Buazard v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on April 6, 2015. (rw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
MARTHA ANN BUAZARD
vs.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 6:14-cv-06064

CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Martha Ann Buazard (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application
for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and a period of disability under Title II of the Act.
The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 7.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues
this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1.

Background:
On June 21, 2011, Plaintiff protectively filed her disability application. (Tr. 10, 103-104).

In this application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to high blood pressure. (Tr. 128). Plaintiff
alleges an onset date of June 2, 2011. (Tr. 10). Plaintiff’s DIB application was denied initially and
again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 47-48).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her application. (Tr. 56-57).

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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ____” The
transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

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This hearing request was granted, and an administrative hearing was held on November 8, 2012 in
Hot Springs, Arkansas. (Tr. 25-46). At this hearing, Plaintiff was present and was represented by
John Yeargan, Jr. Id. Plaintiff, a witness for Plaintiff (Plaintiff’s mother), and Vocational Expert
(“VE”) Mack Welch testified at this hearing. Id. On the date of this hearing, Plaintiff testified she
was thirty-seven (37) years old, which is defined as a “younger person” under 20 C.F.R. §
404.1563(c) (2008). (Tr. 29). As for her education, Plaintiff testified she completed the twelfth
grade of high school. Id.
On January 25, 2013, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 7-17). In this decision,
the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31,
2015. (Tr. 12, Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful
Activity (“SGA”) since June 2, 2011, her alleged onset date. (Tr. 12, Finding 2). The ALJ
determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: hypertension, obesity, headaches with
dizziness, chest pain, and left eye pain. (Tr. 12, Finding 3). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff’s
impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments
in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 12-13, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her RFC.
(Tr. 13-15, Finding 6). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found her
claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained
the capacity to perform the following:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined
in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) with restrictions. She is able to occasionally stoop, crouch,
crawl and kneel. She is restricted from work involving balancing or climbing. She
is restricted from hazards such as unprotected heights, moving machinery or open
flame.
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Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and found she was unable to
perform any of her PRW. (Tr. 16, Finding 6). Then, the ALJ then determined whether Plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
(Tr. 16-17, Finding 10). The VE testified at the administrative hearing regarding this issue. Id.
Based upon that testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform the
following unskilled, sedentary jobs: (1) production inspector with 230,000 jobs nationally, 43,000
jobs regionally, and 3,000 jobs locally; and (2) scale operator/weight checker with 200,000 jobs
nationally, 38,000 jobs regionally, and 1,500 jobs locally. Id. Because Plaintiff retained the capacity
to perform this other work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined
in the Act, at any time from June 2, 2011 through the date of his decision or through January 25,
2013. (Tr. 17, Finding 11).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the review of the Appeals Council. (Tr. 1-3). The Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. 7-9). On May 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed her
Complaint in this matter. ECF No. 1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on May
23, 2014. ECF No. 7. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 10-11. This case is now
ready for decision.
2.

Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
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support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
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listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3.

Discussion:
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ did not fully evaluate the medical records and

the opinions of her treating physician. ECF No. 10 at 5-8. As such, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s
disability determination is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. In response,
Defendant argues the ALJ properly considered the medical records and opinions of Plaintiff’s
treating physician. ECF No. 11. Defendant argues no remand is required. Id.
Upon review of Plaintiff’s arguments, it appears she actually raises three claims: (1) whether
the ALJ properly considered the medical records from her treating physician, Dr. Matthew Husley,
D.O.; (2) whether the ALJ properly considered her Body Mass Index or “BMI”; and (3) whether the
ALJ erred in considering her treadmill test from August 8, 2006. ECF No. 10. The Court will
consider all three of these claims.
First, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinions of Dr. Husley, her treating
physician. ECF No. 10 at 3-5. Dr. Husley has treated Plaintiff since October of 2009. (Tr. 442524). On October 16, 2012, Dr. Husley wrote a “To whom it may concern” letter addressing
Plaintiff’s alleged disability. (Tr. 443). In that letter, he found Plaintiff suffers from “severe
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hypertension, morbid obesity and tobacco abuse.” Id. He also found that “her hypertension is a
disabling condition, and currently prevents her from performing any meaningful work.” Id. In his
opinion, the ALJ fully considered Dr. Husley’s findings but decided to discount those findings for
the following reasons:
Although there is sufficient evidence in Dr. Husley’s records to restrict the claimant
to a reduced range of light work, nothing in the file is consistent with his opinion that
she is completely disabled. As noted above, there is little evidence of continued
medical care after the period at issue. While the claimant’s lack of insurance is a
valid concern, there is no evidence that she sought alternative means, including
emergency room treatment, financial assistance, or such low-cost options as clinics.
(Tr. 15).
The Court finds the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Husley’s findings are sufficient.
Indeed, in her briefing, Plaintiff has not demonstrated she has any limitations greater than those
found by the ALJ. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff has also not demonstrated how Dr. Husley’s treatment
records demonstrate any greater limitations than those found by the ALJ. Id. Finally, as noted by
the ALJ, Plaintiff received inconsistent medical care which cannot be excused by her alleged failure
to afford that care. See Riggins v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 689, 693 (8th Cir. 1999) (recognizing a lack of
attempt to find free or low-cost treatment was inconsistent with the alleged degree of pain and
disability). Thus, the Court finds no basis for reversal on this issue.
Second, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in evaluating her Body Mass Index or “BMI.” ECF
No. 10 at 5-8. Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred by failing to consider the instances where she qualified
under the “extreme obesity” category. Id. Upon review, the Court notes that the ALJ did consider
Plaintiff’s obesity. (Tr. 14-15). Under the Listings, the ALJ is required to consider the claimant’s
obesity, but the Court cannot find a legal distinction–and Plaintiff has not offered a

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distinction–between obesity and “extreme obesity.” Thus, it appears the ALJ fully complied with
his obligations under the Listings, and the Court finds no basis for reversal on this issue.
Third, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in failing to consider the results from her stress test on
August 8, 2006. (Tr. 403). This test, however, is dated nearly five years before Plaintiff’s alleged
onset date of June 2, 2011. Further, upon review of the results from this test, it appears Plaintiff was
directed to have a “full cardiac workup because of a high suspicion for cardiac ischemia based upon
this test.” (Tr. 403) (emphasis added). It does not appear Plaintiff ever sought this follow-up
treatment as directed or ever received a specific diagnosis. Thus, the Court finds no basis for
reversal on this issue.
4.

Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits

to Plaintiff, is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. A judgment incorporating
these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.
ENTERED this 6th day of April 2015.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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