores, but provided no discussion or evaluation of these scores.
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It was the ALJ’s responsibility to evaluate those GAF scores and make a finding regarding
their reliability as a part of the underlying administrative proceeding. See Conklin, 360 F. App’x at
707. Indeed, it is especially important that the ALJ address low GAF scores where, as in this case,
Plaintiff has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder and psychosis. (Tr. 184, 240, 286). Thus,
considering these facts, because the ALJ did not properly evaluate Plaintiff’s low GAF scores, this
case must be reversed and remanded for further evaluation of these scores. Upon remand, the ALJ
may still find Plaintiff not disabled, however a proper and complete analysis of Plaintiff’s GAF
scores should be performed.2
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2012.

/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Based on these findings, I do not find it necessary to reach to other points of error raised by the Plaintiff in
this appeal.

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