Martinez v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on January 8, 2015. (rw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
REBECCA LATRIECE MARTINEZ
vs.
PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 6:13-cv-06130
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rebecca Latriece Martinez (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of
the Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application
for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. The Parties have consented
to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including
conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment
proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion
and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1.
Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her disability application on June 23, 2011.2 (Tr. 8, 93-99). In her
application, Plaintiff claims to be disabled due to the following: lumbar fusion, post-surgery
problems with her back, bursitis, uneven hips, hip pain, and high blood pressure. (Tr. 122). Plaintiff
1
The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. __.” The
transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”
2
It appears this is the third disability application Plaintiff has filed. (Tr. 8). Only the application
filed on June 23, 2011 will be addressed in this opinion.
1
alleges an onset date of June 27, 2011. (Tr. 8, 93). This application was denied initially and again
upon reconsideration. (Tr. 30-31).
Thereafter, on November 21, 2011, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her
application, and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 45-47, 61-65). Plaintiff’s administrative
hearing was held on September 6, 2012 in Hot Springs, Arkansas. (Tr. 19-29). Plaintiff was present
at this hearing and was represented by Hans Pullen. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”)
Mary May testified at this hearing. Id. At the time of this hearing, Plaintiff testified she was forty
(40) years old, which is defined as a “younger person” under 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c) (2008), and had
only completed the seventh grade in school. (Tr. 22-23).
After this hearing, on October 26, 2012, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying
Plaintiff’s application for SSI. (Tr. 5-14). In this decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged
in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since her alleged onset date of June 27, 2011. (Tr. 10,
Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: lumbar fusion,
bursitis, uneven hips, hypertension, and obesity. (Tr. 10-11, Finding 2). However, the ALJ also
determined Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the
Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 11,
Finding 3).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her RFC.
(Tr. 11-13, Finding 4). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found her
claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained
the RFC to perform the following:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
2
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined
in 20 CFR 416.967(a) with occasional bending, crouching, crawling, kneeling and
climbing ramps/stairs but not ladders, ropes or scaffolds or balancing.
Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and found Plaintiff did not have
any PRW. (Tr. 13, Finding 5). The ALJ then determined whether Plaintiff retained the capacity to
perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 13-14, Finding 9).
The VE testified at the administrative hearing regarding this issue. Id. Considering her age,
education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform
the following representative occupation: license clerk or order clerk with 341,600 such jobs in the
national economy and 2,670 such jobs in the regional economy. (Tr. 14). Because Plaintiff retained
the capacity to perform this other work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability,
as defined by the Act, since her alleged onset date of June 17, 2011. (Tr. 14, Finding 10).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 4). On September 25, 2013, the Appeals Council denied this request for review. (Tr.
1-3). Plaintiff then filed the present appeal on November 8, 2013. ECF No. 1. The Parties
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on November 11, 2013. ECF No. 5. Both Parties have
filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 11-12. This case is now ready for decision.
2.
Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
3
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
4
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3.
Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff raises the following four arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ’s
evaluation of the Listings was not supported by substantial evidence in the record; (2) the ALJ erred
in considering her obesity; (3) the ALJ erred by concluding she retained the RFC for sedentary work;
and (4) the ALJ erred by failing to develop the record regarding her limited education and lack of
transferrable skills. ECF No. 11. Because the ALJ improperly evaluated her subjective complaints,
the Court will only address this issue.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five
factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and
20 C.F.R. § 416.929.3 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are
as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain;
3
Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis
of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of
your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board,
etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of
these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not
require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.
5
(3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ
acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective complaints.
See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these
five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are
not entirely credible, the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them
[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant’s complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility
determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any
inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find
a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but
whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity.
See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of Polaski. (Tr. 11-13).
Indeed, the only “inconsistencies” the ALJ notes are that Plaintiff “is able to care for herself and her
daughter. She prepares simple foods, and performs simple household chores. She drives and shops.”
(Tr. 12). While these activities certainly demonstrate Plaintiff has some level of limited daily
6
functioning, these findings do no demonstrate Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of disabling
limitations due to her alleged impairments (lumbar fusion, post-surgery problems with her back,
bursitis, uneven hips, hip pain, and high blood pressure) are not credible. See Reed v. Barnhart, 399
F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing “it is well-settled law that ‘a claimant need not prove she
is bedridden or completely helpless to be found disabled’”) (citation omitted). Because the ALJ
provided no valid reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, this case must be
reversed and remanded.
4.
Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits
to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded.4 A
judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52 and 58.
ENTERED this 8th day of January 2015.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
4
This remand is ordered solely for the purpose of permitting the ALJ the opportunity to comply
with the requirements of Polaski. No part of this remand should be interpreted as an instruction that
disability benefits be awarded. Upon remand, the ALJ should further evaluate the evidence and make a
disability determination, subject to this Court’s later review.
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?