Finley v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on July 8, 2014. (sh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
JAMES BRYAN FINLEY
vs.
PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 6:13-cv-06094
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James Bryan Finley (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his application
for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act. The
Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings
in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting
all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 6.1
Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this
memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1.
Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his disability application on April 14, 2011. (Tr. 18, 124-130).
In his application, Plaintiff claims to be disabled due to knee problems, weakness, anxiety, and
depression. (Tr. 166). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of January 9, 2011. (Tr. 18, 124). This
application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 71-72). Thereafter, on January
9, 2012, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing his application, and this hearing request was
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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. __.” The
transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”
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granted. (Tr. 81-82).
Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was held on November 2, 2012 in Hot Springs, Arkansas.
(Tr. 33-70). Plaintiff was present at this hearing and was represented by John Howard. Id. Plaintiff
and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Diane Smith testified at this hearing. Id. On the date of this hearing,
Plaintiff was forty-five (45) years old, which is defined as a “younger person” under 20 C.F.R. §
404.1563(c) (2008) (DIB). (Tr. 39).
On December 14, 2012, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s
application for DIB. (Tr. 15-28). In this decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Act through December 31, 2015. (Tr. 20, Finding 1). The ALJ found Plaintiff
had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since January 10, 2011, his alleged onset
date. (Tr. 20, Finding 2). The ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: left knee
medial meniscus tear/medial formal condyle defect status post surgery, anxiety disorder, and mood
disorder. (Tr. 20-21, Finding 3). However, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet
or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart
P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 21-22, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his RFC.
(Tr. 23-27, Finding 5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found his
claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained
the RFC to perform a limited range of light work:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of light work
as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). Specifically, the claimant is limited to lifting
and/or carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; standing and/or
for up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; and, sitting for up to 6 hours in an 8-hour
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workday. Additionally, the claimant is limited to occasionally climbing stairs or
ladders, kneeling, and crawling. Further, the claimant cannot sustain work without
the option to sit/stand every 60 minutes. Morever, although the claimant’s gait was
unremarkable, he indicated that he occasionally has problems walking during the
winter months; therefore, he cannot sustain work without the use of a cane to walk.
While using a cane, the claimant’s other hand is free to carry small objects.
Mentally, the claimant is able to perform work where interpersonal contact is routine,
but superficial, as with a grocery checker where the complexity of tasks are learned
and performed by experience with several variables. The claimant can use judgment
within limits. Lastly, the claimant can perform work where the supervision is little
for routine work but detailed for non-routine work. [footnote omitted]
Id.
The ALJ determined Plaintiff had at least a high school education and was able to
communicate in English. (Tr. 27, Finding 8). The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work
(“PRW”). (Tr. 27, Finding 6). The ALJ determined Plaintiff did not retain the capacity to perform
his PRW. Id. The ALJ then evaluated whether Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform other work
existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 27-28, Finding 10). The ALJ relied
upon the testimony of the VE to make this determination. Id. Specifically, based upon that
testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform the requirements of the
representative occupation of machine tender (light, semiskilled) with 1,100 such jobs locally; 5,200
such jobs regionally; and 160,000 such jobs nationally. (Tr. 28). Because Plaintiff retained the
capacity to perform this other work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability,
as defined in the Act, from January 10, 2011 through the date of the ALJ’s decision or through
December 14, 2012. (Tr. 28, Finding 11).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 13). On June 12, 2013, the Appeals Council denied this request for review of the
ALJ’s unfavorable determination. (Tr. 1-3). On August 16, 2013, Plaintiff filed the present appeal.
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ECF No. 1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on September 6, 2013. ECF No.
6. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 11-12. This case is now ready for decision.
2.
Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
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laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. She determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3.
Discussion:
In his appeal brief, Plaintiff raises the two arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ did not
properly consider the combined impact of his impairments; and (2) the ALJ improperly found he
retained the RFC to perform a limited range of light work. ECF No. 11. The Court has reviewed
the ALJ’s decision, the transcript in this matter, and the briefing filed by the Parties. Because the
Court finds the ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, only this issue will be
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addressed.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are
as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;
(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
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Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis
of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of
your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board,
etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of
these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not
require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
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inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. (Tr. 15-28).
Instead of evaluating the Polaski factors and noting inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony
and the record in this case, the ALJ solely focused on Plaintiff’s medical records and whether his
subjective complaints were consistent with his medical records. Id. Notably, the ALJ made the
following finding regarding Plaintiff’s allegations:
In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the medical
evidence and the claimant’s testimony. The claimant’s alleged limitations are not
fully supported by the medical record. The undersigned notes that the claimant is
limited due to his impairments. However, the impact of the claimant’s symptoms
does not wholly compromise the claimant’s ability to function independently,
appropriately, and effectively on a sustained basis. Furthermore, the intensity and
persistence of the symptoms alleged is not consistent with the medical record signs,
laboratory findings, and the medical evidence as a whole.
(Tr. 27) (emphasis added). Accordingly, based upon these findings and because the ALJ disregarded
Polaski in her analysis, this case must be reversed and remanded.3
4.
Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
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This remand is ordered solely for the purpose of permitting the ALJ the opportunity to comply
with the requirements of Polaski. No part of this remand should be interpreted as an instruction that
disability benefits be awarded. Upon remand, the ALJ should further evaluate the evidence and make a
disability determination, subject to this Court’s later review.
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to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 8th day of July 2014.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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