Anderson v. National Park Community College and Board of Trustees of National Park Community College et al
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 6 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Honorable Robert T. Dawson on May 14, 2015. (hnc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
DRECARLOS ANDERSON
PLAINTIFF
v.
Case No. 14-6141
NATIONAL PARK COMMUNITY COLLEGE;
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF NATIONAL PARK
COMMUNITY COLLEGE; WILLIAM RITTER,
individually and in his official
capacity as employee of National
Park Community College; JOHN HOGAN,
individually and in his official
capacity as President of National
Park Community College
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Currently before the Court are the motion to dismiss and
supporting brief (Docs. 6-7) filed by Defendants National Park
Community College (“NPCC”), the Board of Trustees of NPCC (the
“Board”), NPCC employee William Ritter, and NPCC President John
Hogan.
Also
before
opposition (Doc. 9).
the
Court
is
Plaintiff’s
response
in
For the reasons set forth below, the Court
finds that Defendants’ motion should be GRANTED.
I.
Background
The following facts, which are assumed to be true for the
purpose of this motion, are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint:
Page 1 of 12
Plaintiff is an African-American male who began attending
NPCC’s
Adult
Basic
Education
Program
in
the
spring
of
2013.
After starting the program, he was told that he had to leave a
class due to the fact that he was over the age of 18.
At that
time, NPCC and an instructor named Becky Linske 1 allowed another
student who was Caucasian and over the age of 18 to remain in
the classroom.
On October 2, 2013, Plaintiff and another classmate took a
lunch break and upon returning to campus, Plaintiff decided to
get help from a former instructor, Kim Hobson. 2
the
classroom,
employee
of
Plaintiff,
After
Plaintiff
NPCC
–
causing
pushing
was
met
presumably
him
to
Plaintiff,
fall
by
an
Defendant
instructor),
backward
Ritter
Upon entering
into
called
Ritter
who
his
(an
pushed
classmate.
Plaintiff
a
“boy.”
Plaintiff was embarrassed and felt he was being intimidated.
Plaintiff
called
the
report the incident.
Crow
contacted
charge.
Garland
County
Sheriff’s
Department
to
Shortly thereafter, Investigator Leslie
Plaintiff
to
ask
if
he
wanted
to
pursue
the
In
Plaintiff responded affirmatively.
July
of
2014,
representatives
from
NPCC
informed
Plaintiff that the school would handle the October 2 incident
in-house.
According to Plaintiff, after he complained to the
Sheriff’s Department, a representative from NPCC contacted the
1
2
Ms. Linske is not a party to this action.
Ms. Hobson is not a party to this action.
Page 2 of 12
Sheriff’s Department to stop any investigation into the incident
reported by Plaintiff. 3
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action on December 9,
2015, against NPCC, the Board, NPCC employee William Ritter, and
NPCC
President
John
Hogan.
The
complaint
alleges
racial
discrimination claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (“Title VI”); the First and Fourteenth
Amendments
of
the
Constitution;
42
U.S.C.
§
1983;
and
the
Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123105(a) (“ACRA”).
Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),
arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and
that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
II.
Legal Standard
Rule
12(b)(1)
of
the
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
allows the Court to dismiss any claims over which, either on
their face or in light of outside evidence, it does not have
proper
subject
matter
jurisdiction.
In
weighing
a
motion
to
dismiss under 12(b)(1), the Court must first identify “12(b)(1)
3
Plaintiff alleges that NPCC “clearly set out a course of conduct to try and
hide the fact that the abuse and discrimination by William Ritter occurred on
their campus.” (Doc. 1., p. 4). The Court considers this to be the type of
bare assertion that is not entitled to the presumption of truth when ruling
on a 12(b)(6) motion.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680-81 (2009)
(noting “[i]t is the conclusory nature of respondent's allegations, rather
than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the
presumption of truth”).
Page 3 of 12
motions
that
attack
the
complaint
on
its
face
and
12(b)(1)
motions that attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction
in fact, quite apart from the pleadings.”
Mortensen v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977); see
also Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1990).
Defendants here attack the complaint on its face and have not
requested
that
pleadings.
the
Court
consider
any
matters
outside
the
Therefore, “the non-moving party receives the same
protections as it would defending against a motion brought under
Rule 12(b)(6).” Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678
550
(quoting
(2007)).
pleads
Bell
Atl.
Corp.
v.
Twombly,
U.S.
544,
570
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
factual
reasonable
content
inference
misconduct alleged.”
that
allows
the
defendant
court
is
to
liable
draw
the
for
the
that
the
Id.
In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a
court accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained
in a complaint and reviews the complaint to determine whether
its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir.
2008).
Page 4 of 12
III. Discussion
As
subject
a
threshold
Defendants
jurisdiction.
However,
matter
matter,
addressed in the parties’ briefing.
raise
this
the
issue
issue
was
of
not
Plaintiff alleges in the
complaint that jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which
provides
district
rights
civil
the
actions.
sufficiently
Defendants’
states
motion
a
courts
The
proper
to
with
original
Court
finds
basis
for
dismiss
for
jurisdiction
that
the
federal
lack
of
over
complaint
jurisdiction.
subject
matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is denied.
Defendants next assert that Plaintiff’s complaint does not
adequately set forth sufficient factual allegations showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), and that the complaint should therefore
be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff concedes that
he has no valid Title VI claim against the Board, Ritter, or
Hogan.
(Doc. 9, p. 1).
He also acknowledges that NPCC, the
Board, and Ritter and Hogan in their official capacities are
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on his § 1983 claims.
(Doc. 9, p. 3).
further analysis.
Accordingly, these claims are dismissed without
The remaining claims are discussed below.
A. Title VI Claim Against NPCC
Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
Page 5 of 12
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected
to
discrimination
under
any
program
or
activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
Plaintiff
because
has
he
has
allegations
that
failed
not
state
alleged
actions
Plaintiff’s race.
to
a
any
taken
claim
facts
by
NPCC
under
beyond
were
Title
VI
conclusory
motivated
by
Plaintiff alleges NPCC discriminated against
him on the basis of race because he was told he had to leave a
class due to the fact that he was over 18 years of age, while
another student who was Caucasian and over the age of 18 was
allowed to remain in the classroom.
Further, he alleges all
Defendants failed to investigate or take remedial action after
Plaintiff
complained
about
a
hostile
environment
after
the
raise
the
October 2 incident.
Although
possibility
sufficient
Plaintiff’s
of
conclusory
discrimination,
factual
allegations
they
to
allegations
are
rise
to
not
supported
the
level
by
of
an
actionable claim for relief.
See Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d
709,
(“A
712–14
(2d
Cir.
1994)
plaintiff
alleging
racial
or
gender discrimination by a university must do more than recite
conclusory assertions.”).
Plaintiff has not stated any facts
from which the Court could infer any discriminatory intent on
the part of NPCC.
F.3d
789,
794
See Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln High Sch., 618
(8th
Cir.
2010)
(“Title
Page 6 of 12
VI
prohibits
only
intentional discrimination.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title
VI claim must be dismissed.
B. First Amendment Claim
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges an unspecified claim
under the First Amendment.
(Doc. 1, p. 1).
Because Plaintiff
has not set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as required by
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
8(a)(2),
Plaintiff’s
First
Amendment claim must be dismissed.
C. Section 1983 Claims
To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that he was deprived of a constitutional right and that
the person depriving him of the right acted under color of law.
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
In the complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ritter and Hogan, in their
individual
capacities,
violated
his
constitutional
right
to
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
“In
general,
the
Equal
Protection
Clause
requires
that
state actors treat similarly situated people alike.” Bogren v.
Minnesota, 236 F.3d 399, 408 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
“State actors may, however, treat dissimilarly situated people
dissimilarly without running afoul of the protections afforded
by
the
clause.”
Id.
“Because
vicarious
liability
is
inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that
Page 7 of 12
each Government-official defendant, through the official's own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 676.
1. Defendant Ritter
Defendant Ritter contends that he is entitled to qualified
immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
“An official sued under
§ 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless it is shown that
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014) (quotation
omitted).
“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a court must
dismiss
a
complaint
against
a
government
official
in
his
individual capacity that fails to state a claim for violation of
‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.’” Hager v. Ark. Dep't of
Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,
457
U.S.
800,
818
(1982)).
“A
court
considers
whether the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for violation
of a constitutional or statutory right and whether the right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged infraction.”
The
Court’s
preliminary
inquiry
is
whether
the
Id.
facts
alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, show
that
Ritter
violated
Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth
Page 8 of 12
Amendment
equal
protection rights.
Court
concludes
After careful review of the complaint, the
that
the
allegations
fail
to
establish
that
Defendant Ritter violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ritter violated his equal
protection rights when he physically pushed Plaintiff and called
him a “boy,” which created a hostile environment for Plaintiff.
The Court concludes that these allegations, taken as true, are
indicative of a single isolated incident, but are not enough to
support a claim of racial discrimination.
Although Plaintiff
alleges that Ritter’s conduct was racially motivated and that
the term “boy” was used as a racially derogatory term, there are
no factual allegations to support these conclusory assertions.
Further, the Eighth Circuit has long held in other contexts that
“the use of racially derogatory language, unless it is pervasive
or severe enough to amount to racial harassment, will not by
itself violate the fourteenth amendment.”
Blades v. Schuetzle,
302 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2002) (prison context).
Plaintiff
has not alleged how he was treated differently because of his
race.
(8th
See Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 152 F.3d 859, 862
Cir.
1998)
(“To
state
an
[plaintiff]
must
have
established
equal
that
protection
he
was
claim,
treated
differently from others similarly situated to him.”).
Because Plaintiff failed to plead any facts to support the
assertion that Ritter’s alleged actions were racially motivated,
Page 9 of 12
Plaintiff has failed to state an equal protection claim against
Ritter under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, Defendant
Ritter is entitled to qualified immunity and Plaintiff’s § 1983
claim against Defendant must be dismissed.
2. Defendant Hogan
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hogan, President of NPCC,
violated his equal protection rights by failing to investigate
or
take
prompt
remedial
involving Ritter.
action
after
the
October
2
incident
The only allegations specific to Defendant
Hogan are that he is the current President of NPCC, and that he
assumed the position when the previous president retired on June
30,
2014.
engaged
There
in
any
are
no
allegations
discriminatory
that
conduct.
Hogan
personally
Rather,
Plaintiff
alleges generally that all Defendants discriminated against him
because
action
they
after
failed
he
to
investigate
complained
about
officials and local law enforcement.
alleged
any
facts
to
support
an
or
take
Ritter’s
prompt
actions
remedial
to
school
However, Plaintiff has not
inference
that
personal knowledge of any matters involving Plaintiff.
Hogan
had
See Pool
v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr. & Human Res., 883 F.3d 640, 645 (8th Cir.
1989) (noting that supervisor liability under § 1983 requires a
plaintiff
to
show
the
superior
had
actual
knowledge,
and
affirming dismissal where the court could not determine that the
defendant was personally aware of alleged misconduct).
Page 10 of 12
The mere fact that Hogan assumed the presidency of NPCC in
June
of
2014
Plaintiff’s
liability.
is
not
equal
enough
to
protection
allege
rights
that
under
Hogan
any
violated
theory
of
As such, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Hogan will
be dismissed.
D. Arkansas Civil Rights Act Claims
Plaintiff also filed claims under the ACRA, which provides
a
cause
of
action
for
Arkansas Constitution.
deprivation
of
rights
secured
by
Ark. Code Ann. § 16–123–105(a).
the
In this
case, the claims against the Defendants under the ACRA mirror
Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983. Given that the facts and the
legal
standards
for
where
dismissal
is
both
statutes
appropriate
appropriate under the ACRA.
are
under
essentially
§
1983,
the
it
is
same,
also
Because Plaintiff’s pleaded facts
do not state a claim for which relief can be granted under Ark.
Code § 16-123-105(a), Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
ACRA claims will be granted.
IV.
Request to Amend Complaint
Plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint in his
response
to
Defendants’
motion.
It
appears
that
one
reason
Plaintiff seeks leave to amend is to name Defendants Ritter and
Hogan in their individual capacities. (See Doc. 9, p. 1, ¶ 5).
Because the complaint already names these Defendants in both
their official and individual capacities, leave to amend the
Page 11 of 12
complaint
in
this
manner
is
unnecessary.
Plaintiff
also
requests leave to amend the complaint to “flesh out his First
Amendment claims, based on the Defendants’ attempts to chill his
speech
relative
to
reporting
the
school’s
and
its
employees
[sic] actions to the police and the school’s and its employees’
attempts to quash any investigation into the validity of the
complaints made by the Plaintiff.”
While
Plaintiff
has
Id. at p. 2, ¶ 8.
clarified
that
his
alleged
First
Amendment claims stem from a purported violation of his right to
free speech, he has not set forth anything more than vague,
conclusory
allegations
that
he
has
been
harmed.
Further,
Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend fails to comply with the
Local Rules of Court for amending a pleading.
5.5(e).
See Local Rule
Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the complaint is
denied.
V.
Conclusion
For
dismiss
the
(Doc.
reasons
6)
is
set
forth
GRANTED
above,
and
Defendants’
Plaintiff’s
motion
to
complaint
is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of May, 2015.
/s/ Robert T. Dawson
Honorable Robert T. Dawson
United States District Judge
Page 12 of 12
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