Williams v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Barry A. Bryant on December 8, 2015. (rw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
DAVID WILLIAMS
vs.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 6:15-cv-06010

CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
David Williams (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his application for
Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and
XVI of the Act. The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any
and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment,
and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 7.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court
issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1.

Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his disability applications on August 25, 2010. (Tr. 11). Plaintiff

alleges being disabled due to bipolar disorder, mood disorder, and seizures. (Tr. 261). Plaintiff
alleges an onset date of July 1, 2009. (Tr. 11, 231, 237). These applications were denied initially
and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 11). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing
on his applications, and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 89-91).

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The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ____” The transcript pages
for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

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This hearing was held on June 3, 2013 in Little Rock, Arkansas. (Tr. 41-67). Plaintiff was
present at this hearing and was represented by Michael Angel. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert
(“VE”) Elizabeth Clem testified at this hearing. Id. During this administrative hearing, Plaintiff
testified he was forty-three (43) years old. (Tr. 46). Such an individual is defined as a “younger
person” under 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c) (2008). Plaintiff also testified he had a GED. (Tr. 46).
On September 24, 2013, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s
application for SSI and DIB. (Tr. 11-28). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the
insured status of the Act through September 30, 2010. (Tr. 13, Finding 1). The ALJ also found
Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since July 1, 2009, his alleged
onset date. (Tr. 14, Finding 2).
The ALJ then determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: low back pain,
joint pain, seizure disorder, bipolar disorder, and polysubstance abuse disorder. (Tr. 14, Finding 3).
The ALJ also determined, however, that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the
requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No.
4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 14, Finding 4).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff, without the substance abuse, had the RFC to carry, push, or
pull up to 25 pounds frequently and 50 pounds occasionally; and sit, stand, or walk up to six hours
in an eight-hour workday with a sit/stand option of standing at 90-minute intervals and sitting for
10-20 minute intervals. (Tr. 24, Finding 14). Due to Plaintiff’s seizure disorder, the ALJ included
environmental RFC restrictions of no exposure to hazards such as moving mechanical parts of
equipment, tools, or machinery; electrical shock; working in high exposed places; exposure to
radiation; working with explosives; and exposure to toxic, caustic chemicals. Id. From a mental
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perspective, the ALJ determined Plaintiff should not deal with the general public, but could
understand, remember, and carry out simple job instructions; make judgments in simple work-related
situations; respond appropriately to minor changes in the usual work routine; and respond
appropriately to coworkers or supervisors with occasional incidental contact that is not necessary to
perform the work. Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”) and determined without the
substance abuse, Plaintiff was unable of performing his PRW. (Tr. 27, Finding 15). The ALJ then
considered whether Plaintiff, without the substance abuse, would be able to perform other work
existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 27, Finding 17). The VE testified at
the administrative hearing regarding this issue. Id. Considering a hypothetical individual with
Plaintiff’s RFC, age, work experience, and other limitations, the VE testified that person could
perform the requirements of representative occupations such as a factory work inspector with
approximately 1,500 such jobs in Arkansas and 400,000 such jobs in the nation and sorter with
approximately 1,200 such jobs in Arkansas and 140,000 such jobs in the nation. (Tr. 27-28). The
ALJ then found Plaintiff’s polysubstance abuse disorder was a contributing material factor, and
Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act during the relevant period from July 1, 2009, to September
24, 2013. (Tr. 28, Finding 18).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of the ALJ’s unfavorable
decision. (Tr. 5-7). The Appeals Council denied this request for review on November 6, 2012. (Tr.
1-4). On February 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The Parties consented to
the jurisdiction of this Court on March 16, 2015. ECF No. 8. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs.
ECF Nos. 12, 13. This case is now ready for decision.
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2.

Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than
a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have
supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See
Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,
1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of
proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one
year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,
160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines
a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that
his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
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To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)
whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment
listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work
experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his
or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers
the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this
analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3.

Discussion:
In his appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by

substantial evidence in the record and should be reversed and remanded. ECF No. 12 at 9-13.
Specifically, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in failing to fully evaluate the Global Assessment of
Functioning (“GAF”) scores of Plaintiff. Id. The Court has considered Plaintiff’s arguments and
agrees the ALJ erred by failing to fully evaluate Plaintiff’s GAF scores and, this Court finds
Plaintiff’s case must be reversed and remanded.
In social security cases, it is important for an ALJ to evaluate a claimant’s GAF score or
scores in determining whether that claimant is disabled due to a mental impairment. GAF scores
range from 0 to 100. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
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(DSM-IV-TR) 34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000). The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held GAF scores must
be carefully evaluated when determining a claimant’s RFC. See, e.g., Conklin v. Astrue, 360 F.
App’x. 704, 707 (8th Cir. 2010) (reversing and remanding an ALJ’s disability determination in part
because the ALJ failed to consider the claimant’s GAF scores of 35 and 40); Pates-Fires v. Astrue,
564 F.3d 935, 944-45 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole, in part due to the ALJ’s failure to discuss or consider
numerous GAF scores below 50).
Indeed, a GAF score at or below 40 should be carefully considered because such a low score
reflects “a major impairment in several areas such as work, family relations, judgment, or mood.”
Conklin, 360 F. App’x at 707 n.2 (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000)). A GAF score of 40 to 50 also
indicates a claimant suffers from severe symptoms. Specifically, a person with that GAF score
suffers from “[s]erious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent
shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no
friends, unable to keep a job).” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000).
In the present action, Plaintiff was treated at Levi Hospital in 2011 and 2012 for mood
disorder, borderline personality traits and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 553-556, 563-566). During that
time, Plaintiff was assessed as having the following GAF scores:
•

July 28, 2011

GAF of 25

(Tr. 553)

•

July 1, 2011

GAF of 50

(Tr. 555)

•

March 12, 2012

GAF of 13

(Tr. 563)

•

March 16, 2012

GAF of 46

(Tr. 565)
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Further, there were several GAF scores from 2008 that ranged from a low of 25 to a high of 49. (Tr.
433, 437, 446, 448, 452, 457, 466-467, 476, 478). Although these scores pre-date the alleged onset
date, they still have some relevance in determining Plaintiff’s RFC.
Even though Plaintiff was assessed as having these low scores, the ALJ briefly referenced
some, but did not fully consider these scores in his opinion. (Tr. 17-21). This was reversible error.
See, e.g., Conklin, 360 F. App’x. at 707. Accordingly, because the ALJ was required to evaluate
these scores and provide reasons for discounting them but did not do so, Plaintiff’s case must be
reversed and remanded for further development of the record on this issue. See Pates-Fires, 564
F.3d at 944-45.
4.

Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits

to Plaintiff, must be reversed and remanded. A judgment incorporating these findings will be
entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.
ENTERED this 8th day of December 2015.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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