Franklin v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on April 30, 2014. (rw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
Civil No. 6:13-cv-06044
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Clarence Franklin (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his application for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. The Parties have consented to
the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including
conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment
proceedings. ECF No. 7.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion
and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
Plaintiff protectively filed his disability application on November 18, 2009. (Tr. 10, 133-
138). In his application, Plaintiff claims to be disabled due to the following: “I am in constant pain
due to my chest problems. It feels hollow in the middle of my chest. My chest causes my head and
eyes to hurt and my doctor thinks my chest problems are causing my hbp. My conditions cause me
to feel depressed.” (Tr. 179). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of June 23, 2009. (Tr. 10, 133-138).
The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. __.” The
transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”
This application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 69-70). Thereafter, on
July 21, 2010, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on his application, and this hearing
request was granted. (Tr. 85-98).
Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on August 8, 2011 in Hot Springs, Arkansas. (Tr.
23-68). Plaintiff was present at this hearing and was represented by counsel, Shannon Carroll. Id.
Plaintiff, a witness for Plaintiff, and Vocational Expert (“VE”) William David Elmore testified at
this hearing. Id. As of the date of this hearing, Plaintiff was forty-nine (49) years old, which is
defined as a “person closely approaching advanced age” under 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c) (2008) (SSI).
(Tr. 29). As for his level of education, Plaintiff testified he completed the eleventh grade in school
but did not obtain his GED. (Tr. 30).
On November 16, 2011, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s
application for SSI. (Tr. 7-18). In this decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in
Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since November 18, 2009, his application date. (Tr. 12,
Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: ischemic heart
disease and hypertension. (Tr. 12, Finding 2). However, the ALJ also determined Plaintiff’s
impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments
in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 12, Finding 3).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his RFC.
(Tr. 12-17, Finding 4). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found his
claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained
the RFC to perform a limited range of light work:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 416.967(b) except that the claimant may occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds
and frequently lift and carry 10 pounds; the claimant may stand and/or walk about 6
hours in an 8-hour workday and sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; the claimant
may occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
and the claimant must avoid extreme heat.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”), and the ALJ found Plaintiff did
not retain the capacity to perform his PRW. (Tr. 17, Finding 5). The ALJ then evaluated whether
Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. (Tr. 17-18, Finding 9). The ALJ relied upon the testimony of the VE to make this
determination. Id. Specifically, based upon that testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the
capacity to perform the following unskilled occupations: cashier II (light) with 9,000 jobs in the
region and 1,000,000 jobs in the nation and production assembler (sedentary) with 1,000 jobs in the
region and 50,000 to 60,000 in the nation. Id. Because Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform this
other work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from
November 18, 2009 through the date of the ALJ’s decision or through November 16, 2011. (Tr. 18,
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 5-6). On March 22, 2013, the Appeals Council denied this request for review of the
ALJ’s unfavorable determination. (Tr. 1-3). On April 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed the present appeal.
ECF No. 1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on May 2, 2013. ECF No. 7.
Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 10-11. This case is now ready for decision.
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
In his appeal brief, Plaintiff raises two arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ erred in assessing
the limitations he has in his upper extremities and (2) the ALJ erred in discrediting his testimony
regarding his exertional abilities. ECF No. 10 at 1-20. The Court has reviewed the ALJ’s decision,
the transcript in this matter, and the briefing filed by the Parties. Because the Court finds the ALJ
improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, only this issue will be addressed.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are
Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis
of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of
your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board,
etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of
as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;
(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. (Tr. 12-17).
these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not
require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
Instead of doing what is required by Polaski and assessing the Polaski factors and noting
inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and the record in this case, the ALJ merely gave the
following canned reason for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they
are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.
(Tr. 16-17). This reasoning is not sufficient under Polaski. Accordingly, this case must be reversed
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 30th day of April 2014.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This remand is ordered solely for the purpose of permitting the ALJ the opportunity to comply
with the requirements of Polaski. No part of this remand should be interpreted as an instruction that
disability benefits be awarded. Upon remand, the ALJ should further evaluate the evidence and make a
disability determination, subject to this Court’s later review.
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