Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Ritter et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER as set forth re 20 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Carolyn Ritter. Signed by Honorable Robert T. Dawson on December 23, 2014. (rw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

v.

PLAINTIFF

Case No. 14-6087

CAROLYN RITTER, as Administratrix
of the Estate of Judy D. Ritter, as
Administratrix of the Estate of
David W. Ritter, and individually;
DEBBIE COOLEY; DIEDRA LEE; and
GEORGE DONNIE LEE RITTER

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Currently before the Court for consideration is Separate
Defendant
Judgment

Carolyn
and

Ritter’s

supporting

(“Carolyn”)

documents

Motion

(Docs.

for

Summary

20-22).

For

the

reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the Motion should
be GRANTED.
I.

Background
Aetna Life Insurance Company (“Aetna”) filed a Complaint

for

Interpleader

states

that

(Doc.

David

1)

W.

on

July

Ritter

23,

2014.

(“David”),

The

Complaint

deceased,

was

a

participant in a life insurance plan (the “Plan”) sponsored by
his

employer,

policy

of

beneficiary

the

life

benefits

insurance

election

form

of

which

issued
(Doc.

by

were
Aetna.

1-3)

Page 1 of 6

on

funded

by

David
January

a

group

signed
10,

a

2007,

listing his wife, Judy Denise Ritter (“Judy”) as the primary
beneficiary1 of the Plan’s benefits and his mother, Carolyn, as
the sole contingent beneficiary.
On

April

conducted

a

8,

2014,

welfare

the

check

Garland

at

the

County

home

of

Sheriff’s
David,

Office

Judy,

and

Jonathan Ritter at the request of a family member who had not
heard

from

them

since

April

5.

The

bodies of David, Judy, and Jonathan.

officer

discovered

the

David died due to gunshot

wounds to the head, Judy died due to multiple gunshot wounds,
and

Jonathan

wound.
of

died

apparently

from

(Docs. 21-1, 21-2, 21-3).

death

for

all

three

persons

a

self-inflicted

gunshot

The estimated date and time
is

listed

on

the

coroner’s

reports as April 5, 2014 at an unknown time.

(Docs. 21-5, 21-6,

and

Ritter

21-7).

David,

Judy,

and

Jonathan

pronounced dead on April 8, 2014 at 8:00 p.m.

were

each

(Docs. 21-1, 21-

2, 21-3).
Aetna
individually
David,

as

received
as

the

a

request

contingent

Administratrix

of

Administratrix of Judy’s Estate.

for

benefits

beneficiary
David’s

and

from
as

Estate,

Carolyn,
mother

to

and

as

Aetna also received notice

that Judy’s two surviving sisters, Defendants Debbie Cooley and
Diedra Lee, as well as David’s father, Defendant George Donnie

1

David W. Ritter’s son, Jonathan Ritter, was also listed as a primary
beneficiary.
However, Judy was designated to receive 100% of the Plan
benefits. (Doc. 1-3).

Page 2 of 6

Lee Ritter, could have claims for at least a portion of the
Plan’s benefits.

If Judy survived David, Judy would be the

proper beneficiary and the benefits would pass to her estate.
If

Judy

did

not

survive

David,

Carolyn,

in

her

individual

capacity, would be the proper beneficiary.
Because

Aetna

could

not

readily

determine

the

proper

beneficiary, it filed the instant interpleader action. Pursuant
to

this

Court’s

order

(Doc.

17),

Aetna

deposited

the

life

insurance benefits payable under the Plan with the Clerk of
Court.

The Court dismissed Aetna from this action on October 6,

2014, and ordered Defendants to litigate their claims to the
Plan’s benefits.
II.

(Doc. 19).

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

Fed. R.

“The movant bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
must identify those portions of the record which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted).

Once the movant

demonstrates that the record does not disclose a genuine dispute
on a material fact, the opposing party may not rest upon the
Page 3 of 6

mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must provide a
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56,
that sets forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.
1998).

The

Ghane v. West, 148 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir.

Court

must

view

the

facts

in

the

light

most

favorable to the non-moving party “only if there is a genuine
dispute

as

to

those

facts.”

Torgerson,

643

F.3d

at

1042

(quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009)).
III. Discussion
In her Motion, Carolyn asserts that all other defendants
are in default (Doc. 20, p. 2).
Lee,

and

George

Donnie

Lee

Separate defendants Cooley,

Ritter

each

signed

a

waiver

of

service form (see Docs. 12–14), which advised that a response
was

to

be

filed

with

the

Court

by

September

23,

2014.

Defendants Cooley, Lee, and George Donnie Lee Ritter failed to
file

an

answer

period.

or

otherwise

respond

within

the

proper

time

Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooley, Lee, and

George Donnie Lee Ritter are in default and have forfeited any
claim of entitlement to the Plan’s benefits.

See Viking Ins.

Co. of Wisconsin v. Kemp, 2013 WL 6780571, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Dec.
19,

2013)

(“[F]ailure

of

a

named

interpleader

defendant

to

answer the interpleader complaint and assert a claim to the res
can be viewed as forfeiting any claim of entitlement that might
have been asserted.”) (internal quotation omitted).
Page 4 of 6

The affidavits and other evidence on the record reflect
that David, Judy, and Jonathan Ritter were alive on April 5,
2014.

The estimated date of death for each person is April 5,

2014,

and

all

three

were

pronounced

dead

on

April

8,

2014.

Under Arkansas law, if two people die within 120 hours of each
other, they are considered to have died simultaneously and the
effect is that each is considered to have predeceased the other.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-10-202.

(“[A]n individual who is not

established by clear and convincing evidence to have survived
the other individual by 120 hours is deemed to have predeceased
the other individual.”)
Here, even though the exact time and date of Judy’s death
are unknown, it would not be possible for her to have survived
David by 120 hours as both Judy and David were alive on April 5
and found dead on April 8.

Because Judy could not have survived

David by 120 hours, the contingent beneficiary is entitled to
receive the Plan benefits.

Accordingly, the Court finds that

Separate Defendant Carolyn Ritter, individually, is the proper
recipient

of

the

Plan

benefits,

as

she

is

the

sole

named

contingent beneficiary.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Carolyn Ritter’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

(Doc.

20)

is

GRANTED

and

it

is

ORDERED that Carolyn Ritter, individually, is the owner, and
Page 5 of 6

entitled to possession, of the benefits of David W. Ritter’s
life insurance plan.
The bench trial set to begin Monday, April 20, 2015 at 9:00
a.m.

is

CANCELLED.

A

separate

judgment

will

be

entered

in

accordance with this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of December, 2014.

/s/ Robert T. Dawson
Honorable Robert T. Dawson
United States District Judge

Page 6 of 6