Davis v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on July 10, 2012. (dmc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
YULANDA ANN DAVIS
vs.
PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 6:11-cv-06075
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE
Commissioner, Social Security Administration
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Yulanda Ann Davis (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application
for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. The parties have consented
to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including
conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment
proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion
and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1. Background:
Plaintiff’s application for SSI, now before this Court, was protectively filed on August 24,
1998. (Tr. 81-83). This application alleges an onset date of June 1, 1996. (Tr. 82). Plaintiff
alleged, at an administrative hearing on February 22, 2006, she was disabled due to headaches; leg,
knee, mental, and menstrual problems; and lower back pain. (Tr. 315-318).
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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF. No.___” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”
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Plaintiff’s SSI application was initially denied on March 29, 1999 and was denied again on
reconsideration on May 19, 1999. (Tr. 67-70). Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing which
was held on February 15, 2000 in Hot Springs, Arkansas. (Tr. 35-66). On May 23, 2000, the ALJ
entered an unfavorable decision, concluded Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act, and denied
Plaintiff’s request for SSI. (Tr. 11-23). On August 2, 2001, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review of this unfavorable decision. (Tr. 5-7). Subsequently, Plaintiff appealed this
unfavorable decision to this Court. (Tr. 229-238). On January 10, 2003, the Honorable Judge Bobby
E. Shepherd entered an order reversing and remanding Plaintiff’s case to the ALJ, finding that the
ALJ erred both by determining that Plaintiff could perform unskilled, heavy work and by failing to
consider testimony from a vocational expert regarding Plaintiff’s borderline intellectual functioning.
(Tr. 229-238).
Following this remand, a second administrative hearing was held on November 5, 2003 in
Hot Springs, Arkansas. (Tr. 241-267). On February 19, 2004, the ALJ entered a second unfavorable
decision denying Plaintiff’s request for SSI. (Tr. 209-221). Thereafter, Plaintiff appealed this
second unfavorable decision to this Court. (Tr. 291-296). On September 29, 2005, the Honorable
Judge Beverly Stites Jones entered an order reversing and remanding Plaintiff’s case to the ALJ for
a second time, finding that the ALJ erred by failing to question the vocational expert regarding
Plaintiff’s borderline intellectual functioning. (Tr. 295-296). In this opinion, Judge Jones also noted
that, on remand, the ALJ should reevaluate his finding that Plaintiff can perform the full range of
medium work. (Tr. 296).
Following this remand, a third administrative hearing was held on February 22, 2006 in Hot
Springs, Arkansas. (Tr. 311-335). On April 24, 2006, the ALJ entered a third unfavorable decision
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denying Plaintiff’s request for SSI. (Tr. 275-284). Thereafter, Plaintiff appealed this third
unfavorable decision to this Court. (Tr. 426-430). On September 24, 2007, the Honorable Judge
Barry Bryant entered an order reversing and remanding Plaintiff’s case to the ALJ for a third time,
finding that the ALJ erred in his RFC determination and in his credibility analysis. (Tr. 435-450).
Thereafter, a fourth administrative hearing was held on May 30, 2008 in Hot Springs,
Arkansas. (Tr. 537-572). Plaintiff was present and was represented by an attorney, James Street,
at this hearing. See id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) David Elmore testified at this
hearing. See id. At the time of this hearing, Plaintiff was twenty-eight (28) years old, which is
classified as a “younger individual” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (2007), and had completed the
tenth grade of school. (Tr. 545). At the time of this hearing, Plaintiff was also five (5) foot, five (5)
inches tall and weighed approximately three hundred and fifteen (315) pounds. (Tr. 545).
On June 9, 2009, the ALJ entered a fourth unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s request
for SSI.2 (Tr. 404-416). In this opinion, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial
Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since December 29, 1998. (Tr. 406, Finding 1). The ALJ determined
Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of borderline intellectual functioning, obesity, leg and
knee pain, and headaches. (Tr. 406, Finding 2). The ALJ determined that, although severe, these
impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d), 416.925, and
416.926) (“Listings”). (Tr. 406-408, Finding 3).
The ALJ also evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined Plaintiff’s Residual
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The ALJ’s June 8, 2009 opinion is the only opinion that will be reviewed and analyzed in this current
Memorandum Opinion.
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Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 408-415, Finding 4). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints and determined that Plaintiff’s testimony was not fully credible. See id.
Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s RFC and concluded Plaintiff could perform less than the full
range of light work. (Tr. 408, Finding 4). Specifically, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the
ability to perform the following:
lift up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand/walk 6-8 hours in
an 8-hour work day, and sit 6-8 hours in an 8-hour work day, cannot squat due to
obesity; occasionally bend and, non-exertionally, can perform work where
interpersonal contact is incidental to work performed, tasks can be no more complex
than those learned and performed by rote, few variables, limited judgment, and little
supervision is required for routine but detailed for non-routine.
See id.
The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff could not perform her Past Relevant Work (“PRW”)
because she had no PRW. (Tr. 415, Finding 5). The ALJ, however, determined that Plaintiff would
be able to perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 415,
Finding 9). The VE testified at the hearing regarding this issue. (Tr. 569-572). The VE testified that
a hypothetical person the same age as Plaintiff and with the same RFC and education could perform
work as a poultry line worker with 1,800 such jobs in the State of Arkansas and 75,000 such jobs
in the nation, sewing machine operator with 1,000 such jobs in the State of Arkansas and 114,000
such jobs in the nation and as a production assembler with 6,500 such jobs in the State of Arkansas
and 170,000 such jobs in the nation. Id. Based upon the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 416, Finding 10).
On August 27, 2011, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s June 9, 2009 hearing
decision. (Tr. 336). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the present action. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff and
Defendant have both filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 8, 11. This case is now ready for decision.
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2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
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To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion:
Plaintiff brings the present appeal claiming the ALJ erred by: (A) failing to consider the
combination of Plaintiff’s impairments; (B) failed to consider Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations;
and (C) assessing Plaintiff’s credibility. ECF No. 8, Pages 10-20. In response, the Defendant argues
the ALJ did not err in any of his findings. ECF No. 11.
A. Combination of Impairments
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to consider all of her impairments in combination.
However, under the facts in the present case and after a thorough review of the ALJ’s opinion and
the record in this case, this Court finds the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s impairments in
combination.
The Social Security Act requires the ALJ to consider the combined effect of all of the
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claimant’s impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately,
would be of sufficient severity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523 (2006). In the present action, in reviewing
these claimed impairments, the ALJ stated Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Tr. 406, Finding 3) (emphasis added). The ALJ also found, “after
consideration of the entire record,” the Plaintiff had the RFC to perform less than the full range of
light work. (Tr. 408, Finding 4). The ALJ went on to state Plaintiff’s RFC would not preclude her
from performing other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 415,
Finding 9). These statements are sufficient under Eighth Circuit precedent to establish that the ALJ
properly considered the combined effect of a claimant’s impairments. See Hajek v. Shalala, 30 F.3d
89, 92 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that statements such as “the evidence as a whole does not show that
the claimant’s symptoms . . . preclude his past work as a janitor” and “[t]he claimant’s impairments
do not prevent him from performing janitorial work . . .” sufficiently establish that the ALJ properly
considered the combined effects of the plaintiff’s impairments).
Thus, pursuant to the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Hajek, this Court finds the ALJ properly
considered Plaintiff’s impairments in combination. Plaintiff has alleged she suffers from a number
of impairments. However, this Court is not required to find a claimant is disabled simply because
he or she has alleged a long list of medical problems. The ALJ’s opinion sufficiently indicates the
ALJ properly considered the combined effect of Plaintiff’s impairments, and the ALJ properly
considered the severity of the combination of Plaintiff’s impairments. See Hajek, 30 F.3d at 92.
B. Non-Exertional Limitations
Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to consider her non-exertional limitations associated with her
obesity, mild mental retardation, and chronic pain when determining she could perform light work.
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ECF No. 8, Pages. 15-17.3 A review of the ALJ’s decision shows he did in fact consider these
limitations in his RFC analysis.
The ALJ determined Plaintiff’s RFC and concluded Plaintiff could perform less than the full
range of light work. (Tr. 408, Finding 4). Specifically, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the
ability to perform the following:
lift up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand/walk 6-8 hours in
an 8-hour work day, and sit 6-8 hours in an 8-hour work day, cannot squat due to
obesity; occasionally bend and, non-exertionally, can perform work where
interpersonal contact is incidental to work performed, tasks can be no more complex
than those learned and performed by rote, few variables, limited judgment, and little
supervision is required for routine but detailed for non-routine.
See id.
The ALJ found Plaintiff had a severe impairment related to borderline intellectual
functioning. (Tr. 406). The hypothetical question the ALJ presented to the vocational expert
specified borderline intellectual functioning. (Tr. 569). The RFC determination of the ALJ limited
Plaintiff to work where interpersonal contact is incidental to work performed, tasks can be no more
complex than those learned and performed by rote, few variables, limited judgment, and little
supervision is required for routine work but detailed supervision for non-routine. (Tr. 408). The
ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s obesity in finding Plaintiff could not squat due to obesity and could
occasionally bend in his RFC determination. (Tr. 408). The hypothetical question the ALJ presented
to the vocational expert contained these limitations. (Tr. 569).
Substantial evidence supports a finding that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations in determining her RFC.
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Plaintiff incorrectly states the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform the full range of light work, when in
fact the ALJ found the Plaintiff had RFC for less than the full range of light work.
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C. ALJ’s Credibility Determination
Plaintiff also claims the ALJ erred in his credibility determination. ECF No. 8, Pages 17-20.
Specifically, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred by failing to make specific findings as to the relevant
evidence considered in deciding to discredit Plaintiff’s testimony. See id. Plaintiff claims the ALJ
merely decided, without any reasoning or explanation, to disbelieve Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.
See id. In response, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly evaluated and discredited Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints pursuant to the directives of Polaski. ECF No. 11, Pages 10-11.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the
five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529
and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.4 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider
are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the
pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are not
entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
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Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two
additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other
symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your
back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny,
the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979,
983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
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Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in assessing her credibility as it related to the limiting effects
of her impairments and did not fully consider her subjective complaints as required by Polaski. The
Defendant argues the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain in compliance
with Polaski.
In the present action, this Court finds the ALJ properly addressed and discounted Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints. In his opinion, the ALJ addressed the factors from Polaski and 20 C.F.R. §
416.929, and stated inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and the record. (Tr. 412-415).
Specifically, the ALJ noted the following: (1) Absence of objective medical findings to support
Plaintiff’s alleged disabling pain, (2) Plaintiff’s described activities of daily living are not limited
to any serious degree, (3) No physician has placed a level of limitation on Plaintiff’s activities
comparable to those described by Plaintiff, (4) Plaintiff’s medication has been effective in
controlling her symptoms with no side effects, and (5)Plaintiff’s physician encouraged her to get a
part-time job. (Tr. 412-415).
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These findings are valid reasons supporting the ALJ’s credibility determination, and this
Court finds the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and should be
affirmed. See Lowe, 226 F.3d at 971-72. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in discounting Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints of pain.
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. A judgment incorporating
these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.
ENTERED this 10th day of July 2012.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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